Do it yourself

 The Reserve Bank of India adopted its current monetary policy framework in August 2016, under the governorship of Dr. Raghuram Rajan. This marked a major shift in the monetary policy formulation process in India.

In the pre-independence era, the function of monetary policy was mainly to maintain the sterling parity, with the exchange rate being the nominal anchor of monetary policy. Liquidity was regulated through open market operations (OMOs), bank rate and cash reserve ratio (CRR). After independence, India adopted the planning model of development, loosely based on the USSR model. The role of RBI monetary policy in this model was mostly to regulate credit availability, employing OMOs, set bank rate and reserve requirement in congruence with the planning objectives and development needs of the country.

The monetary policy framework witnessed a major shift between from mid 1980s to late 1990s. In 1985, on the recommendation of the (Dr. Sukhamoy) Chakravarty Committee, a new monetary policy framework was implemented. This framework was primarily based on targeting with feedback models. This framework was termed “Monetary Targeting with Feedback” as it was flexible enough to accommodate changes in output growth. The RBI was mandated to control inflation within acceptable levels with desired output growth. Further, instead of following a fixed target for money supply growth, a range was followed which was subject to mid-year adjustments.

Developments like deregulation of interest rates, integration of the Indian economy with the global economy, liberalization of the exchange rate system, etc. in the mid 1990s, warranted a change in the monetary policy approach. The RBI began to deemphasize the role of monetary aggregates and implemented a multiple indicator approach (MIA) to monetary policy in 1998 encompassing all economic and financial variables that influence the major objectives outlined in the Preamble of the RBI Act. This was done in two phases—initially MIA and later augmented MIA (AMIA) which included forward looking variables and time series models.

The current monetary policy framework of the RBI was adopted in 2016. This framework was based on the recommendations of the (Dr. Urjit) Patel Committee report. The Committee recommended a monetary policy framework that was largely based on the US FOMC model – flexible inflation targeting by RBI and a six-member statutory Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) for setting the policy repo rate. The key tools of monetary policy implementation under this framework have been the repo rate as the primary policy rate, supported by liquidity management tools like open market operations, standing deposit facility, and marginal standing facility.

The Monetary Policy Framework Agreement (MPFA) was signed between the Government of India and the RBI in February 2015 to formally adopt the flexible inflation targeting (FIT) framework. This was followed up with the amendment to the RBI Act, 1934 in May 2016 to provide a statutory basis for the implementation of the FIT framework. The Central Government notified in the Official Gazette dated August 5, 2016, that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation target would be 4% with ± 2% tolerance band for the period from August 5, 2016 to March 31, 2021. The same tolerance band has however continued even after the March 2021 deadline.

The framework has, so far, helped anchor inflation expectations, reduce inflation volatility (from 7.5% pre-2016 to ~5% post-2016), and support growth, though challenges remain due to supply-side shocks (e.g., food and fuel prices) and external spillovers.

The RBI has now released a discussion paper listing proposals to suitably refine the extant monetary policy framework, to address emerging economic challenges, such as supply shocks, global uncertainties, and climate-related risks. The goal is to maintain price stability while supporting economic growth and financial stability in a dynamic global and domestic environment.

Proposed refinements

Inflation target and tolerance band: Retain the 4% CPI inflation target but review the ±2% tolerance band. RBI proposes (i) narrow the band (e.g., ±1.5%) for stricter inflation control; or (ii) maintain the current band but clarify its use to avoid misinterpretation as a range for persistent deviation; or (iii) Introduce asymmetric bands (e.g., tighter upper bound to prioritize high inflation control). RBI also suggests considering core inflation (excluding volatile food and fuel prices) as a secondary guide to better reflect demand-driven pressures. Public comments are invited by September 30, 2025, on key questions: Should the 4% target or ±2% band be revised?

Scope of inflation targeting: Continue using headline CPI as the primary metric due to its broad coverage and public relevance. Explore supplementary indicators (e.g., core inflation, inflation expectations, or sectoral indices) to address supply shocks like food price spikes, which are less responsive to monetary policy.

Monetary policy committee (MPC) processes: Enhance transparency through more detailed MPC minutes and forward guidance on policy intentions. Propose increasing the frequency of MPC meetings (e.g., monthly instead of bimonthly) to respond more swiftly to economic developments. Consider expanding external member expertise to include climate economics and global trade specialists.

Incorporating new challenges: RBI proposes to incorporate certain contemporary challenges in the process of setting monetary policy. These new challenges include - (i) Climate Risks: Integrate climate-related risks (e.g., weather-induced food price shocks) into the framework, potentially through adjusted forecasting models or stress-testing scenarios. (ii) Digitalization and Fintech: Account for the impact of digital currencies and fintech on money supply and monetary transmission. (iii) Global Spillovers: Strengthen coordination with global central banks to mitigate the impact of external shocks (e.g., U.S. Federal Reserve rate hikes, commodity price volatility).

Monetary policy transmission: Address lags and inefficiencies in policy transmission (e.g., slow pass-through of rate changes to lending rates) by improving banking sector competition and liquidity management. The RBI proposed exploring alternative tools, such as forward guidance or yield curve control, to enhance transmission in volatile markets.

Growth and financial stability: Balance inflation control with growth objectives, especially in the context of India’s post-pandemic recovery and structural reforms. Strengthen coordination between monetary and fiscal policies to avoid conflicting signals (e.g., high fiscal deficits undermining inflation control).

Rationale for Review

Changing economic landscape: Rising supply-side shocks (e.g., food and energy prices, climate disruptions) and global uncertainties (e.g., geopolitical tensions, monetary tightening in advanced economies) require a more adaptive framework.

Inflation dynamics: Persistent food inflation and volatile global commodity prices challenge the FIT framework’s effectiveness.

Stakeholder feedback: Public and expert consultations highlight the need for greater clarity on the tolerance band and flexibility in addressing non-monetary inflation drivers.

Expected Impact

Price Stability: A refined framework could better anchor inflation expectations, reducing volatility.

Economic Growth: Enhanced flexibility may support growth without compromising inflation control.

Resilience: Addressing climate and global risks could make the framework more robust to shocks.

Challenges: Narrowing the tolerance band or increasing meeting frequency may strain RBI resources and require careful calibration to avoid over-tightening.

In July 2025, India’s consumer price inflation (CPI) hit an eight year low of 1.55% (yoy). Several factors contributed to the fall in inflation, including, a favorable base effect, lower fuel inflation, and decline in beverages and food prices. Since the inflation is much below the RBI tolerance range of 4% to 6%, it has excited the market participants about another rate cut at the RBI’s October 2025 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting. The prospect of lower Goods and Services Tax (GST) rates from November 2025, which could keep inflation subdued further, has added fuel to the speculations.

However, notwithstanding what RBI does at its next meeting, we need to answer a fundamental question - Is this low inflation—or even disinflation—a desirable thing for a growing economy like India?

Positive side of low inflation

Boost to Consumer Spending: Lower prices for essentials like vegetables and pulses mean more disposable income, which could spur consumption in a country where private spending drives nearly 60% of GDP.

Room for RBI Rate Cuts: Low inflation gives the RBI wiggle room to cut rates further, potentially by 25 basis points in October, reducing borrowing costs for businesses and homebuyers. Cheaper loans could ignite investment and housing demand, key pillars of India’s growth story.

GST relief on the horizon: Hopes of lower GST rates from November 2025 could be a game-changer. A reduction in GST, especially on essentials (which make up ~46% of the CPI basket), could keep inflation in check, further boosting purchasing power. This could amplify the RBI’s efforts to stimulate growth without stoking price pressures.

For a growing economy like India, projected to grow at 6.5-7% in FY26, low inflation creates a stable environment for businesses to plan investments and for consumers to spend confidently. No wonder markets are abuzz with optimism.

Why low inflation might be a problem

Low inflation, or worse, disinflation (a slowing rate of inflation), isn’t always a sign of economic health. For a dynamic economy like India, aiming to scale manufacturing and infrastructure, persistently low inflation could spell trouble.

Dampening capex enthusiasm: Low inflation often signals weak demand or excess supply. If prices stay too low, businesses may hesitate to invest in new factories, machinery, or tech upgrades—key drivers of capacity addition (capex). Why expand when profit margins are squeezed, and demand looks shaky? India’s GDP growth is already lacking triggers for acceleration, and a prolonged low-inflation environment could further sap corporate confidence.

Savings take a hit: Low inflation often leads to lower interest rates, as seen with the RBI’s recent cuts. While this is great for borrowers, it’s a blow to savers. Fixed deposits and small savings schemes, mainstay of Indian households’ savings, yield less in a low-rate regime. With real returns (adjusted for inflation) shrinking, households might cut back on savings, which fund bank lending and, ultimately, investment. India’s gross domestic savings rate, already down to 30.2% of GDP in FY24, could face further pressure.

Deflationary risks: If inflation dips too low—say, into disinflation or outright deflation—consumers might delay purchases, expecting prices to fall further. This could trigger a demand slump, hitting sectors like consumer durables and retail hard. Japan’s “lost decades” serve as a cautionary tale of how deflation can choke growth.

RBI’s warning bell: The RBI’s latest monetary policy review projects inflation rising to 4.6% in Q1 FY26, driven by potential food price spikes and global pressures like US tariff hikes (impacting 10.3% of the CPI basket). If businesses and consumers bank on low inflation now, only to face a sudden uptick, it could disrupt planning and erode confidence.

The GST wildcard

The anticipated GST rate cut from November 2025 could tilt the scales. Lower GST on essentials could keep inflation below the RBI’s projections, supporting consumer spending and giving the RBI more room to ease rates.

For instance, a 1% reduction in GST on food items could shave 0.1-0.2% off headline inflation, based on historical studies. This would be a boon for growth, especially in rural areas where food dominates household budgets.

But there’s a catch. Lower GST could reduce government revenue, limiting fiscal space for infrastructure spending—a key driver of India’s capex cycle. Plus, if global commodity prices or US tariffs spike, imported inflation could offset GST’s deflationary impact, forcing the RBI to rethink rate cuts.

Conclusion

Low inflation could be an opportunity as well as a challenge for India. In the short-term, it’s a tailwind—cheaper goods, lower borrowing costs, and potential GST relief could juice up consumption and growth. But sustained low inflation risks stifling capex and savings, which India can’t afford. The RBI’s cautious outlook for FY26, coupled with external risks, suggests it will tread carefully, likely opting for a modest 25-basis-point cut in October rather than aggressive easing.

Investors should watch the October MPC meeting closely and track GST reform updates. Sectors like consumer goods and banking could benefit from lower rates and higher spending, but keep an eye on capex-heavy industries like infrastructure and manufacturing for signs of slowdown. For now, enjoy the calm—but don’t bet the farm on it lasting.

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The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India concluded its three-day meeting on Wednesday. The committee voted unanimously to keep the policy repo rate unchanged at 5.50 per cent. The MPC also decided to continue with the neutral monetary policy stance.

Continuing from yesterday…Mr. Bond no longer a superstar

In my view, the stock market outlook in India, in the short term of one year, is a function of the following seven factors:

In the past few days, three noteworthy events took place in the global financial markets. These events highlight the policymakers’ dilemma and the uncertainty faced by the financial markets.

First, the Bank of Japan changed its policy stance of “negative interest rates” ending its massive decade-long monetary stimulus exercise to a virtual close. Addressing the press after the policy decision, Governor Kazua Ueda emphasized that BoJ has “reverted to a normal monetary policy targeting short-term interest rates as with other central banks” He also added that “if trend inflation heightens a bit more, that may lead to an increase in short-term rates”.

An overwhelming market consensus now believes that BoJ will hike the policy rates from the present 0-0.1% to 1% in the next year. However, given the massive debt accumulated over the past two decades, Japan may not afford any rate hike beyond 1%.

USDJPY (151.38) is now at its lowest level since 1990.

Second, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) cut its policy rates by 25bps, its first rate cut in nine years. The other European central banks, viz., Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank) and Bank of England however decided to maintain the status quo. The decision of SNB was unexpected as the market consensus favored a status quo. SNB did not commit to any further cuts.

This ‘surprise’ move by SNB led the Swiss Franc (USDCHF) and Swiss treasuries to tumble down to their lowest level in eight months.

Third, the US Federal Reserve maintained the status quo on its policy rates, holding the policy rates in a range of 5.25%-5.5%, as expected by the market consensus. The market expectations are now veering around 0-3 cuts this year, against the expectations of 6-8 cuts four months ago. The ‘no-cut’ this year is gaining more support every day.

In the post-meeting press interaction, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell was as non-committal as one could be, leaving the markets confused and speculating. Powell said, “despite high interest rates, economic growth has remained relatively strong and inflation has materially lowered over the past year. Consequently, the FOMC raised its growth and inflation expectations for 2024”. Powell added that “there is still plenty of progress to be made on meeting its 2% inflation target” and hence “the path forward is uncertain.”

After reading the three policy statements carefully, my understanding of the situation is as follows:

·         The central banks are increasingly confident of avoiding any deeper recession in the short term at least (1-2 years). Even the “soft-landing” (shallow recession) appears to be slowly becoming a bear case. The base case is low growth for a longer period.

·         The central bankers are inclined to accept 2-4% inflation as normal. This suits everyone. The governments that have accumulated massive debt over the past decade would be happy if the real rates just stayed negative for long. Savers are happy to earn higher nominal rates on their savings. Corporations are happy to borrow more at negative real rates, buy back their equity, and enhance the market value of their businesses with low earnings growth. We may also see a relative currency depreciation of countries with high external debt (e.g., the US) as a tool for debt management.

·         The popular narrative revolves around “resilient growth”, “sticky inflation” and “calibrated easing”. None seems to be positioned for a Fed rate hike presently. Though the probability may be negligible presently, further strengthening of growth momentum, a strong El Nino, and/or worsening of geopolitical conditions in the Middle East Asia and Central Europe fueling inflation could enhance this probability.

In the Indian context, the RBI has been on pause for over a year now. This is despite inflation consistently remaining close to above the upper bound of its tolerance range of 4-6%; growth surpassing its mostly optimistic estimates; distinct signs of heating in certain pockets of the credit market (especially credit card outstandings and unsecured NBFC lending); and the regulators frequently expressing concerns over excesses in financial markets. RBI has chosen to use tools like withdrawing liquidity through open market operations and nudging NBFCs and banks through advisories to regulate the credit markets.

The popular market narrative in India also revolves around the timing of the cut rather than “cut or hike”. For the financial sector, it means “Margin pressure”, “slower growth”, and “pressure on asset quality”.

RBI’s pause hinders the lenders’ ability to hike the lending rates when the cost of funds is rising due to tighter liquidity and stricter norms. The government has hiked the rates on small savings and EPF. This pressures banks’ cost of deposits. Stricter lending norms might adversely impact the product mix of lenders as the weightage of high-margin personal and unsecured loans reduces. Pressure on low-cost CASA rises as the savers move to high-yield options like corporate bonds, credit funds, and even equities.

In my view, investors should be wary of the free advice of deep value in the banking sector. The large banks are underperforming for a valid reason and smaller banks may have completed their re-rating journey.