Last month, in one of my posts (read here), I mentioned that “From the events of the past few years, it is evident that the era of peace and global cooperation, which started in the aftermath of two devastating wars in the first half of the twentieth century and flourished after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, may be coming to an end. In my view, the year 2024 will see a new paradigm unfolding in global economic, political, and geopolitical spheres. The new paradigm which would take a couple of decades to manifest fully, may inter alia see multiple axes and alliances emerging in the global order, competing with each other for supremacy. Consequently, global trade may get fragmented into multiple trade blocs.”
I also expressed a view that “The trend in the financialization of economies may reverse. Physical resource ownership and localized manufacturing may become the primary focus again.”
A team of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) analyzed the economic impact of the fragmentation of commodity trade, in a working paper titled Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Commodity Markets (Jorge Alvarez, et. al., October 2023). The conclusions of the research are pretty scary. The following are some excerpts from the IMF paper.
Concentration of Production
Unlike manufactured goods, the first stage of production of commodities depends on natural endowments that can be concentrated geographically. As a result of natural endowments’ concentration, there is a significant concentration of production at the country level, with the top three producers accounting on average for about 65 percent of the global output of agriculture, about 50 percent of energy, and about 75 percent of minerals commodities.
For minerals, production is concentrated both at the mining stage due to the geographic concentration of deposits, but often also at the processing stage, with a few countries (most notably China), having developed a strong comparative advantage through the deployment of capital intensive facilities, efficient technological solutions, lighter environmental regulations, and relatively cheaper labor.
Low Elasticities of Supply and Demand
Commodities exhibit low elasticities of supply and demand, particularly in the short run.
On the supply side, scaling up production often requires large investments and long permitting processes that can delay a supply response to price changes. For example, it takes on average 16 years from exploration to the opening of copper mines. Discovering new deposits is also costly and takes time.
On the demand side, many commodities are inputs for key technologies and products or are essential to household consumption, making them hard to substitute, and attenuating the demand response to price changes.
Trade Dependence
With production highly concentrated and demand often spread across many countries, commodities are heavily traded. Their homogeneity and fungibility also contribute to market integration. As a consequence, the share of production that is traded internationally across commodity types is consistently higher than the ratio of world trade to gross output. Across agricultural commodities, around 40 percent of output is exported, around 30 percent for energy and almost 50 percent for mineral commodities are exported. more than 80 percent of lithium, or potash produced cross borders, with the share increasing over time for most raw commodities.
Fragmentation and Commodity Prices
Events of the past few years suggest that the Western Economies and Russia/China led (or controlled) economies are drifting apart, getting divided into separate trade blocks. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the fault lines of global manufacturing. If commodities cannot be transported between China, the West, and Africa, much of the modern manufacturing may halt. For example, Congo supplies two-thirds of the global Cobalt requirement. Disruption in supply chain could halt production in various manufacturing units that use cobalt as a raw material.
A model examines how much prices of 48 key commodities would change in the Western bloc and the Russia/China bloc if trading between the two blocks stopped altogether. In such an eventuality, the Western bloc would end up with a surplus of some commodities like iron ore or copper where there is more production than is needed in the region. Hence, steel prices would drop a lot in the West and rise dramatically in China, which undoubtedly would put an end to a lot of the growth in infrastructure and real estate in that country. Prices for magnesium and graphite, used extensively in the production of batteries and other renewable energy equipment as well as platinum, group metals, and rare earth metals would skyrocket in the West since we would be cut off from supply from China.
Prices of various commodities could move dramatically in the event of geopolitical decoupling of the West from China and Russia.
Obviously, the current geopolitical standoff is an invitation to mutually assured economic destruction for both blocs. The whole rhetoric of China+1; the isolation of Russia and China and the emergence of India at the expense of China appears fraught with danger.
Investors who are positioning for a secular growth of India’s economy over the next decade and the success of China+1 strategy may want to review their strategy in my view.