Showing posts with label RBI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RBI. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 6, 2023

To hike, to cut or do nothing

From the Bollywood movie ‘Chak De India’ (Dir. Shimit Amin, 2007), the climax sequence has been particularly popular. It is perhaps one of the most popular, inspiring, and quoted pieces of Indian cinema. In one part of the climax, the protagonist (played by Shah Rukh Khan), who is the coach of the Indian national women’s hockey team, is guiding the team in the World Cup final match against the defending champion Australia. During a penalty shootout, the coach tries to anticipate the penalty shot of the Australian striker by reading her body language – leg position, eyes, hockey stick and wrist position etc. – and correctly concludes that the striker will hit the ball straight and guides the Indian goalkeeper to stay still in the middle of the goal post. The goalkeeper saves the critical penalty and India wins the match.

Tuesday, November 21, 2023

Investment strategy challenge - 2

Before going on the Diwali break, I had mentioned some of the investment strategy challenges (see here) that a tiny investor like myself is facing due to sharp divergence in the macroeconomic evidence and market performance. Speaking specifically in the Indian context, the macroeconomic evidence is not particularly strong to support the investors’ enthusiasm.

The market participants are spinning new stories to overcome every new challenge. For example, consider the following—

Overheated consumer credit market

Last month, the Reserve Bank of India expressed concerns about the overheating consumer finance market. His statement read, “Certain components of personal loans are, however, recording very high growth. These are being closely monitored by the Reserve Bank for any signs of incipient stress. Banks and NBFCs would be well advised to strengthen their internal surveillance mechanisms, address the build-up of risks, if any, and institute suitable safeguards in their own interest.”


It is pertinent to note that the “Personal loan” segment of the overall credit has been growing at the fastest pace in the past eighteen months. In particular, the credit card outstandings witnessed over 25% growth in this period, as compared to the about 15% growth for the overall credit.

The unsecured personal loan growth has come on the back of mostly stagnant real incomes for households, declining personal savings, a sharp rise in household energy, education, and healthcare inflation, poor consumer non-discretionary spending growth, and strong discretionary (mostly aspirational) spending. Obviously, the unsecured personal loan growth is unsustainable as it is accompanied by a deterioration in the servicing capability.

The Governor’s concerns were ignored by the lenders as well as borrowers, forcing the regulator to take strict measures to put a leash on the runaway consumer credit growth. Last week, the RBI increased the risk weights for the consumer credit exposure of banks, NBFCs, and credit card outstandings, lowering their lending capacities.

In light of these developments, the natural reaction of the markets ought to have been “caution” on consumption and consumer finance. The actual market performance is however nowhere closer to this assumption. As against ~8.7% YTD rise in the benchmark Nifty50, Nifty Auto has risen ~33%, Nifty FMCG has risen ~19%, and Nifty India Consumption is higher by ~16%.

Belying the expectations that some part of the unsecured consumer loans is being used to facilitate margin trading in the stock market, and this segment could get impacted materially, in the last week, NSE witnessed the highest average daily volume in the past six weeks.

Moreover, the Realty sector should be impacted materially by the stricter norms for consumer loans and restrictions on the lending capacity of the lenders, is the best-performing sector YTD, with Nifty Realty rising over 60% YTD and ~4.5% in the past week.

Instead of reducing exposure to the financial sector per se, the market participants seem to have moved some exposure to non-lending financial companies like Insurance companies, asset management companies, etc. This sounds even more counterintuitive, considering that insurance and savings in mutual funds are mostly a discretionary option for Indian households.

Ignoring the impact on consumption and the deteriorating debt servicing profile of households, rating agencies have chosen to focus on the stronger risk-absorbing capacity of the lender due to RBI’s restrictive move. They have also ignored the impact on profitability (hence a case for de-rating) as the growth in the most profitable segment gets restricted.

Ignoring bad news

The market has been ignoring all the negative news flows about a leading business group for the past many months. It also ignored the banning of two key products (contributing 19% of its customer base) of a leading consumer lending company for non-compliance, arguing it is a short-term concern. The market has received positively all news relating to the divestment of government’s stake in PSEs through FPOs, taking advantage of unsustainable high prices, ignoring the total failure to make even one strategic disinvestment. Multiple disasters in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim etc. have not evoked any change in the estimates for spending on road and hydroelectric projects. Not many appear to have made revisions in USDINR estimates due to the worsening current account position.

…and latching on to hopes

The minister made a random statement that the government is planning to start 3000 new trains to make sure that everyone gets a confirmed ticket. The railways related stocks zoomed 5-20% on this statement. No one questioned where these 3000 new trains would run? Could the existing rail infrastructure support so many new trains when we are hearing about one train accident almost every week. The dedicated freight corridor projects have been running late for many years. The Udhampur-Kashmir valley train project is running behind schedule for about two decades. How much time would this new plan take to implement is anyone’s guess.

Moving away from the core

Not long ago, divesting non-core business was a major re-rating argument for many stocks. Recently, many companies have announced diversification into unrelated businesses; but the market participants have either ignored such diversifications or built arguments to support these. For example, an adhesive manufacturer and a metal pipe manufacturer have started lending business but the market appears nonchalant about this. A few years ago, an electric appliance company starting an NBFC was punished so severely that it had to abandon the plans within months.

Under these circumstances it is a serious challenge to stay calm – not get carried away by the market momentum; overcome FOMO; and find appropriately valued stocks for small investors with limited resources and information. It is a daily struggle to suppress the demon of greed; face the agony of a sharp underperformance as compared to the peers, who are swimming with the current; and be content with a reasonable (and sustainable) return. 

Friday, September 22, 2023

Some notable research snippets of the week

Banking system liquidity deficit worsens (Miscellaneous)

As per the latest RBI data, liquidity deficit as measured by fund injections by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) into the banking system was INR1.47trn as of September 18, the highest since April 2019.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) injected Rs 1.47 trillion on Monday and Rs 1.46 trillion on Tuesday. Market participants believed that the disbursement of Rs 25,000 crore as the second tranche of incremental cash reserve ratio (I-CRR) will not be enough, and the liquidity might tighten further to Rs 2 trillion in short term due to tax outflows and arrival of the festival season.

“For now it looks like going into the festival season there would be more outflow and cash leakage from the system. It will lead to higher deficit for the banking system,” said Naveen Singh, head of trading and EVP at ICICI Securities Primary Dealership. “There are other factors at play. We are not seeing much dollar flows coming into the system and the RBI has been continuously defending from the other side. We are not seeing any inflow from the Fx (foreign exchange) side, and the RBI is not in the mood to add durable liquidity in the system. Gradually, the liquidity deficit might go up to Rs 3 trillion, but not in the immediate future,” Singh said. (Business Standard)

Advance tax payments took place last week, while outflows towards Goods and Services tax will be completed by Wednesday, with bankers estimating aggregate outflows of up to 2.50 trillion rupees. The impact has magnified as the twin outflows have occurred in the same reporting fortnight, at a time when a chunk of the money is not available for use as it is blocked in the incremental cash reserve ratio (I-CRR). Moreover, "another drain on rupee liquidity could be from RBI's (Reserve Bank of India) FX intervention if depreciation pressures on the rupee persist," said Gaura Sen Gupta, an economist with IDFC First Bank. (Zawya.com)

The RBI had decided on September 8 to discontinue the I-CRR by October 7 in a phased manner. Out of the total I-CRR maintained, 25% was disbursed on September 19, another 25% on September 23, and the remaining 50% will be released on October 7.

Growth and inflation upgrade (MOSL)

For the past nine months, the fears of slowdown have been totally unfounded. India’s real GDP growth was better than expected (at 6.1% YoY) in 4QFY23 and then improved in line with expectations (at 7.8% YoY) in 1QFY24. Not only India, the US economy too has been much more resilient than our predictions at the beginning of the year.

In view of this, we upgrade India’s real GDP growth projection to 6.0% YoY for FY24 from 5.6% YoY anticipated in Jun’23 (and vs. 5.2% YoY in Mar’23). We, however, keep it broadly unchanged at 5.4% for FY25E (projected at 5.5% in Jun’23). Further, nominal GDP growth forecast is also kept unchanged at 7.8% for FY24, since higher real growth is entirely offset by a cut in GDP deflator forecast. It is likely to improve ~10% for FY25, slightly lower than earlier projection.

After lower-than-expected retail inflation in Apr-May’23, CPI inflation has been much higher in 2QFY24 led by vegetables, pulses and spices. Accordingly, we raise our CPI inflation projection to 5.6% for FY24 (from 4.3% earlier) with a slight upward revision in FY25 (to 5.3% from 5.0% earlier). Accordingly, due to downward revision in GDP deflator, the nominal GDP growth forecast is kept unchanged at 7.8% for FY24, and ~10% (from 10.5%) for FY25.

Rising crude adds to upside risk to external imbalances (JM Financial)

India’s merchandise trade deficit widened to USD 24.2bn in Aug’23 (USD 20.7bn prior). Although August marked a moderation in decelerating trend in trade activity during last four months, however it is too early to call it bottoming out of the weakness in overall trade.

Manufacturing PMI indicated improved export demand, which we believe will reflect in India’s exports data in the forthcoming months. Services exports declined for the first time, this is in-line with the weak guidance given by the Indian IT companies. As crude oil prices are expected to remain elevated in the near term, it adds to the upside risk to India’s external imbalances. We re-iterate our expectation of CAD at 1.4% of GDP for FY24.

Trade imbalance widens further: The sharp deceleration in trade activity during the past four months, moderated in Aug’23. However the decline in exports (-6.9% YoY) was sharper than in imports (-5.2% YoY). Strong sequential gains in imports (10.8% MoM) vs in imports (6.9% MoM) widened the trade deficit further to USD 24.2bn in Aug’23 vs USD 20.7bn in the previous month. On a FYTD basis (Apr-Aug), trade deficit of USD 101bn in FYTD24 is lower than the levels seen in FYTD23 (USD 113bn).

Flat core exports; First decline in services exports: At USD 34.5bn, India’s exports continued to decelerate with strong sequential gains (-6.9% YoY, 6.9% MoM). Non-oil exports remained flat (0.2% YoY) however the fall in oil exports was sharp (-31% YoY). India accounted for 40% of global rice trade in 2022, the ban on exports of parboiled and broken rice was supplemented with exports duty (20%) which reflected in the sharp decline (-10% YoY, -4% MoM) in rice exports. As per the findings of the manufacturing PMI, export orders have been robust even in Aug’23. Firms reported incremental orders from Bangladesh, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and US which we believe should reflect in the trade data of forthcoming months.

While on the services front, exports (prelim) declined (-0.4% YoY) for the first time in Aug’23 (Ex 5) after showing signs of moderation since Apr’23. Since software forms major portion of our services exports, this fall can be attributed to the reduced demand for software exports, as reflected in the moderating deal wins by Indian IT companies.

Continued deceleration in imports: The deceleration in imports continued for eight months in a row, however recorded a consistent growth of 10% on a 4yr CAGR. Sequential uptick in Aug’23 (10.8% MoM) is unlikely to sustain. Close to one fourth of India’s imports consists of oil imports; the sequential gain in oil import (12% MoM) is on the back of an uptick in crude oil prices. We expect that the crude oil prices to remain elevated in the near term which will exert pressure through rising oil imports. Coal imports (-43.5% YoY, -6% MoM) are at its lowest in last two years (USD 2.6bn), which is reflecting the downtrend in coal prices after it peaked in May’22. At USD 4.99bn, Gold imports (38.8% YoY) were the highest in last fifteen months. Imports of machinery and electronic goods have been consistently growing with 4yr CAGR of 7% and 10.3% respectively. But with the ban on imports of laptops and PCs w.e.f 1st November, it is highly likely that imports of electronic goods will moderate.

Crude oil prices expected to remain elevated; CAD expected at 1.4% of GDP: Rising crude oil price is capable of impacting India’s external balance, India crude oil basket has risen sharply by 8% to USD 86.4/bl in Aug’23. Brent crude prices breached the USD 94/bl mark after OPEC’s prediction of supply constraints in the oil market, estimating an oil deficit of 3.3mn barrels (mbpd) while IEA estimated a moderate 1.1 mbpd deficit during Q3FY24. We expect these prices to remain elevated in the near term as this spike is not demand-led but it is engineered through curtailing supply by oil producing countries. On the demand side, we expect China’s demand to come online in a gradual manner. Hence any expectation of pull back in prices will only be on the back of increased supply. Our expectation of CAD at 1.4% of GDP in FY24 would be at risk if monthly run rate of trade deficit breaches USD 20bn mark (Currently at USD 20.2bn).

India NBFCs: Funding cost likely to peak out by 3QFY24 (Nomura Securities)

We take a deep dive into the liability profiles of India NBFCs in light of regulator (RBI) caution on NBFCs’ elevated reliance on bank funding (link ) and further increase in yields across different constituencies by ~10-15bp since 1Q24. Our analysis of rates and liability mix of NBFCs shows that cost of funds (CoF) should peak out by 3Q24, after rising ~30-40bp from 1Q24 levels. This quantum of increase is higher than guidance given by most of the NBFCs. Further, the benefit of policy rate cuts, if any in 1HFY25, on cost of funds for NBFCs should be visible only in 2HFY25.

NBFCs’ reliance on bank funding remains at elevated levels: As of FY23, bank funding to NBFC/HFCs constituted ~57%/44% of their total borrowings. Further, bank loans to NBFCs/HFCs have almost tripled to ~INR13.7tn in Jul’23 at a CAGR of 21% vs 12% for overall bank credit, with PSU banks having 65% market share in it. Bank funding to NBFCs/HFCs reached ~64% of their net worth in 1Q24 (PSU banks: 102%) vs 35% in FY17. We expect NBFCs’ reliance on bank funding to come down in coming quarters, driven by a pickup in alternate sources of funding (e.g., bond market/securitization).

Increase in CoF for NBFCs has been lower than broader increase in interest rates: During 4Q22-1Q24, when repo / 1Y T-bill /1 Y Corp AAA yield inched up by 250bp/242bp/248bp, most of the NBFCs/HFCs barring CIFC and SBI Cards saw a <100bp increase in funding cost vs a >100bp increase for large banks. Compared to CoF of 3QFY19, when the policy rate was at similar level of 6.5%, cost of funds for NBFCs are still lower by up to ~200bp.

Hence, we believe it is quite evident that repricing of NBFC liabilities is still underway, as it happens with a lag both in the upward and downward rate cycles.

Cost of funds could rise another ~30-40bp from 1Q24, and likely peak out in 3Q24: We expect CoF for NBFCs could rise another ~30-40bp from 1Q24 before peaking out in 3Q24. This increase would be driven by 1) another ~10-15bp increase in yields across buckets since 1Q24; 2) a further increase in cost of NCDs, as coupon rates for maturing NCDs in remaining FY24/25 (~25%-50% of 1Q24 outstanding NCDs) are ~100-200bp lower than current yield; and 3) MCLR-linked bank loans are still getting repriced upwards due to a lag. This CoF increase of ~30-40bp during 1Q24-3Q24 is higher than the guidance given by most of the NBFCs and the average 20bp increase built into our current estimates. Hence, there could be ~1-5% risk to our FY24F EPS coming from pressure on CoF.

Benefits of potential policy rate cut in 1HFY25 to accrue only in 2HFY25: We expect benefit of any policy rate cut in 1HFY25 on funding cost of NBFCs to accrue only in 2HFY25. Bank funding forms >50% for NBFC liability side. While repo/T-bill linked bank borrowings will get repriced downward immediately, it will take time for MCLR-linked bank borrowings to reprice downward as well. Further, we estimate that ~60% of a repo rate change gets transmitted into MCLR. On the bond side, NCDs maturing even in FY25 has lower coupon rate compared to current yield which is already factoring in repo cuts.

SBI Cards/Five Star/CREDAG to benefit the most purely from CoF/spread perspective: Only from funding cost and spread perspective keeping other things constant, SBI Cards (SBICARD IN, Reduce), Five Star (FIVESTAR IN, Buy) and CREDAG (CREDAG IN, Buy) should benefit the most in a declining rate cycle as only ~23%/27%/40% of their borrowings are fixed, while the entire loan book is fixed in nature. We expect LIC HF (LICHF IN, Buy) should be negatively impacted the most, as ~43%/99% its borrowings/loans are floating in nature. Having said that, cost of funds is only one of many factors we look at to arrive at our rating on various stocks. 

Defense stocks: No defense against any potential negatives (Kotak Securities)

A reverse valuation exercise of the major listed defense stocks implies that they will capture the bulk of defense capex in the future, which is contrary to historical trends. Indian defense stocks have witnessed an explosive rally in their stock prices over the past few months on expectations of strong spending by the government and indigenization. We concur with the growth part, but are less sure about the implied profitability assumptions.

Indian defense sector is showing signs of exuberance

The Indian defense sector has witnessed a sharp rerating and delivered massive returns over the past 3-6 months on (1) expectations of large spending by the government for an extended period of time and (2) steady increase in indigenization. Large deal wins of companies boosted investor sentiment. In our view, the stocks largely factor in the aforementioned positives, but not potential risks of (1) delays in ordering and (2) lower profitability.

Listed defense companies will need to execute Rs1.3 tn of defense orders PA

Our reverse valuation analysis based on the current market capitalization of a basket of major defense stocks suggests that these companies will need to execute around Rs1.4 tn of defense orders annually to justify their current stock prices.

For context, these companies combined revenues of Rs625 bn in FY2023. Our assumptions bake in the average margin profile for these stocks (see Exhibit 5). We would note that we have not considered a number of private companies (difficulty in segregating market cap. pertaining to the defense segment alone) and government organizations (unlisted) in this exercise.

Defense capex for domestic procurement at Rs1.6 tn in FY2026E

India’s total defense capex increased at a CAGR of 9% over FY2017-23, resulting in a steady decline in its share of overall government capex. We note that India’s defense imports were around Rs400 bn in FY2019-20. We estimate a market opportunity of Rs1.6 tn for domestic procurement by FY2026 based on our assumptions of (1) strong growth in overall defense capex and (2) low growth in imports due to indigenization.

As such, the basket of defense stocks will need to capture a significantly larger share of India’s domestic defense budget compared with history, even as more private companies are entering the sector.

Profitability may be bigger challenge for companies and investors

We are not sure about the future profitability of the defense companies, as (1) their current profitability seems to be on the higher side, (2) the defense industry could become more competitive with the entry of private sector players and (3) government may tighten procurement terms (monopsony buyer), as domestic production capabilities scale up over time. We would note that lower profitability assumptions will imply much higher implied revenues, which may not be feasible in the context of the market opportunity.

Oil & Gas - Fall of the last bastion? (Prabhudas Lilladher)

We remain cautious on PNGRB’s decision to implement common carrier for product pipelines due to the challenge it poses for OMCs. OMCs own ~90% of marketing infrastructure including pipelines, marketing terminals and depots. While pipelines constructed under bidding process already have provisions for common carrier, older pipelines are still lacking behind.

Overall utilization of product pipelines at 68% in FY23 does present an opportunity to other interested parties including private players. Pipelines provide the cheapest method of transportation, as next best coastal is ~46% costlier while roadways are even twice as costly. In addition to the cost of creating new infrastructure, uncertainty of obtaining right of using land for laying pipelines remains a key challenge limiting expansion of private players in product retailing. However, post implementation of unified tariff of natural gas pipelines, we expect PNGRB to open petroleum product pipelines, a step that may sound like fall of the last bastion for OMCs.

Although HPCL/BPCL/IOCL are trading at 0.9/1.2/0.8x FY24 PBV, a look at their long term valuation charts suggests that they could still correct from here. More importantly, the common carrier access of product pipelines may result in sustained de-rating of these stocks even lower.

Almost all marketing infrastructure owned by OMCs: India has total ~22,500km of product pipelines and ~5,000km of LPG pipelines, almost all owned by OMCs. There are 310 marketing terminals/depots, 91% of which are owned by OMCs. Out of 283 aviation fuel stations, 89% are owned by OMCs and 90% of 87,458 retail outlets are also owned by OMCs.

Pipelines are the most critical part of the supply-chain as their construction takes long time. Just to share a perspective, Kochi-Bangalore gas pipeline has still not been completed even after a decade of commissioning the Kochi LNG terminal.

Common carrier access could break the oligopoly: Private players have largely remained at bay (6-7% market share in sale of petrol/diesel in FY23) given 1) pricing interventions in petrol and diesel resulting in non-competitive environment, and 2) high cost plus time involved in laying marketing infrastructure alongside risk associated with it. However, at times OMCs have bled in terms of losses in marketing segment due to inability to pass on high cost to consumers, over a longer period of time; they have shown resilient profits.

The common carrier access in product pipelines, could thus, lower the entry barrier for private players, thereby challenging dominance of OMCs over a period of time.

Marketing margins losses continue: Average HPCL and BPCL returns have under-performed Nifty by 15/7/6% in past 3/6/12month, while IOCL’s performance has given 8% underperformance against Nifty in 3 months (overperformed 3/16% in 6/12m) due to inability of raising retail prices amidst rising crude oil prices. As per our calculation, the gross marketing margin on petrol and diesel stand at Rs5.5lit and loss of 3.8/lit respectively in Sep’23 compared to Rs10.6lit/10.2/lit in 1QFY24 and Rs8.4/2.7/lit in 2QFY24YTD. 

Thursday, September 7, 2023

Fx cover – some red flags to be watched closely

 The total foreign exchange reserves of India stood at a comfortable US$594.8bn; appx 16% of the estimated FY24 nominal GDP of US$3.6trn. To put this number in perspective, in the last twelve months, India’s trade deficit (Export-Imports) was US$229bn. For FY23, the total current account deficit was US$67.1 while net receipts of capital account were US$57.9bn.

Notably, the forex reserve position of India has not changed materially in the past five years. The forex reserves of India stood at US$422.53bn at the end of FY18, appx 16% of FY18 nominal GDP. The reserves peaked in September 2021 at US$642bn as Covid-19 induced lockdown resulted in the collapse of trade. The recent low was recorded in October 2022 (US$531bn). Since then the Reserve Bank of India has recouped over US$60bn of reserves, bringing the reserves to a comfortable position.

For records, the forex reserves broadly include foreign currency assets (89%), Gold (7%), Special Drawing Rights (3%), and reserve position in IMF (1%). The share of USD or US denominated assets in total forex reserve is usually 60 to 70%; similar to the composition trade invoicing of India. Hence, USDINR movement impacts the reserves materially. 



The forex reserve movement during FY23 has however highlighted a few red flags that need to be tracked closely, especially in view of the slowing global economy (cloudy export outlook), rising energy prices (rising import bill) and shrinking US-India yield differential (pressure on USDINR exchange rate).

·         FY23 The Current Account Deficit of India increased to US$67.1bn against US$38.8bn for FY22.

·         Net capital account receipts were lower at US$57.9bn vs US$86.3bn in FY22. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was lower at US#28bn vs US$38.6bn in FY22. Foreign portfolio investment remained negative (-US$5.2bn) after an outflow of US$16.8bn in FY22

·         External Commercial Borrowings were also negative (-US$8.6bn) against a net ECB inflow of US$8.1bn in FY22.

·         High cost NRI deposits (+US$9bn vs US$3.2bn in FY22) were notable contributors to the capital account.

·         INR exchange rate weakness contributed negatively to the overall reserve position for the second consecutive year.

A major global credit event may not put India in a crisis situation like 2008 or 2013. Nonetheless, a significant deterioration in the reserve position may put pressure on the INR exchange rate, credit spreads, and bond yields.



Wednesday, August 30, 2023

Sailors caught in the storm – Part 2

Recently released minutes of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) highlighted that the latest policy stance is primarily ‘Wait and Watch”. This stance is driven by the hopes of:

(a)   Mother Nature helping a bountiful crop (especially vegetables);

(b)   Current rise in inflation being transitory in nature; but MPC is ready to preempt the second-round impact;

(c)   Capex (both public and private) sustaining despite positive real rates and diminishing liquidity and continuing to remain broad-based;

(d)   Growth in the Indian economy staying resilient enough to withstand the external challenges; and

(e)   Government taking adequate steps to mitigate supply-side shocks, while maintaining fiscal discipline, trade balance, and growth stimulus.

Evidently, RBI has no solid basis for making these assumptions.

The monsoon is not only deficient, it is poor both temporally and spatially. Only 42% of districts in the country have received a normal (-19% to +19% of normal rainfall) so far. The remaining districts are either deficient (-20% to -85% of normal rainfall) or have received excessive rainfall (+20% to +156% above normal). Key Kharif states like Easter UP, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Maharashtra, and MP are deficient. Whereas, the western states of Rajasthan and Gujarat and the Northern states of Himachal, J&K, and Uttarakhand are in the large excess bracket. Key vegetable producing states like UP, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and West Bengal are highly deficient. Besides, the reservoir levels in the key state have fallen below long-term averages and could have some impact on Rabi crop also. Apparently, assumptions of early relief in vegetable & fruits, dairy, oilseeds, and pulses inflation are mostly based on hope.

The impact of the supply side intervention of the government post MPC meet, e.g., export duties on onions, and rice, etc., and release of onion buffer stock; fiscal support like subsidy on tomatoes, etc., could prove to be short-lived. Tax collections have started to weaken, further impeding the fiscal leverage for stimulating the economy.

Foreign flows have moderated in recent months. The pressure on INR is visible. The imported inflation, especially energy, could be a major challenge. Most global analysts and agencies are forecasting higher energy prices this winter due to depleted strategic reserves, continuing production cuts, and persisting demand.

One of the key drivers of the overall India growth story, viz., private consumption, does not appear to be in very good shape. High inflation and rates may keep the consumption growth subdued for a few more quarters at least. In any case, we are witnessing signs of heating up in personal loans and the housing market.

The other key driver of growth, the private capex, has shown some early signs of revival in the recent quarters. However, positive real rates, cloudy domestic consumption demand, and poor external demand outlook could hinder acceleration in private capex. The government is front-loaded its capex budget in the first half of the fiscal year in view of a busy election schedule in the second half. The assumption of growth acceleration may therefore be misplaced. In fact, the RBI has itself projected a much slower rate of growth for 2HFY24 and 1QFY25.

Recently, banking system liquidity has slipped into negative territory. Besides a hike in effective CRR, the RBI has been ensuring the withdrawal of ‘excess’ liquidity from the system. We may therefore see a hike in lending rates as MCLR for banks rises (even if the RBI stays put on repo rates) as we approach the busy credit season. The credit growth may be impacted due to this.

 



Wednesday, August 23, 2023

State of Affairs - Consumers turning cautious

High vegetable, grocery, and energy prices have disrupted the budget of most Indian households. Besides, unaffordable housing costs (rentals & EMI) and education & healthcare costs have impacted many middle-class households. An analysis of 1QFY24 results of the consumer companies indicates that there was nothing particularly noteworthy in the overall performance of the consumer companies. Demand environment for both staples and durable consumer goods remained subdued; though some companies reported decent growth in margins primarily due to lower costs.

The current quarter (2QFY24) has witnessed disruptions due to challenging weather conditions. The southwest monsoon has been erratic both temporally and spatially. To date only about 43% of districts have received normal rainfall; whereas 40% of districts are deficient and 17% have received excess or large excess rainfall. Northern states have witnessed significant disruptions due to excess rains; impacting the logistics and crops. Besides, the festival season this year is pushed back by one month, pushing the festival demand to 3QFY24. Obviously, the outlook for consumer demand does not look exciting for the current quarter.

In this background, it is interesting to note the findings of the latest (July 2023) Consumer Confidence Survey (CCS) by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The key highlights of the survey are:

Present tense: After persistent recovery for almost two years, consumer confidence for the current period stood a shade lower than that witnessed in the previous survey round; improvement in respondents’ sentiment on income and spending was offset by somewhat higher pessimism on the general economic and employment situation.

Future hopeful: Going forward, households expect improvement in general economic, employment, and income conditions; they turned less pessimistic on one year ahead price situation vis-à-vis May 2023 round of the survey. The future expectation index (FEI) remained in optimistic terrain and recorded a marginal rise in the latest survey round.

Sentiments improving: Sentiments on current income improved further and moved to an optimistic zone for the first time in four years; future earnings expectations remain buoyant.



The current perception of the economic situation, employment, and inflation has worsened recently. It has persistently remained negative since July 2022.

The expectation for one year ahead regarding economic situation, employment, and spending has also worsened as compared to May 2023 survey. Though it still remains in positive territory, it has not shown any material improvement since July 2022.

It is fair to say that the future expectations of improvement are driven more by hopes rather than any substantive basis.



Wednesday, July 12, 2023

Internationalisation of INR - 2

The Reserve Bank of India constituted an Inter Departmental Group (IDG) in December 2021 “To examine issues related to Internationalisation of INR and suggest a way forward”. The Group submitted its recommendations in October 2022; and the same have been made public last week. The following are some of the highlights of the IDG recommendations.

Terms of References

The terms of reference of the IDG were as follows -

·         To review the extant framework for use of INR for current and capital account transactions and assess their current levels;

·         To review the extant position of use of INR for transactions between non-residents and the role of off-shore markets in this regard;

·         To propose measures, consistent with the desirable degree of capital account liberalization, to generate incentives for use of INR for trade and financial transaction invoicing and denomination, official reserves and vehicle currency for foreign exchange intervention after analyzing data obtained from AD Banks on INR invoiced trading;

·         To propose measures to bring greater stability in the exchange rate of INR determined by market forces and deep and liquid market with availability of wide range of hedging products, efficient banking system and world class infrastructure with easy accessibility to both residents and non-residents;

·         To recommend measures to address concerns, if any, arising of the Internationalisation of INR;

Internationalisation of currency

“An international currency is used and held beyond the borders of the issuing country for transactions between residents and non-residents, and between residents of two countries other than the issuing country. Currency Internationalisation has thus been described as the international extension of a national currency’s basic functions of serving as a unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value. In other words, the internationalization of a currency is an expression of its external credibility as the economy integrates globally.”

Why Internationalisation?

Internationalisation of a currency helps both the government as well as the private sector the issuing currency, by—

·         allowing a country’s government to finance part of its budget deficit by issuing domestic currency debt in international markets rather than issuing foreign currency instruments;

·         allowing a government to finance part, if not all, of its current account deficit without drawing down its official reserves;

·         allowing the country’s exporters and importers to limit exchange rate risk by allowing domestic firms to invoice and settle their exports/imports in their currency, thus shifting exchange rate risk to their foreign counterparts;

·         permitting domestic firms and financial institutions to access international financial markets without assuming exchange rate risk;

·         offering new profit opportunities to financial institutions, although this benefit may be offset in part by the entry of foreign financial institutions into the domestic financial market (to the extent that the government permits it); and

·         reducing the cost of capital and widening the set of financial institutions that are willing and able to provide capital; thus, boosting capital formation in the economy thereby increasing growth and reducing unemployment.

Cost of internationalisation

The internationalisation of a currency does not happen without a cost. Besides resulting in higher volatility in the exchange rates, it usually has monetary policy implications as the obligation of a country to supply its currency to meet the global demand may come in conflict with its domestic monetary policies, popularly known as the Triffin dilemma. Also, the internationalisation of a currency may accentuate an external shock, given the open channel of the flow of funds into and out of the country and from one currency to another.

The costs also emanate from the additional demand for money and also an increase in the volatility of the demand. International currency use can also have an undesirable impact on the financing conditions.

The process of internationalisation

The IDG felt that internationalisation of INR is a process rather than an event. A series of continuous efforts would be needed to achieve the long-term goal of INR internationalisation. There is a need to build upon the small steps already taken.

Many factors play a role in internationalisation of a currency. The prerequisite for internationalisation is however “widespread use of a currency outside the issuer’s borders”. To popularize the international use of a currency, the factors like size of the economy; centrality to global trade; capital account openness, macroeconomic stability, and depth of financial markets, which provide global investors with a safe store of value, etc. are considered important.

The roadmap for internationalisation therefore includes:

·         Removal of all restrictions on any entity, domestic or foreign, to buy or sell the country’s currency, whether in the spot or forward market.

·         Domestic firms can invoice some, if not all, of their exports in their country’s currency, and foreign firms are likewise able to invoice their exports in that country’s currency, whether to the country itself or to third countries.

·         Foreign firms, financial institutions, official institutions and individuals can hold the country’s currency and financial instruments/assets denominated in it, in amounts that they deem useful and prudent.

·         Not only are foreign firms and financial institutions able to issue marketable instruments in the local currency, but the issuing country’s resident entities are also able to issue local currency-denominated instruments in foreign markets.

·         International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, can issue debt instruments in a country’s market and use its currency in their financial operations.

Internationalisation of the INR and capital account convertibility are processes which are both closely and symbiotically intertwined with each other.

Recommendations of IDG

In view of the IDG over the long term (5yr and above), India will achieve higher level of trade linkages with other countries and improved macro-economic parameters, and INR may ascend to a level where it would be widely used and preferred by other economies as a “vehicle currency”. The IDG recommended that keeping in mind the long run goal of inclusion of INR in IMF’s SDR basket, the following measures should be taken in the short and medium term.

Short term (upto 2yrs) measures

·         Designing a template and adopting a standardized approach for examining the proposals on bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements for invoicing, settlement and payment in INR and local currencies.

·         Making efforts to enable INR as an additional settlement currency in existing multilateral mechanisms such as ACU.

·         Facilitating LCS framework for bilateral transactions in local currencies and operationalising bilateral swap arrangements with the counterpart countries in local currencies.

·         Encouraging opening of INR accounts for non-residents (other than nostro accounts of overseas banks) both in India and outside India.

·         Integrating Indian payment systems with other countries for cross-border transactions.

·         Strengthening financial markets by fostering a global 24x5 INR market and promoting India as the hub for INR transactions and price discovery.

·         Facilitating launch of BIS Investment Pools (BISIP) in INR and inclusion of G-Secs in global bond indices.

·         Recalibrating the FPI regime and rationalizing/harmonizing the extant Know Your Customer (KYC) guidelines.

·         Providing equitable incentives to exporters for INR trade settlement.

Medium-term measures (2 to 5yrs)

·         A review of taxes on Masala bonds.

·         International use of Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) for cross border trade transactions and inclusion of INR as a direct settlement currency in the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system.

·         Examination of taxation issues in financial markets to harmonise tax regimes of India and other financial centers.

·         Allowing banking services in INR outside India through off-shore branches of Indian banks.

The IDG discussed in detail the steps already taken by the government and RBI to achieve the larger objective. From the recommendations however it appears that the steps already taken are too small. The government needs to accelerate the process to earn the confidence of domestic and international businesses and investors to improve the acceptability of INR over the next five years. The most important step seems to be “decontrol”; something the incumbent government has not been very fond of. The volatility, opacity and subjectivity in the policy making seems to have led to erosion of faith in INR. These are perhaps the factors which prevented IDG from categorically saying that INR could be internationalised in the next 10yr or so.

Also see: Internationalisation of INR - 1


Tuesday, July 11, 2023

Internationalisation of INR - 1

 One of the elementary principles of economics is that the price of anything is determined by the equilibrium of demand and supply. Though sometimes, in the short term, a state of inequilibrium may exist leading to higher volatility in prices; the equilibrium is usually restored by operation of a variety of factors. This principle usually applies to all things having an economic value, including currencies, gold and money (capital). The traits of human behavior like "greed", "fear", "complacence", "renunciation", and "aspirations" are usually accounted for as the balancing factors for demand and supply and not considered as determinants of price as such.

However, the case of currencies and capital is slightly complex given currency’s dual role as a medium of exchange and a store of value; and use of money as a policy tool to achieve the objectives of price stability, financial inclusion, poverty alleviation, social justice etc.

As a medium of exchange, price of currency is mostly a function of demand and supply of that currency at any given point in time. Higher supply should normally lead to lower exchange value and vice versa. The demand of the currency as medium of exchange is determined by the factors like relative real rate of return (interest), terms of trade (Trade Balance etc.), and inflation, etc. in the parent jurisdiction.

As a store of value, the price of a currency is, however, materially influenced by the faith of the receiver in the authority issuing such currency. For example, to the transacting parties, promise (since the currency is nothing but a promissory note) of the US Federal Reserve may hold much more value than the promise of, say, the Reserve Bank of Australia; regardless of the fact that the Australia runs a current account surplus, has lower interest rate, a similar inflation profile and a much stronger central bank balance sheet (as compared to the US Federal Reserve) and public debt profile. (1.50AUD=1USD)

Similarly, price of money (Interest rates) is usually a function of demand and supply of the money in the financial system. Demand for money is usually impacted by the factors like level of economic activity and outlook in the foreseeable future; whereas supply of money is mostly a function of risk perception; relative returns and policy objectives.

In Indian context, exchange value of INR, 10yr benchmark yield and crude oil prices evoke much interest. Interestingly most economic growth forecasts appear predicated on these, whereas logically it should be the other way round. Politically also, the USD-INR exchange rate is a popular rhetoric of the politicians on all sides of the Indian political spectrum. Recently, the rise in the international acceptability of INR has become a popular plank of the incumbent government; though there is little evidence of this happening as yet. The politicians refuse to acknowledge that INR depreciation is a normal economic phenomenon, and there is nothing at present that can reverse it.

To further emphasize my point, I may reiterate the following narration from one of my earlier posts.

“In the summer of 2007, I had just moved to the financial capital Mumbai from the political capital Delhi. The mood was as buoyant as it could be. Everyday plane loads of foreign investors and NRIs would alight at Mumbai airport with a bagful of Dollars. They would spend two hours in sweltering heat to reach the then CBD Nariman point (Worli Sea link was not there and BKC was still underdeveloped), and virtually stand in queue to get a deal where they can burn those greenbacks.

Mumbai properties were selling like hot cakes. NRIs from the Middle East, Europe and US were buying properties without even bothering to have a look at them. Bank were hiring jokers for USD 100 to 500k salary for doing nothing. I was of course one of these jokers!

That was the time, when sub-prime crisis has just started to grab headlines. Indian economic cycle started turning down in spring of 2007, with inflation raising its head. RBI had already started tightening. Bubble was already blown and waiting for the pin that would burst it.

INR had appreciated more than 10% vs. USD in the first six months of 2007. However, since January 2008 (INR39=1USD) INR has depreciated over 112% till now (INR82.6=1USD). In the meantime, the Fed has printed USD at an unprecedented rate; and there has been no shortage of supplies of EUR, GBP and JPY either.



The point I am making is that in the present times when the balance sheets of most globally relevant central bankers are running out of space to accommodate additional zeros and their governments are still running fiscal deficits are with impunity to service the mountains of their debts and profligate policies, the value of currency is definitely not a function of demand and supply alone. Regardless of economic theory, it is the faith of people in a particular currency that is the primary determinant of its relative exchange value.

2005-2007 was the time when the Indians had developed good faith in their currency, due to high economic growth. Local people were happy retaining their wealth in INR assets, despite liberal remittance regulations and NRIs were eager to convert a part of their USD holding in INR assets. The situation changed in 2010 onwards. There is no sign of reversal yet. Despite the huge popularity of the incumbent prime minister amongst overseas Indians, we have not seen any material change in remittance patterns in the past six years. Despite tighter regulations, local people appear keen to diversify their INR assets. Most of the USD inflows have come from "professional investors" who invest others' money to earn their salaries and bonuses. These flows are bound to chase the flavor of the day, not necessarily the best investment. Whereas the outflows are mostly personal, or by corporates with material promoters' stakes. Even FDI flows have reportedly slowed down in the past one year.

In my view, no amount of FII/FDI money can strengthen INR if Indians do not have faith in their own currency. Yield and inflation have become secondary considerations.

Recently, the Reserve Bank of India released the “Report of Inter Departmental Group on Internationalisation of INR”. The IDG recommended a pathway to be followed for inclusion of INR in IMF’s SDR basket in the “long run”. Tomorrow, I shall discuss the recommendations of IDG tomorrow, in light of my assumptions.