The table above presents the equity returns of some of the world’s largest markets since January 2001 against their nominal GDP growth (in local currency) over the same period.
The idea is to examine whether over long periods, equity returns that track nominal GDP growth are an optimum outcome an investor can reasonably hope for. Listed companies ought to, broadly, grow with the economy that hosts them. Returns far above GDP growth would usually mean valuations have expanded or profit margins have stretched, and neither can go on forever. Returns far below GDP growth usually mean something has leaked between the economy and the shareholder: poor capital allocation, dilution, a shrinking share of profits, or economic growth that happens outside the listed universe.
By that yardstick, the picture is mixed.
The lagging majority
Thirteen of the twenty-three markets have delivered equity returns clearly below nominal GDP growth. In several cases the gap is wide. China and Hong Kong, the UK, France, the Netherlands and Italy have all delivered less than half of their respective GDP growth. China is the starkest example. Nominal GDP compounded at over 11% a year while the Shanghai Composite returned about 2.2%. The economy grew enormously, but very little of that growth reached the owners of listed equity.
The divergence could be a result of a multitude of factors. For example, growth can be captured by the state, by unlisted private firms, by foreign investors in other markets, or by the workers and consumers who benefit from it. It can also be consumed by years of poor returns on capital. Shareholders get only what is left.
The leaders, and when they led
Nine markets have beaten GDP growth: the US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Thailand and, narrowly, India. On the surface this looks like vindication for equities.
Look at when the outperformance arrived, though. In the US, Korea, Japan, Germany and Taiwan, most of the excess return has come in the post-Covid years, and much of it in the last one to five. These are the markets carried by AI, semiconductors, and a general re-rating of earnings.
Japan’s ratio of 7.47 is partly an artefact. Nominal GDP growth of 0.8% a year over 25 years is a very low base, so almost any equity return looks large against it. Much of Japan’s return also came after decades of going nowhere.
A long-run average can hide a lot. For most of the period, these markets did not outperform. They have recently caught up, and then some, and that recent move can be read two ways. It may be a durable re-rating driven by real changes in profitability. It may also be a stretch that will gradually revert.
Only two in sync
Across 25 years, only India and Brazil have logged equity returns in line with GDP growth. India’s Sensex compounded at about 12.0% against nominal GDP growth of 11.5%. Brazil’s Ibovespa compounded at about 9.8% against 10.0%.
I would call this the optimum outcome: equity holders broadly participating in the growth of the underlying economy, no more and no less. It is neither a bubble nor a disappointment.
The question for India
This brings me to the question that matters most to the investors.
Equity returns have lagged nominal GDP growth in most European and ASEAN markets over the past couple of decades. The question is whether India’s recent relative underperformance is a temporary phase, with returns catching up and perhaps overtaking GDP growth, or the start of a longer period in which our market looks more like Europe or Southeast Asia’s.
I don’t think valuations or earnings cycles alone can answer that. My view is that the answer lies in how India’s industrialization progresses. Specifically, it depends on whether we can meaningfully raise our share of global trade, especially in engineering goods and merchandise exports.
The reason is that the markets that kept pace with or beat their economies over long periods, such as Korea, Taiwan and, in recent years, the US, have had globally competitive listed companies that earn high returns on capital. A consumption-led economy can post impressive GDP growth. But if that growth flows into low-margin, domestically focused, or capital-hungry businesses, shareholders may see only part of it. Competing in global markets disciplines costs and capital, and it lets listed companies grow beyond the size of the home economy. If India’s manufacturing and export base deepens, equity returns can plausibly keep pace with GDP growth, or exceed it. If it doesn’t, the European and ASEAN experience is a real possibility.
Some caveats
· Price indices understate returns. Apart from the DAX, which is a total-return index and so not strictly comparable, these are price indices. Including dividends would add perhaps 2–3 percentage points a year in many markets, and would move several laggards much closer to parity.
· Endpoints matter. Starting in January 2001 means starting near the peak of the dot-com era in some markets and before several others had rallied. A different start date would change several rankings.
· Index and economy don’t match. A listed index doesn’t mirror its home economy. The FTSE 100 and the CAC 40 earn much of their profits abroad, so measuring them against UK or French GDP is imperfect.
· The data is approximate. The GDP numbers are broad estimates, so I’d read the table for the shape of the story and not for the second decimal.
None of this, however, changes the central point. Over a very long horizon, equity returns that track nominal GDP growth are a healthy result. Returns well below it suggest value leakage, and returns well above it should make us ask what has changed and whether it will last.
By that standard, India is currently in a good place, but not a guaranteed one. Whether it stays there depends less on the next few quarters of earnings and more on whether we build an industrial base that can compete globally.
