Do it yourself

The common people were however mostly concerned with their cultural traditions. These traditions passed through generations, have been generally regarded as history. Popular literature and other art forms, e.g. films, theater, drama, paintings, etc. also had significant influence on the common peoples' perception about history.

For common people, the valor of Rajput Kings like Prithviraj Chauhan, Maharana Pratap etc., and sacrifice of queen Padmavati are established through ballads written by poets like Chand Bardai (Prithviraj Raso) and Malik Muhammad Jayasi (Padmavat). Disregarding what academic historians had to say about these legends, people idolized them and passed their stories to younger generations with pride and devotion.

The 1960 Hindi Movie Mughal-e-Azam is an indelible impression of Mughal history in common peoples' imagination in India. Anarkali, which historians vehemently claim to be a totally fictional character, lives in peoples' memory as a historical symbol of love and sacrifice.

Conventionally, the history as taught or studied in schools and universities had little meaning for common people. The knowledge of historians that was based on scientific studies, archaeological evidence, authenticated written accounts, etc., and beliefs of common people based on folklores and oral traditions have stayed within their respective boundaries, without any major conflict. The governments mostly remained neutral, equally supporting both the academic & scientific pursuit of history, and promotion of traditional beliefs.

However, in the past couple of decades, a gradual change in this paradigm is conspicuous. An intense struggle is taking place between the historians and the cultural traditions as practiced by the common people in the country.

There is a concerted political endeavor to overwrite academic history books with traditional and cultural beliefs. The argument is that these history books are deeply influenced and/or distorted by the imperialist British academia who had interest in destroying rich Indian legacy; and in the post-independence era by left leaning elite who find traditional cultural beliefs regressive and unfounded.

Besides, the cultural traditions have also shown a tendency of loosening roots with rising urbanization, labor migration and dissipation of cultural ambience (rivers, animals, trees, temple, priest, forest, time, faith, folklores, oral tradition, family, austerity, etc.). The younger people who are not rooted properly in their cultural traditions are commonly seen adhering to frivolities, ignoring the core ideas deliberately (for practical reasons) or ignorantly (for the lack of proper guidance and inheritance of culture).

This dissipation of traditional Indian cultures is allowing the politicians to influence people into believing that alteration of history books would restore their dissipating traditional cultures and thus reinforce their loosening roots.

I do not know if this is the right approach. Maybe it is. Or maybe it is not. Only time could tell this. I am also slightly skeptical about giving this political endeavor the garb of nationalism and patriotism.

But what I am sure about is that the process is introducing some serious discrepancies in Indian society. The generally affable and compassionate populace appears becoming conspicuously condescending. The friction in the society is rising as the grease of traditional beliefs (tolerance, hospitality, acceptance) dries up.

My travels across the country in the past three decades have told me that India is changing fast, but not necessarily in the direction many of us would desire. Not focusing on the direction of change could nullify the impact of the change itself.

I do not want to engage in any political debate. I also do not wish to sermonize anyone or judge any party or organization by their recent activities, iterations, and ideologies, or lack of it for that matter. As such, I would like to limit myself to my economic interests and in my view, the rising insolence and cynicism in the society is not good news for the economy.

Consequently—

·         Suspicious of future policy direction; unconvinced of government promises, and uncertain about the stability of current policy regime - people are reluctant in their investment and discretionary consumption decisions.

·         Confidence in the broader India growth story, juxtaposed with skepticism raised by unpredictability & instability of policy and general social distress, is creating a certain degree of cognitive dissonance impacting the decision making as well as disposition of businesses.

·         The economy faces a potential threat of getting pushed into a vicious cycle of lower growth-lower employment-lower income-lower consumption-lower investment-lower growth, if immediate steps are not taken to improve business and consumer confidence.

In my view, the government should leave the history vs mythology vs traditional beliefs & customs debate to the people and academics, and focus on strengthening the core of the economy. Let schools teach what academics believe to be correct history; and let parents introduce their children to the culture, traditions and legacy beliefs. This arrangement has worked for over 200 years. The generations that have grown up under this arrangement are no less intelligent or committed to their roots. There is nothing to suggest that the future generations will get uprooted if this arrangement is continued.

If this trend sustains, it would pave the path for further easing in the monetary policy; improve the fiscal outlook; improve the outlook for debt and currency markets; aid corporate profitability and encourage fresh investment flows. In this sense, it is certainly good news for the investors in Indian financial markets in the near-term.

However, in my view, a low inflation rate does not help a large section of the Indian population much. A low inflation rate only implies a slower rise in the price level as compared to the prices in the base period. It offers no relief to the people who are already finding the existing prices of the essential goods and services unaffordable. A slower rise, not matched by a similar rise in wage level, just makes the living conditions even more challenging.

Apples at Rs300/kg and Mangoes @Rs180/kg are unaffordable for many middle-class households, even though their annual inflation rate may be close to zero.

Over the past two decades, nominal wage growth has often lagged or barely matched CPI inflation, especially for informal and unskilled workers. This has led to stagnant or declining real wages, exacerbating affordability challenges.

This trend, juxtaposed with poor new job creation, implies a further squeeze on the struggling middle class of India. The growth rate of private consumption, which constitutes approximately 60% of India’s GDP, will decelerate. Household savings which have cushioned the fiscal balance since independence, will erode even faster. A significant section of middle-class households may slither into a debt trap. Investment rate will deteriorate. The economy will get stuck in a vicious cycle of poor savings rate-low investment rate-lower economic growth-lower household income growth-poor savings rate.

Wage dynamics in India

As per the latest Annual Report (2023-24) of the periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS):

·         Labour Force Participation Rate (Ratio of workers employed and willing to work to the total population) in India is ~46%. The worker population ratio (WPR) is slightly lower at ~43%.

·         Of the total Worker population (WP), 58% workers are self-employed (39% work on their own account and 19% family members helping these own account workers). Only 22% of WP is employed in a regular salaried job. ~20% of WP is casual workers.

·         Regular wage workers (22% of WP) earn on average Rs700/day wage. Self employed workers earn on an average Rs463/day wage. Casual workers earn on an average Rs433/day wage.

·         About 90% of WP is employed in the informal sector, with mostly undefined social security and poor job guarantee.

·         Job creation has been a persistent challenge. The PLFS data shows unemployment rates hovering around 6–8% from 2017–2023, with youth unemployment (15–29 years) exceeding 15%. Formal job growth has been sluggish, with only ~10% of the workforce in organized sectors. The IT and services sectors, traditional middle-class job engines, face slowdowns due to automation and global competition.

·         In the past decade or so, wages of the regular salaried employees have risen at 3.7% CAGR; while casual and self-employed have experienced 2-3% CAGR in their earnings. CPI index in the 2013-2025 period has risen at 5.5% CAGR. The affordability quotient of middle classes has obviously diminished.

It is pertinent to note that “Nominal wages grew faster (6–10%) in the 2000s due to MGNREGA and economic growth but slowed to 2–4% post-2015, lagging inflation.

Implications of diminishing affordability quotient

The combination of stagnant real wages and poor job creation has put a squeeze on middle-class disposable income, reducing their ability to consume and save. This is particularly acute for the lower middle class, who lack the financial cushion of wealthier households.

·         Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) accounts for ~60% of India’s GDP. PFCE registered a growth rate of 6–7% in the 2000s and early 2010s. In the past five years PFCE growth rate has slowed to 4–5% due to economic shocks like demonetization, GST implementation, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent trends are indicating a recovery in consumption, with PFCE growth projected at 5–6% for FY25, driven by rural demand and government transfers. However, urban middle-class consumption continues to remain subdued.

Stagnant real incomes and high absolute prices (e.g., food, fuel, education) have adversely affected the discretionary consumption (e.g., durable goods, travel) of households. For example, automobile sales, a proxy for middle-class spending, grew only 2–3% annually post-COVID, reflecting affordability challenges.

·         Household savings have been quintessential to India’s fiscal stability, financing investment, fiscal deficit and cushioning the current account deficit. Gross household savings averaged 20–25% of GDP in the 2000s but have since declined to 17–19%. Financial savings (e.g., bank deposits, mutual funds) have fallen from 10–12% of GDP in the early 2010s to ~7% in 2022–2023.

A sustained decline in household savings reduces the pool of domestic capital available for investment, increasing reliance on foreign inflows or government borrowing. This is straining India’s fiscal balance and public investment. Erosion of savings is also making middle-class households vulnerable to economic shocks.

·         Household debt in India has risen steadily, from ~10% of GDP in the early 2000s to 40% by 2023. Retail loans (e.g., housing, personal, credit card debt) grew at 15–20% annually post-2015, far outpacing income growth. Middle-class households are increasingly relying on debt for housing, education, and consumption (e.g., EMIs for durables).

If real incomes stagnate and job creation lags, households may struggle to service debt, especially with rising interest rates. A debt trap would further erode savings, reduce consumption, and increase financial instability, as households divert income to debt repayment. This could also strain the banking sector, reducing credit availability for investment.

·         Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), a measure of investment, averaged 30–32% of GDP in the 2000s and has fallen below 30% by 2024. In particular, corporate capex has remained slow, despite a variety of government incentives. Declining household savings has on one hand reduced the available domestic capital pool for investment; while on the other hand poor demand growth visibility is also discouraging new capacity building in many areas.

·         Declining household savings has adversely affected bank deposits, constraining credit for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), a key investment driver. RBI data shows SME credit growth slowing to 10–12% from a high of 18-20%.

Conclusion

While low CPI is welcome, it does not address affordability issues. It is critical to not lose focus on managing the price situation and improve the affordability quotient of households. The urgency of implementing structural reforms cannot be emphasized more at this point in time.

Massive efforts and pragmatism are needed in the areas of agricultural productivity enhancements, education & skilling of workers, improving women workforce participation rate, making education, housing and healthcare costs affordable for households. A strong wage indexation mechanism could also help improve the affordability quotient. 

Given my view that the yield curve is no longer a strong leading indicator, I prefer to use a mix of indicators to assess the likely direction of the markets. Mortgage rates, credit growth, credit terms, repo outstandings and the size of the central bank’s balance sheet are the most prominent ingredients in the mix I like to use.

For example, in the context of the US, Mortgage rates are a close pulse on borrowing costs, consumer behavior, and economic health, less abstracted than the yield curve. In the U.S., the 30-year fixed mortgage rate tracks loosely with the 10-year Treasury yield—historically about 1.5 to 2 percentage points higher—but it’s more than just a derivative. It folds in lender risk appetite, housing market dynamics, and Fed policy fallout in a way that hits Main Street directly.

Presently, mortgage rates are climbing—30-year fixed is around 6.8%, up from 6.4% in late March, shadowing that recent 10-year yield jump to 4.5%. That’s despite recession odds rising, which, one may assume, would pull rates down as safety bets pile into bonds. Instead, it’s signaling stubborn inflation expectations (CPI still above 3%) and maybe some lender jitters about defaults if the economy wobbles. Post-2008, mortgage rates have also been a better tell on how QE and rate hikes filter through—when the Fed bought $2.5 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, rates stayed low even as Treasuries twitched. The curve didn’t catch that nuance.

Mortgage trends usually sidestep central bank distortion. The Fed can pivot Treasury yields, but mortgage rates reflect a messier mix—banks’ funding costs, housing supply, wage growth. In 2022, the curve inverted, but mortgage rates soared from 3% to 7% clearly indicating “tightening ahead”.

Mortgage rates provide a frontline view of credit conditions and consumer stress—80% of U.S. household debt is tied to mortgages—without the Fed’s thumb on the scale.

Credit growth, credit terms and repo outstandings pair well with mortgage rates to assess the genuineness of demand supply equilibrium of the credit market. Together, they cut through the noise of central bank meddling and give a clearer view of whether demand and supply are truly balancing or just riding artificial waves.

Credit growth is the engine’s RPM. It tells you how much new borrowing—household, corporate, or government—is fueling the system. In the U.S., total credit to the private sector grew at a sluggish 2.5% annualized rate in Q1 2025, down from 4% in 2023, as per Fed data. That’s tepid, especially with mortgage rates at 6.8% crimping home loans—mortgage debt growth is barely 1% year-over-year. Meanwhile, consumer credit (credit cards, auto loans) is up 5%, hinting that people are leaning on short-term debt as housing gets pricier. If credit growth stalls while mortgage rates rise, it’s a sign demand’s weakening—banks aren’t lending, or borrowers aren’t biting.

Credit terms are the fine print—how tight or loose lenders are with the purse strings. Are banks demanding higher credit scores, bigger down payments, or jacking up spreads on corporate loans? Right now, the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey (Q4 2024) shows tightening standards on commercial loans—net 15% of banks raised hurdles—while mortgage terms eased slightly, with down payment requirements dipping to 10% on average from 12% in 2023. High-yield bond spreads are at 350 basis points over Treasuries, up from 300 in January, signaling risk aversion. If terms toughen as mortgage rates climb, it’s a red flag—supply’s there, but lenders don’t trust demand to hold up.

Repo outstandings are the plumbing’s pressure gauge. The repurchase market shows how much short-term cash banks and funds need, and how willing they are to leverage. As of April 2025, U.S. repo volumes are hovering at $2.8 trillion daily, per NY Fed data, up 10% from last year. In a “genuine” equilibrium, repo would hum along smoothly, not swell like this while credit growth lags.

Mortgage rates at 6.8% look less alarming if credit’s flowing, terms are loose, and repo’s calm—demand and supply are moving in tandem. But slow credit growth, tightening terms, and repo pressure say the market’s strained—supply’s there, but demand’s shaky, and liquidity is a crutch. Central banks can twist yields all they want; these metrics show what’s really moving.

Central bank’s (CB) balance sheet is another key watchable for me. If CB takes too much paper on its own balance sheet, it indicates an attempt to unfairly influence the bond market equilibrium.

CB’s balance sheet is a massive lever they can pull to sway markets, and when it swells too much, it’s a flashing sign they’re trying to muscle the bond market into line rather than letting it find its own footing. As of April 9, 2025, the Fed’s balance sheet sits at about $7 trillion, down from its $8.9 trillion peak in mid-2022 but still a hefty chunk—roughly 25% of U.S. GDP.

Fed loading up on paper—mostly Treasuries ($4.3 trillion) and mortgage-backed securities ($2.3 trillion) as of late 2024—is a deliberate play to augment liquidity or cap yields.

In a free market, bond yields would reflect investor sentiment—fear of inflation, growth bets, default risks. But when the Fed gobbles up $95 billion a month or steps in with “emergency QE” like some predict if Treasury markets seize up again, it definitely distorts the equilibrium.

I use the classical 2:1 debt equity parameter used to benchmark the corporate balance sheets, to assess the central bank’s balance sheet also. I think M2 (Money Supply or Central Bank’s liabilities) should not be more than 2x of the assets on its balance sheet.

For context, in the US M2 money supply is close to US$21 trillion, versus the Fed’s assets of US$7trillion. That is a 3:1 debt equity ratio for the Fed. This implies excess liquidity from years of bond-buying ($4.3 trillion Treasuries, $2.3 trillion MBS on the Fed’s books). Pre-GFC M2 to Fed balance sheet ratio reached 8:1. Banks were churning out loans—subprime mortgages, leveraged buyouts, etc. —while the Fed’s balance sheet stayed lean, mostly short-term Treasuries. Reserves were minimal ($10 billion or so), and the fractional reserve system let M2 balloon. When the housing bubble popped, that 8:1 leverage meant there was no cushion—credit froze, banks choked, and the GFC happened.

(i)    Bond markets are usually more correlated with the economy.

(ii)   Size of bond markets is materially larger than the equity, currency and commodity markets. It has the largest number of leveraged positions at any given point in time; and most of the large and influential market participants are more active in bond markets as compared to the other markets.

I am however inclined to disregard this piece of conventional wisdom. In my view, it would make sense only if the markets are operating in a free and fair manner. In cases where the central bankers and governments (through Sovereign Wealth Funds and other institutions controlled by it) actively and frequently intervene in the market, effectiveness of bond markets in leading the markets is impaired.

The world has definitely changed after the global financial crisis (GFC 2008-09). Central bankers, government, and public institutions are now playing significantly more active roles in the financial and commodity (especially gold and energy) markets. Bond prices are often influenced to suit the objectives of fiscal policy. Stock prices are influenced to suit political expediency.

Even pre-GFC, equity and bond traders did look at proxies like USD/CHF or copper—known as "Dr. Copper" for its economic sensitivity—for directional cues. In the past one decade we have seen Japan’s central bank buying equities; India’s government nudging markets via state-owned entities like LIC; the US Fed’s quantitative easing indirectly supporting massive amounts of stock buybacks; and Sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries piling into equities. This clearly indicates that in markets "no fixed formula works forever." Markets are adaptive. What held true for the past 35 years might not hold for the next 35.

US Bond yields no longer a lead indicator

In my view, the yield curve is fully relevant only if the market is free and genuine demand supply equilibrium of bond prices is discovered by the market forces. In situations where central bankers direct, manipulate or regulate yields, the yield curve is materially less important.

There is plenty of recent evidence, pointing that the US bond yields are no longer a strong indicator of the economy and/or markets. For example, consider the case of the US yield curve inversion in 2022-23.

Typically, an inverted yield curve—where short-term Treasury yields exceed long-term ones—has been a reliable harbinger of recession, preceding every U.S. downturn since the 1950s with a lag of roughly 6 to 18 months. The inversion that began in July 2022, peaking in mid-2023 with the 10-year/2-year spread hitting around -100 basis points, was the longest on record, lasting over two years. By historical standards, a recession should’ve hit by mid-to-late 2024. However, it has not happened; and the GDP growth held steady at 2.8% annualized in Q4 2024, and unemployment remains low at 4.1% as of March 2025.

Moreover, after un-inverting in September 2024—when the 2-year yield (around 3.6%) briefly dipped below the 10-year (around 3.8%)—yields have climbed across the board in the last two weeks. This morning, the 10-year yield is hovering near 4.5%, up from 4.0% in late March, while the 2-year has risen from 4.1% to about 4.5%. Incidentally, this rise coincides with a spike in recession odds, with the New York Fed’s yield curve model pegging the probability of a recession by mid-2026 at around 40%, up sharply from 25% a month ago. Normally, you’d expect yields to fall as recession fears mount, reflecting a flight to safety and anticipation of Fed rate cuts.

Prima facie, it appears that the bond market is more concerned about the rising inflationary expectations, particularly in light of the latest tariff policy of the US government. CPI is currently running above 3%—and there is skepticism about the Fed’s willingness to cut rates meaningfully from their current 4.75%-5.0% range. Higher yields also reflect a demand for more compensation amid uncertainty which could stoke inflation further. Arguably, the economy’s resilience—strong consumer spending, a robust labor market—may have also impaired the yield curve’s predictive edge this time. Structural shifts, like massive Fed balance sheet expansion since 2008 or global demand for long-term Treasuries, have certainly distorted its signal.

The recent yield rise despite recession odds implies that bond traders are betting on tighter policy or inflation risks, despite economic data flashing slowdown warnings (e.g., manufacturing PMI below 50 for months).

Conclusion: The yield curve’s relevance erodes when it’s less about market discovery and more about central bank glide path. Though it’s still worth watching, it’s no longer the king it once was in a freer market.

Tomorrow I will share my thoughts of what could be a better indicator, or aa mix of indicators to assess the likely market direction.

The markets began to take cognizance of the broader developments and oscillated wildly between the extremes of greed and fear during the year. However, thankfully, markets managed to close the year on a rather satisfactory note. Most asset classes – equity, bonds, precious metals, base metals and real estate yielded decent returns for the year. Moreover, as we begin the new financial year (FY26), some of the key concerns, e.g., wider trade conflicts, geopolitical escalations, and fiscal implosions have peaked and showing some early signs of easing.

In India, the economic growth returned to the normal pre-Covid trajectory, as the base effect of FY20 and FY21 low growth tapered off, and external challenges mounted. Equity markets settled close to their long-term average valuations, after witnessing one round each of euphoria and despondency. Bond markets and INR have also managed to end the year on a rather optimistic note.

The following are some of the highlights of the performance during FY25.

Equity Markets

The Indian equity market managed to end the year in positive territory, despite showing negative in six out of twelve months. Indian equities underperformed the global peers. The benchmark Nifty yielded a return of ~5% (3% in USD terms), which was in line with the US markets (S&P500 +8%), and Europe (Stoxx600 +5%, DAX +21%) but much lower than China (Hang Seng +38%, Shanghai Composite +9%). Asian markets, ex China, were mostly negative, with Japan (Nikkei225 -10%), Indonesia (IDX-10%), Korea (KOSPI -10%) and Singapore (SET -15%) ending the year with decent cuts. The valuation premium of Indian markets to the other emerging markets therefore remained elevated.

Banks saved the day for Indian benchmark indices

The benchmark Nifty (+5.3%) performed in line with broader markets (NSE500 +5.4%, Smallcap 100 +5.4%); though midcap stock did somewhat better (Midcap100 +7.5%). The gains in benchmark indices were mostly led by banks (Nifty Bank +9.3%). Overall market cap of NSE was higher by 6.9%, explained by many new listings and outperformance of midcap stocks.

Sector-wise, Financials, Services, Private Banks, Pharma and Metals were top outperformers. Media, IT Services, PSU Banks, Realty, FMCG, Auto, Infra and Commodities were notable underperformers. Micro-sector-wise, Ship builders and EMS were outstanding. Renewable energy and real estate builders were notable losers.

2HFY25 witnessed 5/6 negative months

The benchmark Nifty50 yielded negative month-on-month (MoM) returns for five out of six months in FY25. The second half of the year was worst with five out of six months resulting in negative MoM return. However, the market breadth was negative in nine out of twelve months implying much higher volatility in the broader markets.

Institutional flows positive

Over institutional flows were materially positive for FY25. Net domestic and foreign flows in the secondary equity market amounted to Rs3591bn. Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) were however net sellers of Rs2480bn in the secondary market, while domestic institutions pumped in a record Rs6071bn. FPIs were net sellers in eight out of the twelve months. The nifty-institutional flow correlation (73%) was decent in FY25.

Debt and Currency Markets

Indian debt and currency markets were volatile in tandem with the global trend. However, both bonds and INR managed to close the year on a buoyant note.

RBI cut the policy rates by 25bps and Cash Reserve Ratio for commercial banks by 50bps. The benchmark 10-year treasury bond yields eased to 6.58% from 7.11% a year earlier. USDINR weakened 2.6% to 85.59 from 83.35 a year earlier. Lending and term deposit rates were higher by up to 10-20bps. The yield curve shifted lower and flattened completely.

The RBI changed its policy stance to “neutral” from “withdrawal of accommodation” in FY24. The liquidity position however continued to remain tight, with banking system liquidity remaining in deficit for most part of the 2HFY25. The credit growth outstripped the deposit growth. Overnight and call money rates cooled 25bps in 4QFY25, due to aggressive open market operations carried out by the RBI.

Economic conditions

Overall FY25E GDP growth slowed down to ~6.2% as the effects of the low base of FY21 and FY22 tapered off and fiscal correction progressed further. The consensus estimates for FY26E GDP growth is slightly better at ~6.5%. Nominal GDP growth for FY25E has been materially lower at ~9.1%, and is expected to pick up to ~10.5% in FY26E.

·         CPI Inflation mostly remained within the RBI’s tolerance band of 4-6% (except for a short spike in October 2024). Core inflation eased below 4% in August and then February 2024.

·         Real rates have mostly remained in positive territory during FY24.

·         Fiscal deficit remained high despite moderation over the past few years.

·         The private sector investments failed to gather the desired pace, despite several government incentives. The government capex also slowed down in FY25. 9MFY25 investment to GDP ratio dropped to 32.6%. Private consumption recovered in FY25E from the sharp dip in FY24.

·         External conditions worsened during FY25. Merchandise trade balance deteriorated to USD292bn. Exports were lower yoy, while imports were higher by 6% yoy. External debt was higher by 10%. Net FDI flows continued to slow for the third consecutive year.

Commodities

FY25 was a mixed year for commodities. Precious metals (Gold +40%, Silver 39%) and Industrial metals (Zinc +17%, Copper +10%) recorded good gains, while energy (Brent Crude -17%, Coal -20%) and agri commodities (Wheat -16%, Soy -14%) ended the year with strong losses.

Crypto shine

Cryptocurrencies further strengthened their position with material rise in trading volumes and market capitalization. Bitcoin ended the year FY25 with a strong 21% yoy gain. More jurisdiction accepted cryptocurrencies as a valid medium of exchange, financial asset and/or tradeable asset.