Showing posts with label FII. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FII. Show all posts

Thursday, February 20, 2025

Do not mistake effect for cause

If social media posts are any guide to the popular sentiments, then definitely the Indian equity markets have frustrated even most seasoned investors. In particular, the young investors and traders who had their first tryst with the equity investing/trading are sounding completely disillusioned.

The seasoned investors who have experience of negotiating bear markets multiple times, are mostly frustrated due to the lack of adequate policy support and regulatory overbearance. In my view, insofar as the policy support (or lack of it) is concerned, it is mostly due to misplaced expectations and persistence denial of actual execution. The issue of regulatory overbearance is however a matter of debate.

However, the new class of investors is disillusioned for multiple reasons. First, many of them had committed to investing/trading as their preferred full-time occupation. After this severe market correction, their capital has materially depleted and their confidence is badly shaken. The worst part is that many of them appear clueless as to why the prices of the stocks they own are falling sharply; or why the technical analysis that was working so perfectly for the past four years has suddenly stopped yielding any results.

For the benefit of these investors/traders, I would like to highlight a few points that might help in a slightly better assessment of the current market situation.

FPI selling

This is the single most popular reason cited for the correction in stock prices. For record, as per final SEBI data, since 27 September 2025 (when Nifty 50 recorded its all-time high level of 26277) the foreign portfolio investors (FPIs), have net sold appx Rs2.6 trillion worth of Indian equities on stock exchanges. Adjusted for inflows in the primary market, this net sale number is appx Rs two trillion.

In this period, domestic institutions have net bought over Rs 2.75 trillion worth of equities in the secondary market alone.

The key points that the market participants are missing are—

·         The stock prices at any given point in time are determined by the forces of demand and supply. The net institutional buying (demand) has been positive on almost all days (except 5 days) since 27th September.

·         Most of the damage has occurred in small and microcap stocks. FPI participation in this segment of the market is usually very low. On the other hand, the domestic mutual funds have the highest amount of asset undermanagement (AUM) in midcap and smallcap categories. Moreover, as per the latest available AMFI data, the retail participation is the highest in the midcap and smallcap categories. So technically, retail investors should be the strongest mover of prices of this category

So, blaming FPI selling for the fall in stock prices may not be justifiable.

Hike in capital gain tax

In the final budget for FY25, the finance minister hiked the long-term capital gains (LTCG) tax to 12.5% (from 10% previously) and short-term capital gains (STCG) tax to 20% (From 15% earlier). Almost every market participant on social media has cited this as one of the primary reasons for the underperformance of the Indian equities in the past 5 months.

In this context, it is important to note that—

·         In the budget for FY19 (presented on 1st February 2018), the then finance minister had hiked the LTCG from 0% to 10%. After a small correction, one month later in March 2018, the benchmark Nifty was at the pre-budget level and 2x in 30 months (October 2021) despite pandemic related issues. FPIs net sold Rs530 billion worth of Indian equities (secondary market) in 2018, but bought Rs 1720 billion in the subsequent two years.

Obviously a 10x hike in LTCG neither hurt the stock markets nor prevented FPIs from pumping in huge money in the Indian equities. This time the hike is just 25%.

In my view, the reason for the current decline in stock prices is a combination of several factors. Some of these could be listed as follows:

Economic slowdown – the GDP growth is declining for the past few quarters and now appears to be settling in the 6-6.5% range. This is insufficient for sustaining the current level of government spending, which has been a primary driver of growth in the past few years.

Earnings slowdown – The corporate earnings that have been growing at a rate of 18-19% CAGR for the past four years (FY21-FY24), are peaking. FY25 earnings growth is expected to be in low single digits, while next couple of years the earnings are expected to grow at a rate of 10-14% CAGR. These estimates are also subject to downgrade. With lower economic and corporate growth, the European and Chinese equities with much cheaper valuations and stronger growth visibility (assuming peace deal between Russia and Ukraine) become relatively more attractive.

Liquidity squeeze – Covid-19 related fiscal and monetary stimulus resulted in abundant liquidity in the Indian financial system. At peak the banking system liquidity surplus exceeded Rs 10 trillion in September 2021. In April 2022, the RBI accelerated withdrawal of the surplus liquidity, resulting in the widest liquidity deficit of over Rs 3 trillion in January 2024. This massive liquidity squeeze, coupled with fiscal tightening (Fiscal deficit cut from 9.5% in FY21 to 4.8% in FY25RE), and persistent positive real rates have definitely resulted in lower leverage available to traders and punters in the equity markets. Moreover, the regulatory measures to curb excessive speculation (including stricter margin norms and enhanced surveillance measures) also removed a lot of froth from the market.

Unwinding of leverage of market participants and promoters (active in the market) is the primary reason for the fall in stock prices, not the hike in LTCG or selling of FPI.

Fortunately, the regular household flows (SIP and other wise) to the Indian equities have helped the domestic institutions to absorb all the FPI selling, unlike in 2000 and 2008 market falls. Besides, stronger regulatory measures that resulted in lower issuance of Participatory Notes (PNs) (a kind of derivative instrument on underlying Indian equity stock with obscure beneficial ownership), made sure that the selling was orderly and volatility did not spike. But for these two factors, we could have witnessed much sharper fall and higher volatility in the market, just like 2000 and 2008 when even the benchmark indices fell 10-15% in a single day.

If you are looking for reversal of trend in the market trend, look for a reversal in trends of growth, earnings and liquidity not FPIs flows; for FPI flows are effect not the cause.

Tuesday, December 24, 2024

Greed consistently dominated fear in 2024, or did it?

The sentiments of greed (risk-taking) and fear (risk-aversion) are two key factors that determine the breadth and depth of the stock market performance over a short term.

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

A visit to market

With the conclusion of the US elections, most of the noteworthy events for the current year 2024 are over. Though some traders may be looking forward to 23rd November (Assembly election results), 6th December (RBI’s MPC policy statement) and 18th December (FOMC policy statement), these events are not expected to make any material change in the market sentiments.

Tuesday, July 4, 2023

1H2023 – So far so good!

 

Tuesday, December 20, 2022

2022 in retrospect

Equities – A year of consolidation

The Indian equities consolidated the gains made during 2021 and are ending the year 2022 with marginal gains; unlike other major global markets which gave up most of the gains made during the year 2021. Considering the global economic, geopolitical and financial conditions this is a remarkable performance.

  • The benchmark Nifty50 and Nifty Midcap 100 are ending the year with ~5% gain; though Nifty Small 100 has lost 2022YTD 11%. The market breadth has been marginally negative; and volumes below average.
  • Nifty has now given positive returns in 9 out of the previous 10 years; with 2022 being the seventh consecutive year of positive return.
  • Nifty averaged 17240 YTD2022, 8% higher than the average of previous year. This implies much better returns for the SIP investors.
  • For long term buy and hold investors, five year rolling CAGR in 2022 is ~11.6%, which is close to 2016-2022 average. Five year absolute Nifty return in 2022 is ~73%, also close to 2016-2022 average.
  • July 2022 was the best month of the year for markets. In July Nifty gained 8.7%; the aggregate return for the rest of 11 months is -3.7%.
  • Smallcap stocks underperformed the benchmark Nifty for YTD2022; however on a 3yr basis, midcap and smallcap are still outperforming the benchmark materially. The newly introduced category of Multicap funds is the best performer YTD2022; while on 3, 5 and 10 yr basis smallcap funds are outperforming.
  • Foreign investors have been net sellers in the Indian equities (secondary market) to the tune of Rs 1.46trn; while the domestic institutions were net buyers of Rs2.63trn; resulting in a net positive institutional flow of Rs1.17trn during YTD2022. Contrary to popular perception, the Nifty movement led the institutional flows and vice versa was not true.
  • Sector wise, PSU banks (+71%) were clear leaders, outperforming all other sectors by large margin. Consumers, Auto, Energy and Metals were other notable outperformers. IT Services, Pharma and Realty have been notable underperformers YTD2022.
  • Nifty Bank (+22%) has been a clear leader.
  • Presently, technically Nifty is placed in neutral territory, close to 50 EDMA with RSI close to comfortable 44 and short term momentum indicators in buy zone.

Debt and Currency – USDINR weakens, yield curve higher and flatter

  • USDINR (-6.1%) weakened YTD2022; while EURINR (+2.6%); JPYINR (+9.6%) were stronger.
  • The Indian yield curve shifted sharply higher; though Indian bonds performed much better than their developed economy peers. RBI hiked the policy repo rate by 225bps during the year. However, the most notable feature of the Indian debt market was withdrawal of excess liquidity and consequent sharp rise in overnight and short term rates.