Continuing from yesterday…(see here)
As I mentioned that the old narratives of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (Tariff protection for domestic businesses), New Deal (Fiscal profligacy to stimulate economy) and Plaza Accord (fiscal and monetary manipulation by government/central banks to balance trade) do not fit the current circumstances, given the vastly different context. The efforts to fit the current U.S. President’s economic actions (and promises) related to trade, tariffs, and fiscal policy into historical molds, don’t align with today’s reality, and may be an exercise in futility.
For example, consider the following:
· In 1930, global trade was 5% of U.S. GDP, and the world economy was already in freefall post-1929 crash. In 2025, trade is a larger share of GDP (e.g., ~25% for the U.S.), but global supply chains are far more integrated, making outright trade wars costlier and less likely. Modern trade agreements (e.g., USMCA, WTO) and digital economies add complexities that were not present in 1930.
Smoot-Hawley’s tariffs were sweeping and indiscriminate (40–60% increase across the board). Current U.S. tariff proposals (e.g., 10–30% on imports, higher on China) are targeted; negotiable; and used more as leverage rather than permanent barriers. Retaliation risks exist (e.g., EU or China tariffs), but multilateral frameworks mitigate escalation.
The 1930s lacked modern central bank tools like QE or quicker rate adjustments. In 2025, central banks globally can counteract trade shocks swiftly; unlike the gold-standard-constrained 1930s.
Critics overstate Smoot-Hawley’s relevance, projecting a worst-case scenario without acknowledging 2025’s resilience (e.g., diversified U.S. economy and tech dominance). The analogy ignores that tariffs today are often diplomatic tools, not ideological commitments, unlike Smoot-Hawley’s protectionist zeal.
· The New Deal addressed 25% unemployment and a collapsed banking system. In 2025, U.S. unemployment is low (4–5%), and banks are stable, though inflation and debt ($36T) pose challenges. The urgency for New Deal-scale intervention is absent.
The New Deal was a comprehensive overhaul of the extant system. Adherence to Keynesian theory was at core of the New Deal. Trump’s infrastructure spending may echo WPA projects, but without the New Deal’s social safety net expansion or unified vision. Besides, current policies are often stalled by partisan gridlock or judicial review, unlike Roosevelt’s legislative dominance.
The New Deal’s trade liberalization (1934 Act) countered Smoot-Hawley’s damage. In 2025, trade policy is biased towards protectionism, not liberalization; and global allies are skeptical of the US leadership, unlike the 1930s’ pre-WWII alignment.
· In 1985, the G5 shared aligned interests (Cold War unity, Japan’s deference). In 2025, the Sino-US rivalry, EU autonomy, and BRICS expansion (e.g., India’s growing role) complicate cooperation. A coordinated currency intervention (like in Plaza Accord) is unlikely given China’s managed yuan and the US political volatility.
The Plaza Accord used currency markets, not tariffs or fiscal policy. Current US actions emphasize more on tariffs and sanctions, not multilateral agreements, reflecting unilateralism over 1985’s teamwork.
The Accord strengthened the US’s exports but sparked Japan’s asset bubble and a lost decade. In 2025, similar interventions risk unintended consequences (e.g., inflation from a weaker dollar), but global economic fragmentation reduces the Accord’s replicability.
G-5 has now been replaced with G-20, which is not necessarily aligned with the US on trade or geopolitical issues.
· Unlike 1930 or 1985, today digital economies (e.g., AI, e-commerce) and global supply chains dominate trade. A 1930 like trade war would disrupt tech flows (e.g., semiconductors), not just goods, with broader fallout. Similarly, a New Deal’s public works may be much less transformative today when remote work and AI are reshaping labor markets.
· Current US political polarization and debt levels materially constrain a New Deal-scale ambition, while cultural shifts (e.g., distrust in institutions) differ from 1930s’ unity or 1985’s optimism.
In my view, rather than forcing old frameworks in the current crisis, it would be more useful if the US policymakers craft a “new solution” suitable to 2025 conditions. The new solution may, for example, include:
· Fair taxes on trade: Tax goods from some countries but let allies like India sell clothes or spices without extra costs. This keeps prices low for Indian shops and helps American workers.
· Green projects: Build solar panels, electric car batteries and chargers, like new roads in the 1930s, to create jobs and fight climate change.
· Global teamwork: Create a new group with India, China, and others to agree on development of a neutral digital currency for international trade settlements; framework for global digital payments, like a global UPI, as an alternative to SWIFT, so no one country controls everything. These ideas can help the US to grow together with its trade partners, without repeating past mistakes.
These are just a few of the suggestions. A pragmatic approach, rather than adopting whimsical and jingoistic measures to achieve MAGA goals, will lead all down, including the US.
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