Do it yourself

India’s real GDP grew by 5.4% yoy during 2QFY25 (July-Sep); the slowest growth rate recorded since 3QFY23. The Reserve Bank of India had forecasted a growth of 7%, just a month ago, while the market consensus was less sanguine at ~6.5%.

For the argument’s sake, some of the slowdown in 2QFY25 could be attributed to a high base (2QFY24 GDP grew at 8.1%). However, it is tough to deny that the Indian economy has been growing below potential in most of the post global financial crisis (GFC-2009) period. In fact, it will not be totally perverse to argue that in the past one decade or so, the potential growth curve itself has moved lower.

For record, the Indian economy has grown at an average rate of 5.8% during the past decade (FY15-FY24). Even normalizing for the Covid-19 lockdown impact, the Indian economy has grown at an average rate of 6.0%, much below the estimated potential growth rate of over 8%. The real GDP had grown at an average rate of 7.8% during the preceding decade (FY05-FY14).

The slowdown in 2QFY25 has been led by the industrial sector, especially, manufacturing and core sector (e.g., mining and electricity) – a sector that has been the highest priority area for the incumbent government in the past decade. Agriculture (3.5% growth) sector did well on the back of a bountiful monsoon; and services also grew at a decent 7.1% led by public administration. On demand side, investments contracted for the fourth consecutive quarter, belying the promise of a massive jump in allocation for capex in the union budgets for FY24 and FY25. Private consumption grew 6% yoy on a low base of 2.6%, but declined qoq, despite the higher DBT.

The fiscal data for April-October 2024 period shows that contrary to its commitment in the union budget, the government has sacrificed capital expenditure in favor of direct cash transfer (DBT) to households. Ahead of key state elections, the government transferred an advance installment of tax devolution to states to meet revenue expense obligations. The central government capex (including on defense) was much lower than the budget targets. The disbursement of the promised capex loans to the states was also lower. Revenue expenditure on education, drinking water and sanitation were restrained to increase DBT allocation.

The popular narrative after the announcement of 2QFY25 GDP data appears to be that high effective rate of taxes and higher interest rates are hurting the growth and fiscal and monetary stimulus may lead to a course correction. I sincerely beg to differ from this hypothesis.

I have often highlighted that the obstacles to the acceleration in India’s growth rate are structural and not cyclical. Inability to adequately exploit our most valuable resources – the human capital and the largest pool of arable land in the world – is the principal reason for below potential growth. Consistent misallocation of capital, adhocism in policy making, lack of a conceptual growth framework, a distorted federal political structure, blatant pursuit of crony socialism, and lack of a long-term socio-economic growth plan.

In this context, it might be pertinent to note the OECD has projected a gradual deceleration in the potential growth rate of the Indian economy in the next four decades, as the marginal productivity of capital declines and contribution from technological progresses diminishes. (Table 1). The potential rate declines, even if in a blue-sky scenario, where India is able to take fuller advantage of its demography and is able to achieve a much higher rate of capital accumulation and employment (Table 2). (see full report here)