The world is not resetting — It is reorganizing

The idea of a “global reset” has gained popularity in recent years. It reflects a widespread sense that the extant world order is no longer working and a fundamentally new thing needs to emerge to replace it. Total collapse of global growth in the past couple of decades, unsustainable trade balances, and excessive socialism (social security in developed countries) have raised the specter of a total collapse in the global order, just like it happened in the early part of the twentieth century.

While this feeling is understandable, the term itself might be misleading, in my view. What we are witnessing may not be a reset, but a reorganization of global institutions and systems.

Global systems rarely collapse overnight. Instead, they evolve unevenly, often while appearing stable on the surface. Trade continues, markets function, currencies circulate, and institutions remain intact. Yet beneath this continuity, the logic guiding decisions is changing.

For much of the post–Cold War era, economic integration was the dominant force. Countries pursued efficiency, specialization, and scale. Global supply chains expanded, capital flowed freely, and geopolitical considerations took a back seat to economic growth.

That framework is now under strain.

In recent years, governments have begun to prioritize resilience over efficiency, security over openness, and control over integration. Supply chains are being restructured, trade rules rewritten, and capital flows increasingly scrutinized. These shifts began immediately after the global financial crisis (2009) and have become more visible and consequential in 2025.

Importantly, this does not mean globalization is ending. Instead, it is becoming selective. Nations still trade, invest, and cooperate, but increasingly on conditional terms. Strategic sectors—technology, energy, finance, and critical resources—are no longer treated as neutral economic domains.

For example, the "US-India strategic relationship" experiment started by Bush Jr and MMS has ended. We have gone back to the pre-2009 transactional relationship. People in their 20s may find it hard to assimilate this reversal, but older people find it normal to accept.

This reorganization is messy by nature. Old assumptions coexist with new priorities. Policies are often reactive rather than coherent. Markets oscillate between optimism and caution as they try to interpret incomplete signals.

The danger lies in misdiagnosing the moment. Believing that a clean reset is underway encourages extreme positioning and binary thinking. In reality, the world is navigating a long transition, with overlapping systems and partial adjustments.

For investors, policymakers, and businesses, the challenge is not to predict a final outcome, but to operate effectively during the transition itself. Adaptability matters more than certainty. Flexibility matters more than conviction.

The world is not being rebuilt from scratch. It is being rearranged—slowly, unevenly, and with friction. Understanding this distinction is the first step toward navigating what comes next.

2025: A global reconfiguration in progress

The year 2025 is likely to be remembered not as a moment of rupture, but as a period when several long-term global trends became impossible to ignore. Political realignments, economic fragmentation, and rapid technological change have collectively weakened the assumptions that shaped the global order over the past three decades.

Rather than a sudden “reset,” the world appears to be undergoing a gradual but meaningful reconfiguration. Existing systems continue to function, yet their underlying logic is shifting. Governments, markets, and institutions are adjusting to this reality, though not always in a coordinated or predictable manner.

From integration to strategic competition

For much of the post–Cold War period, economic integration was seen as a stabilizing force. Trade, capital flows, and technology exchange were expected to align national interests and reduce conflict. That assumption is now being tested.

Major economies are increasingly treating economic capabilities as strategic assets. Access to technology, capital markets, critical minerals, and supply chains is no longer viewed as neutral. Instead, these levers are being used to protect national interests and, at times, to influence the behavior of other states.

Examples include export controls on sensitive technologies, higher trade barriers, and the use of financial sanctions. These measures are not new, but their frequency and scope have increased. The result is a more fragmented global economic environment, where efficiency is often sacrificed for resilience and control.

This shift does not signal the end of globalization. Rather, it marks a transition toward selective globalization, shaped by strategic priorities rather than purely economic logic.

Competing power centers and partial decoupling

The United States and China remain the two most influential actors in this evolving system. Their relationship is characterized by deep economic interdependence alongside growing strategic rivalry.

Full decoupling between these economies remains unlikely. However, partial and targeted decoupling—particularly in areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, defense technologies, and critical infrastructure—is already underway. These sectors are increasingly viewed through a national security lens, influencing investment flows and corporate strategies.

Other major players, including Russia, Japan, and the Middle East, are navigating this environment through pragmatic, issue-based alignments rather than fixed alliances. Europe continues to hold substantial economic and regulatory influence, but faces internal constraints that limit its ability to respond quickly and cohesively to global shifts.

The emerging picture is not one of rigid blocs, but of a multipolar system marked by overlapping interests, tactical cooperation, and persistent competition.

Domestic constraints and Policy Uncertainty

At the same time, many countries face significant domestic challenges. Demographic transitions, immigration pressures, social polarization, and fiscal constraints complicate policy choices and limit strategic flexibility.

These internal pressures matter for markets. Political uncertainty and policy inconsistency increase risk premiums and discourage long-term investment. In such an environment, capital tends to favor jurisdictions that offer clarity, institutional stability, and predictable rule-making—even if growth prospects are modest.

Financial markets and the search for stability

Concerns about debt sustainability, fiscal discipline, and the long-term credibility of monetary frameworks have contributed to cautious investor behavior. While fears of an imminent monetary collapse are overstated, the accumulation of structural risks has encouraged diversification.

In this context, increased interest in traditional stores of value such as gold reflects prudent risk management rather than panic. Investors are not abandoning the financial system, but they are reassessing assumptions about stability and correlation across asset classes.

Markets are adapting to a world where geopolitical developments increasingly influence financial outcomes.

India’s strategic position: opportunity and execution

India enters this period of global reconfiguration with significant potential. Its large domestic market, demographic profile, and geopolitical relevance position it well in a multipolar world. The stated objective of strategic autonomy—maintaining relationships across power centers while avoiding excessive dependence—is conceptually sound.

The challenge lies in execution.

For strategic autonomy to be credible, it must be supported by sustained economic reforms, infrastructure development, regulatory predictability, and capital formation. At present, private investment remains cautious, and foreign capital flows have moderated. This reflects not a lack of interest in India, but uncertainty about policy consistency and long-term direction.

Markets tend to distinguish between stated intent and demonstrated capability. Reducing this gap will be critical if India is to translate geopolitical relevance into durable economic influence.

Looking Ahead

The global environment over the next few years is likely to remain complex and fluid. While uncertainty poses risks, it also creates opportunities for countries that can adapt quickly, offer stability, and integrate strategically with global supply chains.

The world is not breaking apart, nor is it returning to old models of dominance. It is evolving toward a more competitive, less predictable equilibrium. Success in this environment will depend less on alignment with any single power and more on institutional strength, policy clarity, and economic resilience.

For policymakers, investors, and businesses alike, the task ahead is not to predict a final outcome, but to navigate a transition that is already underway.

Crystal Ball 2026 – Down but not out

 Across global banks, asset managers, and research institutions, the consensus view for 2026 is of a sub-trend but resilient global economy transitioning into a post-inflation, late-cycle phase.

Growth is expected to remain positive but uneven, led by the U.S. and parts of Asia, while Europe lags amid structural and fiscal constraints. Inflation is broadly forecast to moderate toward central-bank targets, giving policymakers room for gradual and cautious rate cuts, though a return to the ultra-low-rate era is not expected.

Financial markets are seen shifting from liquidity-driven gains to earnings- and fundamentals-based performance, with lower average returns, higher dispersion across assets, and sustained volatility.

Structural forces — geopolitical fragmentation, elevated debt, demographic pressures, and the transition to a more multipolar global order — dominate cyclical drivers, while technology and AI-led productivity gains remain the key upside risk.

Overall, institutions describe 2026 as a year of normalization rather than acceleration, where selectivity, diversification, and risk management matter more than broad market beta.

Here is a snapshot of global outlooks for 2026 based on reports published by leading banks and asset managers.

Crystal Ball 2026 — Consensus Takeaway

Growth: Sub-trend but positive

Inflation: Lower, not gone

Rates: Gradual easing

Markets: Lower returns, higher dispersion

Risks: Geopolitics, debt, fragmentation

Goldman Sachs Asset Management- Cautiously constructive

•      Global growth remains positive but below pre-pandemic trend

•      U.S. avoids recession; growth slows but stays resilient

•      Inflation normalizes further, allowing gradual rate cuts

•      AI-led productivity gains support medium-term optimism

•      Markets likely to favor quality assets over cyclical risk

Fidelity International - Bottom-up cautious

•      Earnings growth becomes more important than multiple expansion

•      Markets increasingly stock-specific

•      Inflation volatility declines but does not disappear

•      Policy mistakes remain a risk

•      Active selection emphasized

Crédit Agricole - Cautious normalization

•      Global growth stabilizes below trend

•      Rate cuts begin but are gradual

•      Credit conditions ease slightly

•      Europe remains vulnerable

•      Financial stability risks monitored

Bank of America - Neutral-to-defensive

•      2026 characterized by slow growth, lower inflation

•      Labor markets cool but avoid collapse

•      Equity upside capped by valuations

•      Bond returns improve versus past decade

•      Policy errors remain key tail risk

Morgan Stanley - Constructive with volatility

•      Growth moderation continues into 2026

•      AI investment supports productivity upside

•      Inflation falls but wage pressures linger

•      Markets transition from liquidity-driven to earnings-driven

•      Increased scenario dispersion

Deutsche Bank - Cautiously pessimistic

•      Global economy avoids recession but lacks momentum

•      Fiscal constraints grow more binding

•      Europe underperforms peers

•      Trade fragmentation intensifies

•      Policy coordination weakens

Citi - Late-cycle cautious

•      Global economy slows into late-cycle phase

•      Inflation normalization supports risk assets

•      Earnings growth uneven

•      Dollar volatility increases

•      Policy uncertainty remains elevated

Moody’s – Credit risk persists

•      Sovereign credit pressures persist

•      High debt constrains fiscal policy

•      Growth insufficient to offset demographics

•      Default risks remain elevated in weaker economies

•      Structural reform critical

State Street Global Advisors - Balanced, risk-aware

•      2026 characterized by late-cycle dynamics

•      Policy rates peak and transition into easing phase

•      Equity returns more moderate than 2023–24

•      Greater dispersion across regions and sectors

•      Volatility structurally higher than pre-2020

BNP Paribas Asset Management - Defensive with selective opportunity

•      Global economy stabilizes but growth remains fragile

•      Europe lags the U.S. and parts of Asia

•      Disinflation trend continues, but uneven

•      Sustainability and energy transition remain long-term drivers

•      Policy uncertainty remains a core risk

J.P. Morgan Asset Management - Constructive but selective

•      Global growth slows but avoids a hard landing

•      Inflation converges toward targets in major economies

•      Central banks gain flexibility in policy

•      Equity returns positive but less broad-based

•      Income and alternatives regain importance

Allianz Global Investors – Active management

•      “New regime” investing continues into 2026

•      Inflation lower, but not returning to ultra-low era

•      Bonds regain relevance as diversifiers

•      Valuations matter more than liquidity

•      Active management favored

Barclays Private Bank - Capital-preservation focused

•      Growth decelerates but remains positive

•      Inflation pressures ease unevenly

•      Higher dispersion across asset classes

•      Defensive positioning favored over aggressive risk-taking

•      Liquidity conditions stabilize

HSBC Asset Management - Global and thematic

•      Global economy transitions toward lower-inflation equilibrium

•      Asia remains the main growth engine

•      U.S. slowdown manageable

•      Climate transition reshapes capital flows

•      Diversification essential

Capital Economics - Macro-pessimistic

•      Global growth remains structurally weak

•      China’s slowdown is secular, not cyclical

•      Advanced economies face aging-related constraints

•      Inflation risks fade faster than growth risks

•      Downside skew remains

MUFG Research – Asia to outperform

•      Asia outperforms developed markets

•      Japan benefits from structural reform

•      China stabilizes at lower growth

•      Currency volatility persists

•      Global financial conditions ease slowly

BlackRock - Regime-change thesis

•      “Fragmented world” theme dominates 2026

•      Higher macro volatility is structural

•      No return to pre-2020 stability

•      Tactical allocation favored over strategic beta

•      Geopolitics shapes returns

Invesco - Selective opportunity

• Market leadership narrows

• Valuation discipline returns

• Alternatives gain prominence

• Income strategies regain relevance

• Long-term themes outweigh cycles

ING - Macro-conservative

•      Growth stabilizes at low levels

•      Europe structurally underperforms

•      Inflation risks fade faster than growth risks

•      Trade fragmentation remains drag

•      Downside risks dominate upside

Diagnosing the investors’ pain - 2

As I mentioned yesterday (see here) the pain being felt presently by the non-institutional investors is disproportionately high. For the investors and traders who have spent a short period of time in the market, mostly those who started investing in post Covid period, the pain may be actual, while for those who have been investing for a long time, the pain might only be notional due to perception of relative underperformance or loss of opportunity cost.

Over exposure to small cap stocks

While large caps account for ~60–63% of total and free-float market capitalization, retail participation in this segment has been relatively muted. Institutional investors—both domestic and foreign—continue to dominate ownership and trading activity in large caps. As a result, price discovery here has been more orderly, liquidity deeper, and drawdowns relatively contained.

In contrast, non-institutional investors (retail investors, HNIs, family offices, and smaller proprietary books) have had disproportionately higher exposure to small cap stocks. This skew became more pronounced during the 2020–2023 period, when abundant liquidity, low interest rates, and a sharp post-COVID earnings rebound created an ideal environment for risk-seeking behavior.

Small caps offered three things that large caps could not during that phase:

·         the promise of rapid earnings growth,

·         the possibility of valuation re-rating, and

·         the psychological appeal of “finding the next multibagger”.

This led to a powerful feedback loop—rising prices attracted incremental capital, which further pushed up prices, often well ahead of fundamentals. Valuation discipline gradually took a back seat.

Consequently, though the tradeable (free float) market cap of 5000 small cap stocks is approximately 17% of the total tradeable market cap, over 35% of the total asset under management (AUM) of mutual funds, AIF and PMS etc. is invested in small cap stocks. Smallcap funds witnessed 37% yoy AUM growth in FY25.

Margin Trade Finance (MTF): the hidden amplifier

Another critical, and often underappreciated, contributor to the current pain has been the sharp rise in Margin Trade Finance (MTF) positions, especially in mid and small cap stocks. Over the last few years, MTF became more accessible, cheaper, and widely marketed. Many investors used leverage not for short-term tactical trades, but for holding structurally illiquid small cap names.

This worked exceptionally well on the way up. However, leverage has a habit of revealing itself brutally on the way down.

As small cap stocks started correcting, even modest price declines triggered margin calls. Forced selling followed—not because of deteriorating business fundamentals in every case, but because leverage reduced the ability to absorb volatility. This has exacerbated downside moves and compressed recovery attempts, thereby deepening investor discomfort.

Importantly, this phenomenon does not show up clearly in index-level data. Indices are weighted by market capitalization, while investor pain is weighted by position concentration and leverage. The two are very different.

Normalization, not necessarily a breakdown

The current correction in small cap stocks should also be viewed in a broader historical context. Between 2020 and 2023, small cap indices and several individual stocks delivered returns far in excess of long-term averages—both in absolute terms and relative to earnings growth. A phase of return normalization was therefore inevitable.

What we are witnessing now appears less like a systemic breakdown and more like a recalibration—of valuations, expectations, and risk appetite. Such phases are uncomfortable, but they are also an integral part of healthy market cycles.

For investors, the key takeaway is not to extrapolate past excess returns indefinitely, nor to assume that all pain signals permanent damage. The real task lies in reassessing portfolio construction—especially exposure to illiquid names, leverage usage, and valuation sensitivity—so that future volatility becomes survivable rather than debilitating.

 

What to do now?

Investors need to have a hard relook at their investment strategies and portfolios, and carry out the following five corrections, if needed, in my view:

·         Calibrate all deviations from the predetermined asset allocations.

·         Resize the disproportionate allocations to small and midcap stocks.

·         Exit narrative and momentum stocks where the fundamentals are weak or do not support the stock price.

·         Deleverage.

·         Review your advisors’ quality, and look for alternatives if needed.

Diagnosing the investors’ pain

The benchmark Nifty50 has faced acute selling pressure around the 26000 level in the past two months. It has made several unsuccessful attempts to sustainably topple over this barrier. Nifty Midcap100 (benchmark for midcap stocks) has also shown a similar trend in the 60000-60500 range. Nifty Smallcap 100 (benchmark for smallcap stocks) has declined for the past two months.

It is pertinent to note that in Indian context, a large cap company is defined as a company that falls within the top 100 companies in the country in terms of total market capitalization. At present, the companies with a total market capitalization in excess of appx Rs1060bn (~USD1.2bn) would qualify to be large cap companies. The companies with a market capitalization rank from 101 to 250 are termed as midcap companies. Presently, the companies with a total market capitalization between 343bn and Rs1060bn (US$375mn to US$1.2bn) are classified as midcap companies. All other companies are classified as small cap companies.

Out of INR474trn total market capitalization of Indian listed companies, appx 60% is of large cap companies (top 100); 20% is of midcap companies (101 to 250); and 20% is of small cap companies (251 to 5250).

If we consider free float market cap, i.e., market cap excluding the promoters’ holding, appx 63% is of large cap companies (top 100); 20% is of midcap companies (101 to 250); and 17% is of small cap companies (251 to 5250).

(These are approximate numbers based on data collected from various sources. Actual numbers might be slightly different.)

On 2025YTD basis, Nifty50 is up ~9.5%, Midcap100 is up ~4.5% and Smallcap 100 is down ~8%. As per the Value Research data, on an average YTD2025, large cap funds have yielded a return of 8%, Midcap 2% and Smallcap funds (-)6%. Multicap and Flexicap funds have yielded a return of 1.5%-3%, on an average YTD2025.

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​However, anecdotal evidence indicates that the pain being felt by investors is much more severe than what the performances of benchmark indices or average of a fund category might indicate. In my view, it might be an opportune time to diagnose the reasons for this acute pain, in order to take corrective steps, including amending the investment strategies, if required.

More on this tomorrow.