A multi-Axis world is the most optimistic
outcome of this war, in my view. Unfortunately, it may not be the most likely
outcome. Optimism in geopolitics requires more than goodwill — it requires
institutional capacity, distributed leadership, and the willingness of major
powers to accept constraints on their own behavior in exchange for systemic
stability. History suggests these conditions are rare.
Nonetheless, the Multi-Axis World
scenario is not wishful thinking. It has strong intellectual foundations and
some precedents in the existing architecture of global governance. More
pertinently, it represents the trajectory that the world’s middle powers —
including India — have the strongest interest in pursuing, and the most agency
to shape.
The core argument of this scenario is
that the US-Iran conflict, rather than destroying the globalized order, forces
it to evolve. The shock is severe enough to delegitimize the old architecture —
US-led unipolarity, dollar hegemony, a rules-based order in which the rules
were largely written by the powerful — but not severe enough to collapse it
entirely. What emerges is not a simpler world but a more complex one: a world
of multiple overlapping coalitions, negotiated interdependencies, and reformed
institutions that more accurately reflect the distribution of actual power.
The Multi-Axis World draws heavily on the
international relations (IR) tradition of complex interdependence, developed by
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s and refined through subsequent
decades of scholarship. Their central insight — that in a world of deep
economic integration, military force becomes less effective as an instrument of
foreign policy, and the costs of disrupting interdependence become
prohibitively high — remains one of the more empirically durable propositions
in IR theory.
The argument is not that conflict
disappears. Keohane and Nye were not naifs. Their claim was more specific: that
certain types of conflict — interstate territorial war between economically
integrated states — become rarer and more costly. The European Union is the
most successful real-world experiment in this proposition. Despite deep
historical enmities, Western European states have not fought each other since
1945. The mechanism is precisely the complex web of economic interdependence
that makes the cost of war with a trading partner prohibitive.
More recent work by Erik Gartzke on the
capitalist peace, and by Bruce Russett and John Oneal on the Kantian peace,
adds further layers. Democratic governance, trade interdependence, and
membership in international institutions are individually associated with lower
conflict probability; together, they are strongly reinforcing. The Multi-Axis
World scenario is essentially a bet that these mechanisms survive the shock of
the West Asia war and reassert themselves in a reformed institutional
architecture.
The defining structural feature of the
Multi-Axis World is not the absence of blocs — it is the overlapping and
partially contradictory nature of those blocs. States belong to multiple
groupings simultaneously, with different memberships for different purposes.
Trade blocs are not the same as security blocs. Technology coalitions cut
across both. Mobility frameworks — governing the movement of people — have
their own logic entirely.
This is not a hypothetical. The current
world already exhibits this structure in embryonic form. India simultaneously
participates in QUAD (a security dialogue with the US, Japan, and Australia),
SCO (a security and economic grouping dominated by China and Russia), BRICS (an
economic forum that includes both China and the West’s adversaries), I2U2 (a
technology and infrastructure forum with Israel, the US, and UAE), and G20 (the
broadest legitimate forum for global economic governance). India is in all of these
simultaneously, and its memberships create both constraints and leverage.
In the Multi-Axis World scenario, this
pattern generalizes. Most major and middle powers build portfolios of
overlapping memberships. The result is that no single great power can afford to
rupture its relationships with others — because doing so would cascade through
too many shared institutional memberships. This is complexity as deterrence:
not military deterrence, but systemic deterrence. The cost of unilateral action
rises with the density of the interdependence web.
One of the more counterintuitive claims
in this scenario is that democracy not only survives the post-war shock but
actually strengthens over the medium term. This requires explanation, because
the short-term trend clearly runs the other way: the West Asia conflict has
boosted nationalist and authoritarian politics in multiple countries, as crises
typically do.
The longer-run logic, however, draws on
the democratic resilience literature. Research by Milan Svolik at Yale on the
survival of democracies under stress suggests that democracies facing external
threats tend to consolidate — both internally, as citizens rally around
institutions, and externally, as democratic states deepen security cooperation
with each other. The post-war period, in this scenario, becomes a catalyst for
democratic solidarity rather than democratic retreat.
The more plausible mechanism is economic.
The multi-axis world is one in which growth returns, trade recovers, and middle
classes expand — particularly in the large developing economies that
successfully navigate the transition. Historically, sustained economic
development is the single strongest predictor of democratic consolidation.
South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile all made democratic transitions at income levels
that India, Indonesia, and Nigeria are now approaching. If the multi-axis world
delivers development, democracy follows.
The demographic dimension of the
Multi-Axis World scenario is among its most interesting and most practically
important features. The scenario posits material demographic shifts driven by
regulated immigration from developing to developed countries.
This is not just a hopeful extrapolation
— it is a structural necessity. The developed world faces a demographic crisis
of its own making. Europe’s total fertility rate has fallen to 1.5, well below
the 2.1 replacement level. Japan’s population has been declining in absolute
terms since 2008. South Korea’s fertility rate, at 0.72 in 2023, is the lowest
ever recorded for any country. Without immigration, these economies face
unsustainable dependency ratios: fewer workers supporting more retirees, with
cascading effects on pension systems, healthcare, and GDP growth.
The developing world, meanwhile, has the
opposite problem: abundant young populations and insufficient domestic capital
and institutional capacity to employ them productively. The match is obvious in
theory. The challenge is political. Immigration has been one of the most
destabilizing political forces in Western democracies over the past decade, and
for understandable reasons — rapid, unmanaged demographic change produces
genuine social disruption.
The Multi-Axis World scenario’s bet is
that the post-war shock creates the political conditions for a new social
contract around managed migration. Not the chaotic, crisis-driven flows of the
2015 Syrian refugee wave, but structured bilateral agreements — skilled labor
corridors, circular migration schemes, and portable social security
arrangements — that meet the developed world’s labor needs while preserving the
sending country’s human capital base through remittance flows and diaspora
investment.
Perhaps the single most consequential
institutional change in the Multi-Axis World scenario is the emergence of a
neutral global reserve currency — one that is not the liability of any single
sovereign state and cannot be weaponized through sanctions or exclusion.
The dollar’s dominance has been both an
extraordinary privilege for the United States and an increasingly resented
asymmetry for the rest of the world. The use of dollar clearing as a sanctions
mechanism — most dramatically against Russia in 2022 — has convinced virtually
every non-Western central bank that holding reserves in dollars is a
geopolitical risk as much as a financial asset. The search for alternatives is
now serious and well-funded.
The academic literature on reserve
currency transitions — including Barry Eichengreen’s work on the dollar’s
exorbitant privilege — suggests that transitions are rare but not impossible.
Sterling’s loss of reserve status in the mid-twentieth century is the relevant
precedent. What replaced sterling was not another national currency — it was a
multilateral institution, the IMF’s SDR system.
In the Multi-Axis World scenario, a
reformed and genuinely representative IMF administers a reserve asset — whether
an enhanced SDR, a commodity basket, or a jointly-managed digital currency —
that provides a neutral settlement mechanism for cross-bloc trade. This is
technically achievable. The political obstacles are formidable but not
insurmountable, particularly if the US calculates that losing the reserve
currency privilege through geopolitical overreach is worse than negotiating an
orderly transition.
The United Nations Security Council
structure, designed in 1945 to reflect the power distribution of a world that
no longer exists, has been one of the most persistent sources of institutional
dysfunction in global governance. A council in which the US, China, Russia, the
UK, and France each hold a veto was barely functional during the Cold War and
has been increasingly paralyzed in the post-Cold War era.
The Multi-Axis World scenario requires
reformed global institutions that command genuine legitimacy — which in
practice means institutions that give adequate voice to the world’s emerging
powers. India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, and others have been making this
argument for two decades without result. The West Asia conflict, by
demonstrating the limits of the existing system so dramatically, may have
created the political window for reform that decades of incremental advocacy
could not.
What would reformed institutions look
like? The proposals are not new — they have been debated in academic and policy
circles for years. Expansion of the Security Council’s permanent membership to
include regional powers. Weighted voting in the IMF that reflects current
economic realities rather than 1945 GDP shares. A reformed World Trade
Organization dispute settlement mechanism. A genuine global climate governance
body with binding enforcement. The content of reform is less uncertain than the
political will to achieve it.
For India, the Multi-Axis World scenario
is the most congenial of the three. It is a world that rewards India’s existing
strategic architecture: a country too large and too democratic to be a client
state, too pragmatic to be confined to a single bloc, and too
development-hungry to accept the deglobalization scenario’s growth penalty.
India’s ambition to be a Vishwaguru — a
civilizational anchor — fits naturally into a multipolar world where no single
power dominates the normative agenda. India’s diplomatic tradition, from Nehru’s
non-alignment through the current strategic autonomy doctrine, is essentially a
bet on a world like this. India has been preparing for the Multi-Axis World for
seventy years. If it arrives, India is better positioned than almost any other
country to benefit.
The risks are internal rather than
external. A Multi-Axis World that rewards institutional quality, democratic
governance, and human capital development will expose India’s internal
contradictions more sharply than either of the other scenarios. Governance
quality, judicial independence, minority rights, and the rule of law are not
just domestic concerns in a multi-axis world — they are competitive assets that
determine how seriously other members of the system take you.
The Multi-Axis World is the hardest to
achieve of the three scenarios. It requires institutional innovation,
distributed leadership, and the willingness of major powers to accept genuine
constraints. These are demanding conditions. But the alternatives are more
costly, and the major powers know it. A deglobalized world imposes large
economic losses on everyone. A neocolonial world risks escalation to
great-power conflict. The Multi-Axis World, for all its complexity, is the
outcome that all major powers can rationally prefer — even if none of them is
willing to lead the way to it.
In 1945, after the worst war in human
history, the major powers built the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system,
and the Marshall Plan. These were imperfect institutions, designed partly to
serve the interests of the powerful. But they also reflected a genuine,
hard-won understanding that the alternative — a world of pure great-power
competition — had just killed fifty to eighty million people.
The West Asia conflict has not killed
tens of millions. But it has reminded the world of what unconstrained
great-power competition looks like. That reminder may be enough.
Concluding
part on 5th May 2026.
Scenario 1: Deglobalization
Scenario 2: The Return of
Colonialism