If a geologist tells you, “the Himalayan
Glaciers are melting fast and there will be no water in the Ganges in year
2050”; what would be your instant reaction? Will you—
·
Rush to store water in buckets?
·
Begin to explore places which
are not dependent on the Himalayan Rivers for their water needs, for relocation
in next few years?
·
Commit yourself to the
environment conservation by adopting 3R (Reduce, Reuse and Recycle) as part of
your life so that the green house emission is reduced, global warming is
reversed and the geologists are proven wrong?
·
Dismiss the information
provided by the Geologist as fait accompli and get on with your routine
life?
I may say with confidence that various people
will react differently to this information, but none will rush to store water
in buckets, and a very large majority will dismiss the information as fait
accompli.
I believe that the finance and economics experts
portending about various policy changes are no different than the Geologist
forecasting end of the Himalayan glaciers; and the market’s reaction to their
prophecies is also no different. A large majority of investors dismiss the
experts’ views and perhaps no one takes material investment decisions based on
these prophecies.
Nonetheless, these prophecies do create an
environment of great anticipation with usual jitteriness and eagerness in the
near term. One mistake that most of the common investor make in this
environment of jitteriness and eagerness to do something, is to not ask
themselves—
(a) What
is the situation that is being sought to change?
(b) How
the change would impact the businesses underlying their portfolio of
investments?
(c) How
the action they are contemplating to take will protect them from the perceived
adverse impact of the change in the status quo?
For example, take the case of experts’
prophecies regarding gradual termination (tapering) of the latest assets buying
program of the US Federal Reserve (the Fed). For past few months, almost every
finance and economics expert has spoken and/or written about the imminent
decision of the Fed to taper its assets buying program and its likely impact on
the markets. The markets have been witnessing intermittent bouts of volatility
whenever any official of the Fed or a reputable expert speaks/writes about this
change.
Last week the Fed Chairman Jerome Powell was
scheduled to make a speech in a symposium held in Jackson Hole valley (Wyoming,
USA). This annual symposium, sponsored by Federal Reserve of Kansas City, is
being held since 1978; and in Jackson Hole since 1981. The symposium is usually
held in the month of August, just ahead of the pre scheduled US Federal Reserve
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting in September.
Many prominent central bankers, finance
ministers, reputable academicians and market participants take part in this
symposium to discuss the currently important issues facing the global economy.
In distant past, some reputable economists, like James Tobin (Tobin Rule) and
John Taylor (Taylor Rule), have presented their path breaking papers at the
symposium.
It is customary for the US Fed representative
(Usually the Chairman or a senior official) to present their thoughts on the
topic selected for that year’s symposium. The topic for 2021 symposium was “Macroeconomic Policy in an Uneven Economy”.
There has been couple of instances (Paul Walker
1982 and Greenspan 1989) where the US Fed representatives dropped some hints
about the imminent policy changes in the ensuing FOMC meetings. But those hints
were incidental and not by design. Otherwise, there has been no instance where the thoughts of the US Fed
representatives have actually digressed from the given topic for the symposium.
Nonetheless, various experts have been regularly conducting a post-mortem of
their speech to find mentions of the words and terms which they can use to
market their views in the garb of the Fed’s hints.
In fact in past two decades,
no path breaking paper has been presented at the symposium and Fed chairman
speeches have been noted for all the wrong reasons; most notable being the
Bernanke dismissal of sub-prime crisis (2007); and Greenspan’s advocacy for
expansionary policies (2005), which was heavily criticised by Raghuram Rajan in
2005 and rest of the world in 2008.
It would therefore be not
completely wrong to say that Jackson Hole event is now mostly irrelevant for
the financial markets. A harsher criticism would be to state that Jackson Hole
is on the path to become American version of annual event held by an NGO (World
Economic Forum) in Europe’s Davos.
For records, at this year
Jackson Hole symposium, the Fed Chairman did not say or hint anything that had
not been said at previous FOMC meetings, Congressional testimonies and various
public speeches. The focus was on the topic of the symposium rather than the
monetary policy of US Federal Reserve. Mr. Powell just reiterated, “The Committee (FOMC) remains steadfast in our oft-expressed
commitment to support the economy for as long as is needed to achieve a full
recovery. The changes we made last year to our Statement on Longer-Run Goals
and Monetary Policy Strategy are well suited to address today's challenges.”
If you were also bothered about the taper
signaling at Jackson Hole, the Fed Chairman actually hinted that they have
taken lessons from the past instances of Fed trying to stay ahead of the curve
and hurting the markets. Mr. Powell said, “The period from 1950 through the
early 1980s provides two important lessons for managing the risks and
uncertainties we face today. The early days of stabilization policy in the
1950s taught monetary policymakers not to attempt to offset what are likely to
be temporary fluctuations in inflation.15 Indeed,
responding may do more harm than good, particularly in an era where policy
rates are much closer to the effective lower bound even in good times.”
So where do you see the scope of any action
by the mighty US Federal Reserve, that would even marginally harm the investors’
interests!
Now coming to the Taper tantrums, it is
important to understand the implications of the Fed’s assets buying program;
simply because the impact of the tapering will entirely depend on these.
The Fed started a Large Scale Asset Purchase
Program on 25th November 2008 (QE1) to “manage the supply of bank
reserves to maintain conditions consistent with the federal funds target rate
set by the FOMC”. The idea was to provide enough liquidity support to
stabilize the financial system and stimulate faster growth. The program was
executed by increasing money supply (Quantitative Easing or QE) through
purchase $175 billion in agency debt, $1.25 trillion in agency MBS, and $300
billion in longer-term Treasury securities. It was also decided to reinvestment
the principal amount received on maturity of the securities purchased under the
program.
The Second Round of the Program was started on
3rd November 2010 (QE2) to purchase $600 billion in longer-term
Treasury securities.
The Third Round of the program (QE3) was
started on 13th September 2012 and included a total purchase of $790
billion in Treasury securities and $823 billion in agency MBS during September
2012 and October 2014.
Overall, close to US$4trn were added to bank
reserves during 2008-2014 under the three rounds of Asset Purchase Program by
the US Federal Reserve. Besides, these purchases, the Fed also implemented
Operation Twist under which it managed to extend maturity of over US$660bn US
government securities.
On 16th December 2015, the FOMC
noted that the conditions set for normalization of monetary policy have been
achieved, and process of normalization of target rate could now begin. The
actual normalization process started in October 2017 when the Fed “decreased
the reinvestments of principal payments from the Federal Reserve’s securities
holdings”.
The tapering of first three rounds of QE did
not entail any Sale of securities by the Federal Reserve. It just
implied that the Federal Reserve will not reinvest the amount received in
maturity of the securities purchased under the program. The maturities may
happen over a period of up to 25yrs.
Consequently, the assets on the Fed’s balance
sheet decreased from the peak of US$4.5trn in winter of 2014 to US$3.8trn in
the summer of 2019.
To support the economy in the wake of lockdown
imposed to mitigate the impact of Covid-19 pandemic, the fed started the latest
round of its Asset Purchase Program (QE4), as the Fed cut back its target rate
back lower. QE4 has resulted in the Fed’s balance sheet ballooning to over
US$8trn, a rise of over 100% in less than 2yrs time.
Presently, the fed is buying US$120bn worth of securities
every month from market.
Five things to note from this—
(a) The
US Federal Reserve’s asset purchase program aims to achieve the FOMC’s target
rate, implying that the assets are purchased by Fed to keep rates lower by
supplying adequate liquidity to banks.
(b) Tapering
does not mean immediate sale of securities held by the Fed. It just means not
buying more and/or refraining from reinvesting the maturities as and when these
occur.
(c) If
US$120bn/monthly purchases are decreased by US$20/month, it would still mean
that Fed will still be adding US$300bn more to its balance sheet in next
6months.
(d) Fed
balance sheet had started to increase in November 2019, even before the
pandemic forced worldwide lockdown. If the circumstances need, the Fed shall
again restore its QE program, like in 2020.
(e) US
Fed is not the only Central Banker in world which is running a QE program.
European Central bank (ECB), Bank of England (BoE), and Bank of Japan (BoJ) are
also running major QE programs.
QE is win-win for the Fed and US economy
The cost of funds for the Fed is zero. So when
Fed buys interest bearing securities from the market and infuses more liquidity
in the system, five things happen –
(i) Fed
is able to earn substantial income on the securities so purchased;
(ii) The
interest rates in the economy are pegged lower, thus helping the government to
finance its fiscal deficit at lower cost;
(iii) Fed
repatriates its income surplus to the Federal government by way of dividends,
which also helps reducing the fiscal deficit;
(iv) The
additional liquidity supplied by the Fed helps to stabilize the financial
system and supports the economic growth; and
(v) QE
keeps the USD from strengthening and thus helps the trade account of US.
It is thus a win-win arrangement for the Fed
and US economy. There is no reason to believe that QE will be completely
terminated without significant improvement in the US economy or an even more
attractive alternative to QE emerging.
Quantitative Easing (QE) must be understood
different from the fiscal easing. In case of fiscal easing the government
borrows money from the market and hands out immediate benefits to the people
and businesses in the form of tax cuts, subsidies, incentives and cash payouts;
whereas in case of quantitative easing, the central bank provides reserves to
the commercial bankers so that they can meet the increased credit demand,
without pressurizing the lending rates. The decision to lend or not to lend,
and decide the actual lending rate remains with the banks.
The fiscal easing thus has the chances of directly causing
higher inflation; whereas QE may or may not result in higher inflation. The
available evidence clearly shows that fiscal easing (tax cuts by Donald Trump
(US$1.5trn over 10yrs beginning 2018) and cash payout by Joe Biden (US$1.9trn,
2021) have caused more inflation that US$8trn in QE over past 10yrs. The
inflation actually came down during the tenure of QE2 and QE3.
From 2008 to 2014 almost every penny of QE was
getting accumulated in banks’ excess reserves (liquidity with banks that can be
given as loan). It was only in 2016 (after taper tantrum started) that banks
started to grow their loan books by running down on reserves. The excess
reserves have again increased sharply in 2021 to an all-time high of over
US$4trn.
The argument that the tapering will suck out
liquidity from the system therefore does not appear to be fully supported. It
is true that the mortgage rates had risen from 3.5% in 2016 to ~5% in early
2019. However, correlating this fully with the tapering may not be justifiable.
This period saw sharp rise in economic growth, asset prices and therefore
credit demand. Besides, the rates had started falling from mid-2019 when growth
started faltering, much before the pandemic and QE4 started.
QE and Indian investors
Insofar as India is concerned, there is little
evidence to highlight any strong correlation between QE and foreign flows,
market performance and economic growth.
In past 20 months the US Fed has done over
US$4trn in QE. However, the Indian secondary markets have received a paltry
US$9.7bn in net FPI inflows. The net FPI inflows since 2010 have been less than
US$35bn against QE amount of US$8.3trn. Five out of past 12 years have
witnessed negative FPI inflows. Nifty returns have shown very poor correlation
to net FPI flows in a particular year; even though on day to day basis, a
stronger correlation might exist.
Besides, India’s external position is much
stronger as compared to 2013-16 taper tantrum period. The present situation of
the current accont balance, short term foreign currency debt and forex cover is
substantially better than the 2013-2016 position.
What to do? – Do not fill your buckets for
now!
The question now is “what a common Indian
investor do when the Fed actually announces a tapering by the end of 2021, as
widely expected, or refrains from doing so?”
In my view, the answer is “Nothing”.
The common investors must note that QE of 10yrs
may not have played any direct role in construction and performance of their
respective investment portfolios. They must also keep faith in the collective
wisdom gained by of the central bankers of the world since the global financial
crisis; and believe that they would not do nothing to harm the still fragile global
economy, weak in the knees markets and governments with explicit socialist
agendas.
Therefore, it would be prudent to not take any
investment action merely because of quantum of QE done or not done by the Fed.
(No water storage in buckets)
An action on the investment portfolio would be
needed only if any pertinent change is witnessed in the prospects of the
underlying businesses. (Look for businesses that are likely to grow regardless
of central banks’ actions)
As a prudent policy they should maintain a balance between
Safety, Liquidity and Returns (SLR) factors in their respective portfolios.
(Own businesses that will survive the volatility; hold sufficient liquidity for
the transition phase; invest in businesses that promise sustainable higher
return)