Tuesday, September 23, 2025

Dark clouds gathering on the horizon

 The events of the past two months clearly point towards deteriorating global growth prospects; rising economic uncertainties; and widening geopolitical and trade conflicts. Market participants ought to take note of these dark clouds gathering on the horizon.

Deteriorating global growth prospects

The US economy flirting with stagflation

The US Federal Reserve cut its target interest rate by 25bps to 4%-4.25% last week, after a pause of nine months. The fed officials now estimate two more cuts in the next three months. The Fed decided to continue reducing its securities holdings (Treasury, agency debt, agency mortgage-backed securities) as part of its balance sheet runoff.

·         Economic growth has moderated in the first half of the year. Consumer spending is weaker; and housing remains weak.

·         Core inflation is still above the Fed target. The Fed Chairman, Jerome Powell, described the rate cut decision as a risk management measure. He admitted that there is tension between the goals of maximum employment and stable prices; because inflation remains too high while employment risks are rising.

·         In the Fed's opinion, downside risks to employment have increased. There is more concern about labor market weakness than before. Unemployment has edged up (around 4.3% in August). Job gains have slowed significantly. Reportedly, workers out of work for 27 weeks or longer – rose to 1.9mn in August 2025, up 385,000 from a year earlier. These workers now make up 25.7% of all unemployed people, the highest share since February 2022. Persistent long-term joblessness often signals deeper cracks forming in the labor market. Initial claims for unemployment insurance jumped by 27,000 to 263,000 for the week ending Sept. 6.

Most experts believe that under the current circumstances, the Fed may not venture into aggressive easing. QE may not be a viable option given the inflation concerns and aggressive rate cuts may also not help.

Chinese economy facing slow down amidst structural challenges

China has been a major growth engine for the global economy in the past couple of decades. The engine has been showing distinct signs of fatigues in the post Covid period. The Chinese economy grew 5.3% in the first half of 2025, with 5.4% in Q1 and 5.2% in Q2. Industrial output and fixedasset investment are weakening. Retail sales / consumer spendings are soft. Property sector continues to drag the economy. Deflationary pressures are mounting.

Growth is widely forecasted to continue slowing, especially in H2 2025, unless strong policy stimulus revives private spending. Some forecasts expect Q3 and Q4 growth to dip below 5%, possibly closer to 4%. Inflation (especially producer and export prices) being weak is threatening to turn into a wider deflation risk. Real estate sector remains a key risk area — both for financial stability and for overall growth.

Structural challenges

·         China’s historical growth model that is heavily reliant on investment, exports, and property, is hitting diminishing returns. Slower labor force growth, aging population, and less efficiency gains also poses a serious structural challenge to the Chinese economy.

·         Tightening financial regulations on developers, falling property prices, and declining real estate investment is feeding into weaker household wealth and local government revenues.

·         After COVID-19 disruptions and regulatory uncertainty, households demand remains weak and not showing much sign of an imminent recovery.

·         Trade tensions (tariffs etc.), shifting global demand, and competition. Export growth has helped in some months, but exports to certain markets have dropped sharply.

European economy showing no signs of improvement

The economic growth in Europe continues to be weak. The European Commission’s Spring 2025 forecast projects ~1.1% growth for the EU overall, and about 0.9% growth in the euro area for 2025 — roughly flat compared to 2024. The deflationary pressures are intensifying. Inflation is expected to drop from ~2.4% to ~2.1% in the euro area in 2025, and further in 2026. Business sentiment in the European economy is weakening, especially among firms exposed to export competition, global trade tensions, and supply chain disruption.

The factors impacting European growth are both cyclical and structural. Therefore, some rebound is expected in 2026, especially if investment picks up and disinflation completes, possibly helping consumer real incomes. However, there is less visibility about improvement in structural factors, in the near term.

Cyclical factors

·         After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, energy supply disruptions (especially natural gas) plus high energy prices raised costs for both producers and consumers. Though prices have retraced somewhat, energy components of costs are still significantly higher than pre-pandemic in many places.

·         To fight inflation, central banks have raised rates. That increases borrowing costs, weighs on investment (especially in manufacturing, construction), and slows demand.

·         Tariffs and trade policy uncertainty (both with the U.S. and more broadly) are hurting export demand.

·         Consumer confidence remains fragile: households are still dealing with high inflation (food, energy), rising living costs, and economic uncertainty. That reduces spending.

·         Investment cycle is not picking up due to higher cost of capital, uncertain regulatory / policy environments, and energy & supply risks.

Structural factors

·         Competition from Asia and China (especially low-cost manufacturers) is squeezing European exporters.

·         Shifts in supply chains and demand patterns post-COVID are disrupting traditional trade flows.

·         Productivity growth has been sluggish in many European countries, as demographics are worsening and investment in tech innovation has been lagging.

·         Regulatory burdens, fragmented capital markets, and slower innovation are holding back private investment and scaling up.

·         High energy costs and environmental transition costs also pose competitive disadvantages relative to regions with cheaper energy or more efficient infrastructures.

·         Civil unrest in many major European economies is becoming more deep rooted with rising resentment against immigration policies and rising youth employment.

Japanese economy also facing specter of stagflation

Japan’s economy recently contracted (-0.2% in a recent quarter), largely driven by falling exports. Demand from major trade partners is weakening. U.S. tariffs on Japanese goods (especially autos and parts) are hurting its export-heavy industries. Inflation has remained above the Bank of Japan’s target (2%) for some time. Food, energy, and import costs (exacerbated by a weak yen) are contributing to higher consumer prices. Moreover, while inflation is persistent, wage growth has been slower, so real income gains are modest.

Growth is expected to remain modest. Most forecasts point to ~1.0-1.2% real GDP growth in FY2025, assuming global demand holds and domestic consumption strengthens. Fiscal pressures continue to mount as interest costs are rising; resulting in less fiscal space for stimulus or cushioning shocks. External risks (trade, global slowdown, currency fluctuations) also remain elevated. For example, stronger yen is hurting exports; and U.S./China trade policies are adversely impacting demand for Japanese goods.

Two major constraints for the Japanese economy are:

Demographics & labor constraints: Japan’s population has been aging fast, and the working-age population is shrinking. This means fewer workers, more spending on healthcare/pensions, and fewer taxpayers. Labor shortages in certain sectors are putting upward pressure on wages, but this comes with trade-offs (cost pressures for businesses, especially smaller firms).

Monetary Normalization: The Bank of Japan has begun to shift away from ultra-loose monetary policy (e.g. raising short-term rates to ~0.5%, reducing purchases of government bonds / ETFs). This helps combat inflation, but carries risks: higher borrowing costs for companies and government, and stress for debtors.

These two are mostly structural and may keep the growth rate of the Japanese economy under check.

…to continue tomorrow.


Thursday, September 18, 2025

DXY vs USDINR

Since the beginning of the year 2025, the exchange rate of India Rupee (INR) has fallen against the currencies of most of our major partners. Though, USDINR (INR vs USD) is the most keenly watched exchange rate (since a majority of our forex reserves, external debt and external trades are USD denominated), INR has depreciated most against EURO (EUR). The extent of depreciation against Japanese Yen (JPY), Chinese Yuan and British Pound (GBP) is mostly similar.

Wednesday, September 17, 2025

Investors’ dilemma - 2

Continuing from yesterday… (see here)

Investors world over are currently faced by a common challenge, viz., divergence of asset prices from the underlying fundamentals. This is particularly true for the investors in equities, precious metals, and treasuries. Nonetheless, they are staying invested, or even increasing their exposure and/or leverage driven by greed or lack of alternatives.

If you take a note of the macroeconomic fundamentals of the top 10 global economies, you would notice that the growth trajectory of most economies is still lower than 2019 (pre-Covid) levels. Though, the growth rate of some emerging markets, like India and Brazil has recovered to the pre-Covid level, on several other parameters like unemployment, fiscal balance etc. these economies are also still struggling to regain even the pre-Covid momentum.

GDP Growth: Most of the top 10 global economies have recovered from the 2020 contraction, but rates remain below 2019 levels in advanced economies due to higher interest rates and geopolitical tensions. Emerging markets like India and Brazil show stronger rebounds.

Inflation: Global inflation has cooled from post-pandemic peaks but remains above 2019 lows in most cases, influenced by energy prices and supply chain issues.

Unemployment: Rates are generally higher than 2019 peaks in many countries, despite labor market resilience. Unemployment issue is becoming structural in several developed European economies, leading to widespread civil unrest.

Fiscal Deficit: Deficits widened dramatically post-2019 due to pandemic related stimulus spending. The current levels are only slightly improved but remain elevated in all economies except China.

Public Debt-to-GDP: Ratios surged across the board due to stimulus; while some stabilization is underway, levels are 20-50% higher than 2019 in most cases, raising sustainability concerns.

If you compare the macro fundamentals to pre-Covid (2019) levels, you would notice that-

·         GDP growth rate in Japan, India, Italy, and Brazil exceeds 2019, driven by post-pandemic recovery and some structural reforms. Unemployment has fallen in France, Italy, and Brazil but still remains elevated. Fiscal positions in China show modest improvement from consolidation efforts.

·         Advanced economies (e.g., US, Germany, UK) face slower growth and higher inflation than 2019, amid tighter monetary policy. Deficits have widened across nearly all (average +2.5% of GDP), fueled by pandemic legacies and energy shocks. Debt ratios have risen sharply (average +16%), with China and Canada seeing the largest jumps, raising risks of higher interest costs and reduced fiscal space.

·         The world economy has grown cumulatively ~25% since 2019, but unevenly—emerging markets like India lead recovery, while advanced ones grapple with aging populations and high debt. Projections suggest stabilization by 2026 if inflation eases further, but geopolitical risks (e.g., trade tensions) could exacerbate deficits.

 

The challenge for investors’, therefore, is whether and how to align their portfolios and asset allocation with the underlying fundamentals, in order to (i) hedge against a sudden convergence of asset prices and macroeconomic & corporate fundamentals (crash); (ii) preserve their wealth and (iii) manage to earn a positive rate of return.

Given the euphoric market conditions and FOMO pandemic, it is not an easy challenge to meet. Nonetheless, I am working on my strategy to meet this challenge. Would be happy to receive suggestions from my readers.


Tuesday, September 16, 2025

Investors’ dilemma

The behavior of Global markets has always been perplexing for the participants. The past 8-9 months have been no different in that sense. Stock prices, commodities, cryptos, bonds, and precious metals have all moved higher; in many cases without a fundamental case for such an upmove.

Thursday, September 11, 2025

End of demographic dividend approaching fast

The latest Sample Registration System (SRS) report confirms what has been feared for the past few years – Indian population is peaking and Indians are getting older much ahead of the original estimates.

Wednesday, September 10, 2025

…and the big one

Continuing from yesterday (Two short stories, and a big one)

Tuesday, September 9, 2025

Two short stories, and a big one

Thursday, September 4, 2025

Policy Uncertainty – India’s Biggest Business Risk

One of the biggest hurdles to doing business in India today is not infrastructure, taxation, or talent—it is policy unpredictability.

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

US Tariffs - Imagining the worst case

The US administration has imposed a 25% penal tariff on the goods imported from India, with few exceptions. The reason cited for this penal action is continued import of crude oil from Russia by the Indian refiners, despite the US administration insistence that sales proceeds from such oil sales are being used to finance the Russian war on Ukraine. These tariffs are over and above the MFN tariffs prevalent prior to 7th August 2025, and 25% reciprocal imposed with effect from 07th August.

Considering the exemption for several items that are critical for the US supply chains, e.g., mobile phones, certain metal items, pharma, semiconductors, energy etc., the effective tariff rates on Indian exports to the US are estimated to be ~33%.

India has termed this penal action “unfair, unjustified, unreasonable”. The public stance of the Indian government is that buying Russian oil is critical for our energy security, and it is our prerogative to decide from where to buy. 

Considering the current seemingly inflexible stance of both the parties on this issue, it would not be unreasonable to assume that these penal tariffs may stay, at least for a few more months, till a breakthrough in trade talks is achieved. Reportedly, the Indo-US bilateral trade talks are continuing and the negotiators are hopeful that a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) may be achieved in the next few months.

However, assuming the worst case (penal tariffs stay for a longer term than presently estimated), the repercussions could be serious for the Indian economy, in general, and exporters in particular. Some of the consequences of sustained penal tariffs could be listed as follows. Please note that these are based on worst case assumptions and not a base case.

Capital and jobs drain: If the penal tariffs sustain, a large number of SMEs, catering mostly to the US demand, especially in sectors like textile, jewelry, carpet, could think of relocating their manufacturing base (fully or partially) to a more tariff friendly jurisdiction like UAE, Oman, Egypt etc. This would result in material capital outflow and loss of jobs for local workers.

Job losses and labor migration: The loss of business due to lower exports to the US is likely to affect the labor-intensive SME sector the most. Various estimates are suggesting a loss of over one million manufacturing jobs directly. There could be material secondary job losses also as exporters scale down their businesses and workers migrate to their native places. This could adversely impact the already struggling private consumption growth and household savings.

Capital controls: India has traditionally run a trade surplus with the US. Loss of exports to the US market, may erode this surplus, adversely impacting the overall trade balance of India. To manage this widening of trade deficit, the government might consider, like it did in the 2013 BoP crisis, imposing some capital controls like reducing limits under LRS remittance, capital investments (outbound FDI) through automatic route, etc. It may also consider liberalizing rules for FDI in sectors like retail trade, increasing competition for the local businesses.

Uncertainty over pharma and services: As of now, pharmaceuticals and services are not covered by the reciprocal and penal tariffs. These two together form ~45% of total Indian exports to the US. If the two sides are unable to find a solution to the current impasse, the US may consider imposing some tariff or non-tariff barriers on pharma and services also. Though not on the board this morning, in the back of minds it must be bothering many entrepreneurs and investors. Even the global corporations making large investments in setting up GCCs in India, would be mindful of this risk and slowdown their future investment plans.

India+1: Presently, it may not be viable for a lot of American importers to immediately replace Indian imports with other countries. However, to mitigate a long-term risk, American importers might explore developing vendors in other countries, even if it costs a fraction higher. This clouds the long-term prospects of export growth for the Indian vendors, even if the present tariff impasse gets resolved in the next few months.

Wider sanctions: To increase pressure on India, the US administration may enhance the scope of penal tariffs to non-tariff restrictions (effectively sanctions like 1998) to include sale of critical defense components, and technology transfer agreements etc. This may adversely impact, for example, the plans to develop local fighter jets and develop a local semiconductor ecosystem.

Remittances: Sanctions and/or fear of sanctions can materially affect remittances from the US to India. On the positive side, many NRIs can accelerate their remittances to preempt remittance tax, restrictions on remittances to India or freezing of assets on some convoluted pretext (This has already happened with Russians and Iranians). On the negative side, VISA restrictions, cancellation of Green cards and H1Bs etc., may impact remittances adversely to some extent.

Uncertainty for tech workers and students: For the past many years, India has sent the largest number of tech workers and students to the US. Escalation in trade conflict could impact this trend adversely. Moreover, dark clouds of uncertainty may engulf the workers and students already present in the US or planning to travel to the US in near term. There are already reports of several Indian students (present and prospective) suffering from extreme stress and depression.

Rise in Chinese threat: To mitigate the impact of the US tariffs and potential sanctions, the Indian government has already enhanced its engagement with the Chinese government and businesses. Reportedly, India has shown inclination to relax several restrictions on the Chinese businesses, capital and products. This is in spite of the past history of mistrust and deceit, and recent Chinese participation (against India) in Operation Sindoor. A liberal access to the Chinese capital and technology might seriously compromise the security of the country; and potentially create a gulf between the government and defense establishment.

I am definitely not suggesting that the government of India should accede to the unfair and unjust US demands and sign an unfavorable trade agreement. I have just listed some pointers for adjusting investment strategy, should things take a turn for the worst.