What gets measured gets managed. What gets obscured gets inherited.
The completion of twelve years of the Narendra Modi-led NDA government has triggered a familiar debate. Supporters point to faster infrastructure creation, digitization of governance, improved tax compliance, stronger foreign policy visibility, record UPI adoption, rising formalization, and India’s emergence as one of the fastest-growing major economies.
Critics argue that beneath these achievements lie deeper structural weaknesses that have either persisted or worsened.
Both narratives contain elements of truth.
India today is larger, more digitally connected, and more visible on the global stage than it was in 2014. Yet the ultimate test of governance is not merely GDP growth or international ranking of GDP number. It is whether the country’s long-term developmental foundations have strengthened.
(I would like to make it clear that this is not an exercise in political partisanship. The purpose here is narrower and, in some ways, more demanding: to assess the domains where the record is objectively weak and the agenda remains unfinished.)
Human capital: The unfinished foundation
India’s most consequential competitive advantage is demographic: a large, young workforce that ought to be highly productive. Whether it will be, depends almost entirely on the quality of education and health systems built now. On this, the twelve-year record is mixed at the primary level and disappointing at the structural level.
Education
As per the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2024 — approximately 50% of Class 5 students cannot read a Class 2-level text — a basic literacy failure at scale, after a decade of policy attention. Secondary education outcomes remain poor. Dropout rates among 15-16 year-olds average 8%, rising to 13% in Uttar Pradesh and 8.6% in Bihar. Teacher training, while expanded, remains syllabus-driven rather than competency-driven. The National Education Policy 2020, whatever its aspirations, has yet to produce measurable system-wide improvement at secondary and tertiary levels.
Public investment in education has consistently fallen short of the 6% of GDP target that NEP 2020 itself mandates. The structural deficit in higher education quality — as measured by India’s dismal showing in global university rankings — has not been meaningfully addressed.
Health
The trajectory on health outcomes shows improvement on legacy indicators: infant mortality has declined from approximately 40 per 1,000 live births in 2014 to 25 by 2023; the maternal mortality rate has improved to 80 per 100,000 live births (compared to 130 in 2014). These improvements reflect the continuation of long-run secular trends, aided by schemes like Janani Suraksha Yojana.
What has not improved is the structural commitment to public health financing. India’s public health spending continues to hover around 1.9% of GDP — well below the National Health Policy 2017 target of 2.5% by 2025. Critically, Union transfers to states for the National Health Mission dropped from 75.9% of the health budget in 2014-15 to just 43% in 2024-25 in real terms. The burden of healthcare costs on households remains severe: out-of-pocket expenditure accounts for approximately 48% of total health spending, pushing an estimated 63 million Indians into poverty annually due to catastrophic medical costs.
Ayushman Bharat is a genuine policy innovation, extending coverage to previously uninsured populations. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains contested — particularly the quality of care delivered and the adequacy of insurance payouts for complex conditions. Access to basic primary care, especially in rural areas, remains structurally underfunded.
The verdict on human capital is that incremental improvements have occurred, but the structural investment required to realize the demographic dividend has not been made. The 2030s will reveal the cost of this underinvestment.
Employment: The disputed ledger
No topic in Indian economic policy discourse is more contested — or more politically charged — than employment. Both the government’s triumphalist claims and the opposition’s ‘jobless growth’ narrative oversimplify a complex picture.
The data from the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) does show genuine improvement on several headline metrics. The Worker Population Ratio increased by approximately 9 percentage points between 2017 and 2023, implying a 26% rise in employment over the period. Youth unemployment fell from 17.8% in 2017-18 to 10% in 2022-23. Female labour force participation has increased, particularly in rural areas. The employment elasticity of GDP between 2017 and 2023 was approximately 1.11 — suggesting that every 1% increase in GDP was accompanied by a 1.11% rise in employment.
These are not fabricated numbers, and dismissing them entirely would be dishonest. However, the quality of employment created remains the central and largely unresolved concern.
The increase in employment is predominantly in self-employment, unpaid family labour, and informal agriculture — not in the organized manufacturing or formal services jobs that generate the quality of employment needed to absorb India’s approximately 12 million annual entrants to the labour force. The share of manufacturing in total employment has not meaningfully increased. India has not replicated the manufacturing-led employment transformation that propelled East Asian economies. EPFO payroll additions (a proxy for formal employment) remain modest relative to the scale of the workforce.
The absence of a population census since 2011 also introduces genuine uncertainty into employment data — a point that is more than a political talking point. The PLFS itself notes methodological limitations in capturing the full complexity of informal employment.
Assessment: The ‘jobless growth’ narrative is an overstatement. But the quality of employment — formal, productive, adequately compensated — has not kept pace with economic growth. This is not a failure unique to the Modi years, but twelve years of high growth should have delivered a more decisive structural transformation.
Energy security: The widening import gap
India’s energy vulnerability is the most under-discussed structural risk in the country’s economic story. Twelve years of a government that has consistently invoked energy security as a national priority have paradoxically left India more import-dependent than it was in 2014.
The data is unambiguous. Domestic crude oil production has fallen from 36.94 million tonnes in 2015-16 to 28.7 million tonnes in 2024-25 — a 22.3% decline. Simultaneously, crude oil imports rose from 202.85 million tonnes in 2015-16 to 243.22 million tonnes in 2024-25. India’s crude oil import dependence has increased from 84% in 2014-15 to approximately 88-90% in 2024-25. The annual crude import bill reached approximately USD 137 billion in FY2024-25.
The situation is made structurally worse by a depletion of domestic reserves. India’s proved crude oil reserves fell from 762.73 million tonnes in 2014 to 672.07 million tonnes — a 12% decline. Natural gas reserves fell more sharply, from 1,427 BCM in 2014 to 1,073 BCM in 2025, a 25% reduction. Despite opening the oil and gas sector to 100% FDI, India attracted only about USD 8.19 billion in upstream FDI between April 2000 and September 2024 — a rounding error by global exploration standards.
The renewable exception — A genuine achievement
The solar power story is, without qualification, a significant achievement of the Modi years. India’s installed solar capacity increased from just 3 GW in 2014 to approximately 130 GW by 2025 — a more than 40-fold increase. Overall renewable capacity grew from 76 GW in 2014 to over 233 GW in 2025. India now ranks third globally in solar capacity. This is real, meaningful, and strategically important.
The limitation, and it is a significant one, is that renewables’ share of actual electricity generation (~16%) remains well below their share of installed capacity (~50%), due to the intermittency problem and inadequate storage infrastructure. Coal-fired generation still accounts for over 80% of actual power produced. The structural energy vulnerability — particularly to Middle East geopolitics — therefore persists. The West Asia disruptions of early 2026 demonstrated this with painful clarity.
Crude import dependence (2014-15): 84%
Crude import dependence (2024-25): ~89%
Domestic production decline: -22.3% (2015-16 to 2024-25)
Solar capacity (2014): 3 GW
Solar capacity (2025): ~130 GW
Income and wealth inequality: The inconvenient numbers
India’s growth story has generated enormous aggregate wealth. The distribution of that wealth is a separate, and far less comfortable, conversation.
The top 10% of Indians hold approximately 57% of national income; the top 1% hold approximately 22%. The bottom 50% account for roughly 13% of national income. Wealth concentration is even more extreme: the top 1% own approximately 40% of total national wealth, while the bottom 50% hold just 3%. The wealth Gini coefficient rose from 81.2% in 2008 to 85.4% in 2018 and has remained elevated since.
The government has pointed, with some justification, to the Household Consumption Expenditure Survey of 2022-23 showing a Gini Index of 25.5 — a relatively low figure. This requires context: this is a consumption-based measure, not an income or wealth-based measure, and is not comparable to the income-Gini figures cited by most international institutions. The World Bank itself noted this distinction in its April 2025 Poverty & Equity Brief. Consumption surveys structurally understate the true inequality in income and wealth.
There is a legitimate discussion to be had about methodology. But the direction of travel is not seriously in dispute: labor’s share of national income declined from approximately 32% in the 1990s to roughly 22% by 2024, per ILO data. CEO pay rose 50% between 2019 and 2024, while worker wages grew by less than 1%. The billionaire class has expanded dramatically; Asia’s two wealthiest individuals are Indian. This has occurred during a period of strong aggregate GDP growth — which is precisely the point. Growth has not been distributionally neutral.
The government’s narrative on inequality leans heavily on poverty reduction data, which is real and significant. But poverty reduction and widening inequality can coexist — and in India’s case, they have.
Ecological vulnerabilities: Progress and denial
India’s ecological stress represents the compound interest on decades of growth-at-all-costs development — and the Modi government has managed this inheritance with mixed results.
Forests and Biodiversity
The global annual rate of net forest loss has declined from 10.7 million hectares (1990-2000) to 4.12 million hectares (2015-2025), reflecting global improvements in forest governance. India’s official forest cover figures show a modest increase in recorded forest area. However, independent analyses consistently note that the definitional inclusion of monoculture plantations and agroforestry distorts the picture. Net natural forest loss continues, biodiversity pressures remain acute, and forest clearances for infrastructure projects have been expedited rather than constrained under the current regime, including significant amendments to the Forest Conservation Act.
Water
India’s water stress is accelerating. The country accounts for approximately 17% of the world’s population but has access to only 4% of its fresh water. Groundwater depletion continues at alarming rates across the Indo-Gangetic plains and peninsular India. The Jal Jeevan Mission, which aims to provide tap water connections to all rural households, has achieved impressive connection numbers (over 80% coverage reported). Independent assessments, however, note significant gaps between connections and functional, quality water supply. The deeper structural challenge of aquifer depletion has not been addressed.
Air Quality
India contains 42 of the world’s 50 most polluted cities by PM2.5 concentration. Delhi’s air quality routinely reaches hazardous levels for months each year. The National Clean Air Program has set targets; measurable progress at the population level remains elusive. This is an area where 12 years of policy attention has yielded insufficient results.
Against these challenges, the renewable energy transition is a genuine bright spot. India’s commitments under the Paris Agreement have been largely honored, and the clean energy deployment trajectory is one of the world’s more credible energy transitions.
Institutional credibility: The slow erosion
Democratic health depends not only on elections — which India continues to hold — but on the credibility of the institutions that make those elections meaningful and that arbitrate between citizens and the state. This is where the twelve-year record raises the most serious concerns.
Judiciary
The formal independence of India’s judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed, and the Supreme Court has delivered important rulings that constrain executive power. But the perception of increasing politicization is not limited to partisan critics. Freedom House’s 2024 report notes that while the judiciary is formally independent, ‘courts have shown signs of increasing politicization’ and government judicial appointments have been considered political in nature by observers. Several high-profile Supreme Court rulings have been favorable to the ruling party on politically sensitive matters. The pace of judicial appointments and the government’s posture toward the collegium system have been sources of institutional friction.
Election commission and democratic institutions
The Election Commission of India has faced unusually sharp credibility questions during this period. Opposition parties, civil society organizations, and a growing body of expert opinion have raised concerns about the Commission’s assertiveness in enforcing the Model Code of Conduct evenhandedly. The 2024 Lok Sabha elections were considered broadly free and fair — the outcome itself was proof of that, with the BJP performing worse than projected. But the process, including VVPAT verification controversies and the appointment process for Election Commissioners, has drawn sustained scrutiny.
Press Freedom
The Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranked India 159th in 2024 and 157th in 2026 — among the lowest-ranked democracies in the world. The methodology of this index is contestable, and the government has credibly argued that India’s 900+ television channels and thousands of print outlets constitute genuine media plurality. The concern, however, is structural: media ownership has consolidated dramatically. The acquisition of NDTV by the Adani Group in 2022 and the creation of JioStar through a Reliance-Disney merger have raised well-documented concerns about editorial independence in the concentrated ownership environment.
India has moved from ‘Free’ to ‘Partly Free’ in the Freedom House classification, a designation maintained since 2021. The V-Dem Institute classifies India as an ‘Electoral Autocracy.’ These designations are contested and carry Western institutional biases. But the direction of the trend — even adjusting for methodological limitations — is difficult to dismiss.
Law enforcement and the corruption paradox
Perhaps the most difficult section to write — and the most important for institutional credibility — concerns the use of investigative agencies and the government’s relationship with political corruption.
India’s Corruption Perceptions Index score was 36 in 2013 (when the Modi government inherited the UPA’s record). It stood at 38 in 2024 — a marginal deterioration that prompted the government itself to distance itself from the methodology. The government’s rhetoric has been consistently and emphatically anti-corruption. The substantive record is more complicated.
The Indian Express conducted an investigation in 2024 that documented 25 opposition politicians facing central agency investigations who crossed over to the BJP since 2014. Of these, 23 received reprieve — with three cases closed entirely and 20 stalled or placed in cold storage. In contrast, the same investigation noted that between 2014 and September 2022, 121 prominent political leaders came under the ED’s radar, of whom 115 were from opposition parties.
The pattern is not entirely new in Indian politics — the weaponization of investigation agencies predates Modi. But the scale and systematicity of the ‘washing machine’ phenomenon (as it has come to be called across party lines, including by a former BJP state president who first used the metaphor) is unprecedented. This is not partisan allegation; it is documented by the country’s most respected investigative journalism.
The corrosive effect on institutional credibility is twofold: it undermines the legitimacy of genuine anti-corruption action when it occurs, and it normalizes a transactional relationship between political loyalty and legal jeopardy. This is not a foundation on which rule of law can be built.
A government that came to power on an explicit anti-corruption mandate and has expanded the remit and resources of the ED must be held to a higher standard on this dimension. The ‘washing machine’ pattern represents a material failure against that standard.
Conclusion: The 12-year balance sheet
The Modi government’s achievements are real and should not be elided in an honest assessment. The physical infrastructure build-out, digital public infrastructure, formalization of the economy through GST and DBT, and the renewable energy transition are all genuine program successes.
But twelve years is long enough for structural failures to be owned. The human capital foundation — in education quality and public health investment — remains inadequate for the ambitions of a country claiming to be a future economic superpower. Energy import dependence has worsened despite ambitious rhetoric. Income and wealth inequality have increased materially, even as poverty has been reduced. Ecological stress is unaddressed at systemic scale. And the credibility of democratic institutions — judiciary, election commission, investigative agencies, and a free press — has declined by most independent measures.
The investment implications of this assessment are not trivial. An economy with deteriorating human capital quality, rising inequality, deepening energy import dependence, and weakening institutional credibility faces compounding structural headwinds that will eventually show up in growth sustainability, FDI attractiveness, and market valuations.
The next election cycle will offer a fresh mandate — to this government or to an alternative. The structural challenges catalogued here, however, are not election-cycle problems. They are generational ones, and they will require a generational commitment of political will and public resources that Indian politics, across all parties, has thus far found difficult to sustain.