Showing posts with label Monetary Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monetary Policy. Show all posts

Thursday, November 9, 2023

Investment strategy challenge

Wishing all the readers, family, and friends a very Happy Diwali. May the Lord enlighten all of us and relieve everyone from pain and misery. 

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The growth is slowing across the world. The engines of global growth - India and China – are also expected to slow down in 2024. Most European countries are flirting with recession. Canada is technically in recession. The US growth is stronger than estimates but not enough to support the

Growth decelerating

As per the latest World Economic Outlook report released by the World Bank, global growth has slowed down to 3% in 2023 from 3.5% recorded in the year 2022. The global economic growth is expected to further decelerate to 2.9% in 2024. The advanced economies have grown by 1.5% in 2023 against 2.6% in 2022. Their growth is likely to further decelerate to 1.4% in 2024. Economic growth in Emerging economies is also not accelerating. These economies are expected to grow at the rate of 4% in 2023 and 2024, against 4.1% in 2022.

Though the likelihood of a hard landing in the US may have receded, the risks to the growth still remain tilted to the downside.

Inflation persisting

The growth slowdown could be largely attributed to the effects of the monetary tightening measures taken since 2022. However, despite the sharp growth deceleration, global inflation is likely to stay above 5% in 2024 also. The World Bank expects global inflation to ease to 6.9% in 2023 and 5.8% in 2024, against 8.7% in 2022. In recent weeks, the inflationary expectations have risen again and could contribute—along with tight labor markets––to core inflation pressures persisting and requiring higher policy rates than expected. More climate and geopolitical shocks could cause additional food and energy price spikes.

Geoeconomic fragmentation – risks rising for emerging economies

The rising geoeconomic fragmentation is seen as a key risk to global growth and financial stability. Intensifying geoeconomic fragmentation could constrain the flow of commodities across markets, causing additional price volatility and complicating the green transition. Amid rising debt service costs, more than half of low-income developing countries are in or at high risk of debt distress.

No room for policy error

Given the still high inflation, unsustainable fiscal conditions and high cost of disinflation, there is little margin for error on the policy front. Central banks need to restore price stability while using policy tools to relieve potential financial stress when needed. effective monetary policy frameworks and communication are vital for anchoring expectations and minimizing the output costs of disinflation. Fiscal policymakers should rebuild budgetary room for maneuver and withdraw untargeted measures while protecting the vulnerable.

However, if we juxtapose these economic realities with the market performance, the dissonance is too stark. Formulating an investment policy that balances the macroeconomic and market realities is extremely challenging under the current circumstances.

I shall share my thoughts on this after the Diwali break. I will post next on 17th November.


Wednesday, August 17, 2022

Side effects of inflation

 The latest episode of global inflation is impacting peoples’ lives in multiple ways, especially in developed countries where the present generation of citizens has not experienced this kind of rise in the cost of living; borrowing cost and challenges in accessing consumer credit. It is of course a significant challenge for the young investors and professional money managers who have been raised in an environment of profligate fiscal policies; abundance of liquidity; near zero cost of borrowing; persistent struggle to mitigate the deflationary pressures and unchallenged US supremacy over global markets and geopolitics. For them all the assumptions that underlined their investment strategies might be falling apart; just like the Dreamliner Titanic.

This episode of inflation and consequent monetary tightening would indubitably prove to be an important life lesson for the young investors and money managers; and go a long way in defining the future investment strategies and market directions.

Besides, there are some other noticeable side effects of the inflationary pressures on the global socio-economic milieu. For example consider the following:

There are several reports indicating that harassed by the rising cost of living and high rentals, many youngsters may be returning to live with their parents; several more may have delayed the decision to leave the parental homes; yet some other who were living alone are moving in with their partners and friends to save on rental and other costs (for example see here). It may be too early to conclude anything, but if this trend sustains we might find it catalyzing some interesting changes in the demographic profiles of many countries; housing market; immigration policies etc.

There is enough anecdotal evidence available to indicate that employees demand higher wages to manage the rising cost of living; but they seldom agree to wage cuts during the deflationary phase. The businesses therefore usually engage in workforce realignment to optimize their wage bill. The senior employees whose actual contribution is stagnating but wages are rising, are invariably replaced by younger employees which cost much less simply due to their lesser vintage. Inflation thus causes higher unemployment in middle and upper tier employees, who are either forced out of the labor market or accept new jobs at much lower wages. The governments however do not have this luxury of letting senior people go. They usually meet the goal by imposing a moratorium on fresh hiring and rationalizing non-wage costs, e.g., travel.

The products’ prices usually do not move in direct proportion to the raw material prices. During raw material inflation the margins of most companies shrink, unless they enjoy significant demand elasticity for their respective products and are able to pass on the entire raw material inflation on to their customers. However, during the raw material price deflation phase, a majority of companies do not pass on the benefit to their customers. This is the phase when most companies, that have survived the inflationary period, see their margins expanding.

As the rate of inflation declines, the prices of consumer goods do not necessarily fall. They just stop rising at a faster rate. Thus, if the wages of households have not risen in line with the rise in the cost of living, the hit to their consumption and/or savings could become structural.

Financial repression is one of the worst impacts of inflation. The savers lose real income while the borrowers get money at much lower real cost. Post inflation this situation is rarely reversed. Neutral real rate is usually the best case in a deflationary period. Positive real rates are not seen to last for any meaningful period.

To control inflation, a variety of fiscal and monetary policies are used by the governments and central banks. Higher interest rates, lower liquidity, higher tariffs to curb demand, subsidies to the poor to augment their income are some of the popular tools used to mitigate inflation and its impact. However, in case of deflation the use of fiscal policies is not very popular; even though in some cases incentives are offered to encourage demand. Withdrawing fiscal subsidies and incentives in the post inflation period however proves to be a serious political challenge. Thus, while the monetary expansion could be moderated in a relatively shorter span of time, the fiscal corrections could take much longer.

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

Investor’s positioning vs premise

Just when everything appeared to be settling nicely, the volatility in Indian equity markets has increased materially. The sharp corrections at any hint of adverse event highlights the jitteriness (and to some extent lack of conviction) of market participants. Considering that household investors (and traders) have increased their participation in the market significantly in past 6-8 weeks, the pain quotient of any sharp correction from here could be significantly higher.

Evidently, while the benchmark indices are now mostly flat for past 8-9 weeks, the sectoral shifts have been meaningful. Investors have adopted inflation (commodities) and cyclical recovery (mid and small cap) as a primary investment theme. Financials, discretionary consumption and realty sectors have witnessed a major “move out”.

The investors positioning seems to be, inter alia, based upon the following premise:

(a)        The earnings recovery witnessed in 4QFY21 shall continue for most of the FY22 and FY23.

(b)   The inflation which has been mostly a “supply shock” phenomenon in past three quarters will become a “demand shock” as cyclical recovery continues to gather pace and supply response lags the demand surge.

(c)    End of forbearance period for loans may lead to accelerated delinquencies, especially from MSME sector.

(d)   RBI shall continue to pursue accommodative monetary policy, regardless of the fiscal conditions, inflationary pressures and pace of cyclical recovery.

(e)    The companies may further improve on the multiyear high margins achieved in 2HFY21 and justify PE rerating of mid and small cap stocks.

The investors’ positioning is mostly based on promise of higher fiscal spending and incentives for setting up new manufacturing capacities. Obviously the assumptions suffer from a certain degree of dissonance.

Stress in MSME sector that is driving financials down is not reflected in sharp outperformance of mid and small cap stocks. Fears of lockdown, poor income growth etc. are reflecting in underperformance of discretionary spending (auto, media, realty etc.) but the “demand shock” expectations in metals etc. contradict this positioning. Service sector underperformance also mostly belies the cyclical recovery thesis.

The participants’ positioning also does not fully factors, in my view, the recently added high risk dimension to the RBI’s monetary policy. So far the quantitative easing (money printing) has been the domain of the jurisdiction having a universally acceptable currencies (US, EU, Japan, UK). RBI has ventured into this with a partially convertible currency. This could be a two edged sword. Could make INR highly volatile and impact the CAD.

The following excerpts from some recent global research are worth noting:

“US producer price inflation has jumped to a 10-year high. Business surveys suggest pipeline price pressures continue to build with some surveys suggesting a greater ability to pass higher costs onto consumers. This will add to the upside risks for CPI in coming months and increasingly points to earlier Federal Reserve policy action.” (ING Bank NV)

“China’s renewed focus on de-carbonisation leading to steel capacity cuts, strong domestic demand and muted global coking coal costs are likely to sustain high steel margins globally over FY22-23E. Lower Chinese export rebate as suggested (for months now) in media articles can discourage Chinese steel exports further. India domestic HRC price ex- Mumbai stands at c. INR 60k/t , significantly higher than JM/street assumption of INR 48k/t, while the landed China price at c. INR 68.7k/t leaves significant room for further price hikes in the domestic steel circuit.” (JM Financial Research)

“After two consecutive quarters of solid earnings beats and upgrades, we expect another strong quarter, aided by a deflated base of 4QFY20 and healthy demand recovery for the large part of 4QFY21 – as attested by high-frequency indicators. Performance is expected to be healthy despite headwinds of commodity cost inflation in various sectors. The key drivers of the 4QFY21 performance include: a) Metals – on the back of a strong pricing environment and higher volumes; b) Private Banks and NBFCs – on moderation in slippages and improved disbursements / collection efficiency; c) a continued strong performance from IT – as deal wins translate into higher revenues; d) Autos – as operating leverage benefits offset commodity cost pressures; and e) Consumer Staples and Durables – on strong demand recovery despite commodity price inflation. MOFSL and the Nifty are expected to post a healthy two-year profit CAGR of 16% and 14%, respectively, over 4QFY19–4QFY21” (Motilal Oswal Securities)

“If our growth projections were to come to fruition, India’s economy would pass the US$6.4 trillion mark by 2030, with per capita income at US$4,279 – reaching the upper middle income country threshold. This implies a real GDP growth of 6% and nominal growth of 10-10.5%. A key ingredient to our forecast is our estimate that manufacturing as a share of GDP will rise from approximately 15% of GDP currently to 20% by F2030, implying that its goes from US$400bn to US$1175bn. We believe that the thrust toward a manufacturing-led growth will set in motion the virtuous cycle of productive growth of higher investment - job creation - income growth – higher saving - higher investment and India would be one of the few large economies offering high nominal productive growth.” (Morgan Stanley)




Friday, February 7, 2020

RBI turns pragmatic in a welcome move

Unlike the previous occassions, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) decided to honor the market consensus and held the policy rates unchanged. However, honoring the consensus was limited to not changing the policy repo rates; otherwise it announced a number of policy measures that were not expected by the market and hence could be counted as positive surprise.
  • The MPC kept the Repo Rate (5.15%), Reverse Repo Rate (4.9%) and Marginal Standing facility Rate (5.4%) unchanged.
  • GDP growth for FY21 is projected at 6%, howver the recovery is expected to be back ended. Accordingly, the growth is expected to remain in the range of 5.5-6.0% in H1FY21, before recovering to 6.2% in Q3FY21.
  • The target consumer price index (CPI) is maintained at 4% +/- 2% band. However, the CPI inflation projection has been revised upwards to 6.5% for Q4FY20; 5.0 to 5.4% for 1HFY21 and 3.2% for 3QFY21 with risks broadly balanced.
    The policy statement makes many departures and signals a paradigm shift in the thought process at RBI. There is a clear hint in the policy statement that pragmatism may finally be making inroads at RBI. The decision makers appear inspired to experiment with innovative policy tools rather than sticking with traditional methods and thought process. For example consider the following measures:
  • For the first time MPC included the term "as long as it is necessary" in regard to its accommodative monetary policy stance. This shall comfort the markets as it lends a fair degree of predictability to the policy stance. The governor categorically stated in the post policy press interaction that the next policy move will be a cut, the timing of which will be determined by the inflation trajectory.
  • Instead of cutting Repo Rate, the RBI instituted an mechanism whereby the short and mid-term bond yields may converge to Repo Rate of 5.15%, effectively meaning more than 50bps rate cut at the shorter end of maturities. To achieve this end, RBI has announced Long Term Repo Operations (LTROs) of 1yr and 3yr at the repo rate of upto Rs1trn, which effectively means that Rs1trn would be available to banks for 1yr and 3yr at 5.15% instead of 5.8 to 6.12% at present.
  • Henceforth, a 14-day term repo/reverse repo operation at a variable rate conducted to coincide with the cash reserve ratio (CRR) maintenance cycle would be the main liquidity management tool for managing frictional liquidity requirements.
  • For the first time RBI provided targeted credit stimulus without actually compromising on overall prudential norms. Traditionally the sector specific easing was done by relaxing risk weights. This time it has been decided that the banks will exempted from maintaining CRR on the incremental credit provided by the banks during February-July 2020 period to retail loans for automobiles, residential housing and loans to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
  • For the benefit the eligible MSME entities which could not be restructured under the provisions of the circular dated January 1, 2019 as also the MSME entities which have become stressed thereafter, it has been decided to extend the benefit of one-time restructuring without an asset classification downgrade to standard accounts of GST registered MSMEs that were in default as on January 1, 2020.The restructuring under the scheme has to be implemented latest by December 31, 2020.
  • For the benefit of real estate projects that get stuck due to reasons beyond control of the developer (e.g., due to delay in clearances, courts injunctions etc.) the RBI has decided to allow extension of date of commencement of commercial operations of project loans for commercial real estate. (Loan for commercial real estate here means loan for real estate being developed for selling and not self use). This essentially means that the projects remaining uncompleted for reasons beyond the control of the developers shall remain standard asset till the time they are completed. This is one of the most pragmatic policy measure taken in recent years.
Read the policy documents here

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Credit situation may not be as bad as being widely perceived

The Monetary Policy Report released by the Reserve Bank of India last week, highlights some interesting trends in credit market. Though the sharp deceleration in the credit to the commercial sector has been adequately underlined, I find the following trends also noteworthy from the investment strategy viewpoint:
(a)   Despite conspicuous rise in the stress in NBFC sector and spate of downgrades, "Interest rates on CPs moderated noticeably during H1.

Though, CP issuances moderated from July reflecting heightened risk aversion in view of downgrading of a few CP issuers in June and July 2019, the interest rates in the primary CP market – as reflected in the weighted average discount rate (WADR) – moderated sharply by 130 bps during H1:2019-20, facilitated by the easing of liquidity conditions.
 

(b)   The risk premium declined sharply to an average of 64 bps in August-September on account of (i) the liquidity effect emanating from the switch in liquidity conditions from deficit to surplus since the beginning of June 2019; (ii) the predominance of issuances by top rated issuers raising funds at competitive rates; and (iii) the measures taken by the government and the Reserve Bank to provide liquidity support to NBFCs.
 


(c)    During H1:2019-20, policy transmission was nearly complete in all segments of the money market. Of the three policy announcements during this period, the maximum impact was felt after the June policy – which signaled both a rate cut and a change in the stance from neutral to accommodative.
 
(d)   While credit growth to agriculture and personal loans remained broadly unchanged in the last one year, credit growth to industry moderated in the last four months after accelerating continuously between August 2018 and April 2019. Credit growth to services has decelerated sharply since January 2019.
Of the incremental non-food credit flow during the year (August 2019 over August 2018), personal loans accounted for the largest share, followed by services and industry. Within personal loans, credit offtake has been broadly concentrated in two segments, viz., housing and credit card outstanding. Within industry, credit growth to beverages and tobacco, cement, engineering, vehicles, construction and infrastructure (viz., power, telecommunications and roads) accelerated.
(e)    Credit quality has deteriorated with both the stressed assets ratio and the non-performing assets (NPA) ratio increasing marginally in June 2019 after four successive quarters of decline. Sector-wise analysis indicates that the NPA ratio deteriorated for all sectors in June 2019, barring industry.
(f)    With muted credit offtake and decline in non SLR investments, banks have augmented their SLR portfolios despite the reduction in SLR by RBI. Banks held excess SLR of 6.9 per cent of net demand and time liabilities (NDTL) on August 30, 2019 as compared with 6.3 per cent of NDTL at end-March 2019.
(g)    Overall, financial flows to the commercial sector in 2019-20 so far (up to mid-September) have been lower than in the same period last year due to a decline in funding from banks and lower funding from non-bank sources.
However, among domestic non-bank sources of funding, public issues of equity and private placement increased significantly. Among foreign sources, both external commercial borrowings and foreign direct investment (FDI) registered sharp increases. Notably, end-use provisions were rationalized in July 2019.
(h)   The weighted average lending rate (WALR) on fresh rupee loans declined during February-August 2019 across bank groups, with the largest decline observed in foreign banks and the least in public sector banks.

 




In conclusion, the slowdown in credit is a concern, but it may not be as alarming as it is being made out to be. Diversification of sources of funds and large base effect may have some role to play in the credit deceleration. However, the primary reason could be disruption in PSBs due to restructuring and other governance factors. Liquidity or availability of credit does not seem to be a concern at present.
The indebtedness at the household level is rising. This is both an opportunity and threat for the financial sector.
In my view, it is more a matter of time when the goals of PSBs and borrowers match and the credit growth begins to accelerate.