The rate of Consumer Price Inflation (CPI) in India dropped to 3.34% in the month of March; below the lower bound (4%) of the regulator’s (RBI) target band of 4% to 6%. It is definitely a significant development insofar as the monetary policy consideration, macroeconomic stability, and consumer confidence are concerned.
If this trend sustains, it would pave the path for further easing in the monetary policy; improve the fiscal outlook; improve the outlook for debt and currency markets; aid corporate profitability and encourage fresh investment flows. In this sense, it is certainly good news for the investors in Indian financial markets in the near-term.
However, in my view, a low inflation rate does not help a large section of the Indian population much. A low inflation rate only implies a slower rise in the price level as compared to the prices in the base period. It offers no relief to the people who are already finding the existing prices of the essential goods and services unaffordable. A slower rise, not matched by a similar rise in wage level, just makes the living conditions even more challenging.
Apples at Rs300/kg and Mangoes @Rs180/kg are unaffordable for many middle-class households, even though their annual inflation rate may be close to zero.
Over the past two decades, nominal wage growth has often lagged or barely matched CPI inflation, especially for informal and unskilled workers. This has led to stagnant or declining real wages, exacerbating affordability challenges.
This trend, juxtaposed with poor new job creation, implies a further squeeze on the struggling middle class of India. The growth rate of private consumption, which constitutes approximately 60% of India’s GDP, will decelerate. Household savings which have cushioned the fiscal balance since independence, will erode even faster. A significant section of middle-class households may slither into a debt trap. Investment rate will deteriorate. The economy will get stuck in a vicious cycle of poor savings rate-low investment rate-lower economic growth-lower household income growth-poor savings rate.
Wage dynamics in India
As per the latest Annual Report (2023-24) of the periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS):
· Labour Force Participation Rate (Ratio of workers employed and willing to work to the total population) in India is ~46%. The worker population ratio (WPR) is slightly lower at ~43%.
· Of the total Worker population (WP), 58% workers are self-employed (39% work on their own account and 19% family members helping these own account workers). Only 22% of WP is employed in a regular salaried job. ~20% of WP is casual workers.
· Regular wage workers (22% of WP) earn on average Rs700/day wage. Self employed workers earn on an average Rs463/day wage. Casual workers earn on an average Rs433/day wage.
· About 90% of WP is employed in the informal sector, with mostly undefined social security and poor job guarantee.
· Job creation has been a persistent challenge. The PLFS data shows unemployment rates hovering around 6–8% from 2017–2023, with youth unemployment (15–29 years) exceeding 15%. Formal job growth has been sluggish, with only ~10% of the workforce in organized sectors. The IT and services sectors, traditional middle-class job engines, face slowdowns due to automation and global competition.
· In the past decade or so, wages of the regular salaried employees have risen at 3.7% CAGR; while casual and self-employed have experienced 2-3% CAGR in their earnings. CPI index in the 2013-2025 period has risen at 5.5% CAGR. The affordability quotient of middle classes has obviously diminished.
It is pertinent to note that “Nominal wages grew faster (6–10%) in the 2000s due to MGNREGA and economic growth but slowed to 2–4% post-2015, lagging inflation.
Implications of diminishing affordability quotient
The combination of stagnant real wages and poor job creation has put a squeeze on middle-class disposable income, reducing their ability to consume and save. This is particularly acute for the lower middle class, who lack the financial cushion of wealthier households.
· Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) accounts for ~60% of India’s GDP. PFCE registered a growth rate of 6–7% in the 2000s and early 2010s. In the past five years PFCE growth rate has slowed to 4–5% due to economic shocks like demonetization, GST implementation, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent trends are indicating a recovery in consumption, with PFCE growth projected at 5–6% for FY25, driven by rural demand and government transfers. However, urban middle-class consumption continues to remain subdued.
Stagnant real incomes and high absolute prices (e.g., food, fuel, education) have adversely affected the discretionary consumption (e.g., durable goods, travel) of households. For example, automobile sales, a proxy for middle-class spending, grew only 2–3% annually post-COVID, reflecting affordability challenges.
· Household savings have been quintessential to India’s fiscal stability, financing investment, fiscal deficit and cushioning the current account deficit. Gross household savings averaged 20–25% of GDP in the 2000s but have since declined to 17–19%. Financial savings (e.g., bank deposits, mutual funds) have fallen from 10–12% of GDP in the early 2010s to ~7% in 2022–2023.
A sustained decline in household savings reduces the pool of domestic capital available for investment, increasing reliance on foreign inflows or government borrowing. This is straining India’s fiscal balance and public investment. Erosion of savings is also making middle-class households vulnerable to economic shocks.
· Household debt in India has risen steadily, from ~10% of GDP in the early 2000s to 40% by 2023. Retail loans (e.g., housing, personal, credit card debt) grew at 15–20% annually post-2015, far outpacing income growth. Middle-class households are increasingly relying on debt for housing, education, and consumption (e.g., EMIs for durables).
If real incomes stagnate and job creation lags, households may struggle to service debt, especially with rising interest rates. A debt trap would further erode savings, reduce consumption, and increase financial instability, as households divert income to debt repayment. This could also strain the banking sector, reducing credit availability for investment.
· Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), a measure of investment, averaged 30–32% of GDP in the 2000s and has fallen below 30% by 2024. In particular, corporate capex has remained slow, despite a variety of government incentives. Declining household savings has on one hand reduced the available domestic capital pool for investment; while on the other hand poor demand growth visibility is also discouraging new capacity building in many areas.
· Declining household savings has adversely affected bank deposits, constraining credit for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), a key investment driver. RBI data shows SME credit growth slowing to 10–12% from a high of 18-20%.
Conclusion
While low CPI is welcome, it does not address affordability issues. It is critical to not lose focus on managing the price situation and improve the affordability quotient of households. The urgency of implementing structural reforms cannot be emphasized more at this point in time.
Massive efforts and pragmatism are needed in the areas of agricultural productivity enhancements, education & skilling of workers, improving women workforce participation rate, making education, housing and healthcare costs affordable for households. A strong wage indexation mechanism could also help improve the affordability quotient.