Do it yourself

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India concluded its three-day meeting on Wednesday. The committee voted unanimously to keep the policy repo rate unchanged at 5.50 per cent. The MPC also decided to continue with the neutral monetary policy stance.

 India’s external debt hit US$736.3bn by March 2025, a 10% jump from last year, with a significant portion (over 41%) of the debt maturing soon. As the US threatens 500% tariffs on countries buying Russian oil, including India, investors need to evaluate: Can India afford a confrontation with the US, China and other major trade partners, and could it withstand a covert economic embargo? Here’s my take, may be naïve and ill informed, but nonetheless relevant.

India’s External Debt

According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) latest release, India’s external debt stood at US$736.3bn at the end of March 2025, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 19.1%. Key highlights of the data are:

Long-Term Debt: US$601.9bn, up US$60.6bn from last year, with commercial borrowings and non-resident deposits driving growth. About 77% (US$568bn) of this debt is owed by non-government entities. The non-government debt is almost equally divided between financial institutions (US$271.3bn) and non-financial corporations (US$261.7bn).

Short-Term Debt: US$134.5bn, representing 18.3% of total debt and 20.1% of foreign exchange reserves.

Components: About one half of external liabilities (US$251bn) is loans and debt securities, 22% currency and deposits and 18% trade credit. The rest 10% includes IMF SDRs and intercompany lending by MNCs.

Maturity: 41.2% of the external debt (about US$305bn), is due to mature within the next 12 months.

Debt Sustainability: Foreign exchange reserves cover 92.8% of total debt, down from 97.4% a year ago, signaling a slight decline in buffer capacity.

Refinancing challenge

With over 40% of long-term debt maturing soon, India faces a refinancing challenge, particularly if global financial conditions tighten or trade disruptions escalate. India’s reliance on Russian oil, which accounts for 35-40% of its crude imports (2.08 million barrels per day in June 2025), has put it in the crosshairs of a proposed US Senate bill. The “Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025,” backed by Senator Lindsey Graham and reportedly supported by President Trump, proposes a 500% tariff on countries importing Russian energy to pressure Moscow over Ukraine. India, alongside China, buys 70% of Russia’s oil exports, making it a prime target.

Economic Impact: A 500% tariff on Indian exports to the US, India’s largest export market, could affect US$66bn (87% of India’s US exports), as per Citi Research estimates. This could disrupt key sectors like pharmaceuticals, IT, and textiles, potentially triggering inflation and job losses.

Oil Dependency: India imports 88% of its crude oil, with Russia offering competitive discounts. Switching to costlier suppliers like the US or Middle East could raise import costs significantly, straining India’s trade balance.

Can India Afford a Confrontation?

India’s economic fundamentals offer some resilience but also expose vulnerabilities.

Forex Reserves: At US$703bn (as of recent data), India’s reserves cover 92.8% of external debt, providing a cushion to manage maturing obligations. However, refinancing US$270.9bn in long-term debt within a year could pressure reserves, especially if US tariffs disrupt export revenues.

Trade Dynamics: The US accounts for a US$45.6bn trade deficit with India. A trade war could prompt reciprocal tariffs, but India’s 12% trade-weighted average tariff (vs. the US’s 2.2%) limits its leverage. Negotiations for a trade deal to cut tariffs on US$23bn of US imports are underway, signaling India’s preference for diplomacy over confrontation; notwithstanding some recent comments of senior ministers that suggest otherwise.

Oil Alternatives: India has diversified its oil imports, with the US supplying 6.3% (439,000 bpd in June 2025) and West Asia 35-40%. While switching from Russian oil is feasible, it would increase costs, potentially impacting fuel prices and inflation.

Can India Sustain Virtual Economic Sanctions?

Virtual economic sanctions, such as the proposed 500% tariffs, or Chinese embargo on export of critical components, chemicals, human resources etc., would act as a severe trade barrier.India’s ability to sustain them depends on several factors.

Energy Security: India’s strategic reserves (9-10 days of imports) and diversified suppliers (US, Nigeria, Middle East) provide short-term flexibility. However, replacing Russia’s 40% share at higher costs could strain refiners and consumers.

Economic Resilience: The RBI’s Financial Stability Report (July 2025) highlights strong banking sector metrics, with declining non-performing assets and robust capital buffers. This suggests India’s financial system could absorb some shocks, but prolonged trade disruptions could erode confidence.

Need for caution

India’s debt remains manageable for now, but over 41% debt maturity in 12 months calls for vigilance. Investors in Indian bonds or banking stocks should monitor refinancing risks.

A US tariff war could hit export-driven sectors like IT and pharmaceuticals hardest. India’s diplomatic efforts to secure a trade deal or tariff waiver will be critical. A successful negotiation could stabilize markets, while failure could spark volatility.

Conclusion

India’s US$736.3bn external debt and looming maturities pose challenges, but its reserves and diversified oil sources provide a buffer. A full-blown confrontation with the US seems unlikely, given India’s diplomatic push and economic stakes. However, sustaining virtual sanctions would strain India’s trade balance and energy costs, making de-escalation the smarter play.

The 41% of external debt (US$305bn) maturing within 12 months is significant, requiring substantial refinancing or reserve drawdowns. India’s US$703bn forex reserves provide coverage, but a US tariff war could reduce export revenues, complicating debt servicing.

Sustained 500% tariffs would disrupt exports, weaken the rupee, and increase debt servicing costs. The RBI’s strong banking sector provides some stability, but prolonged sanctions could erode investor confidence and slow growth.

India’s neutral geopolitical stance and trade deal negotiations (aiming to cut tariffs on US$23bn of US imports) indicate a strategy to avoid sanctions. A waiver or partial exemption is possible, given India’s strategic importance to the US.

Read with US$703bn may be just enough

The Reserve Bank of India holds US$702.78bn in foreign exchange reserves. In the popular macroeconomic analysis, especially in the context of the equity market. this piece of data is often used as one of the points of comfort by analysts.

This data could be viewed from multiple standpoints. For example –

Is it adequate to pay for the necessary imports in the near term, assuming the worst-case scenario of no exports could be made and no remittances are received. Currently, India’s monthly imports are appx US$67bn. However, a material part of these imports is crude oil and bullion. A part of the crude oil and bullion is re-exported after refining/processing. I am unable to figure out the precise net import number for domestic usage, but it would be safe to assume that about three fourth of US$67bn, i.e., US$50bn is for domestic usage. Allowing another 20% for “avoidable in emergencies” category of imports, we have appx US$40bn/month import bill payment obligations. By this benchmark we have sufficient reserves to pay for appx 18months of imports. This is a very comfortable situation from conventional yardsticks.

However, we need to consider interest payment and debt repayment obligations also to assess the adequacy of the foreign exchange reserves.

As per the latest RBI release (see here), India’s total external liabilities stood at US$736.3bn as on 31^st March 2025. 41.2% or appx US$305bn of this debt is due for repayment within the next 12 months. Assuming an average interest rate of 5%, another ~US$35bn would be needed for interest repayments. This implies about half of our foreign exchange reserves are needed for debt servicing in the next 12 month. This matrix raises some questions on the adequacy of our US$703bn reserves.

It also highlights the importance of remittances (appx US$135bn in FY25), foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows (appx US$13.6bn in CY2024, including equities and bonds), and net foreign direct investment (US$3.5bn in FY25). An adverse movement in any of these flow matrices could materially affect the external stability. This brings in the factors like geopolitical stability, internal political & law and order situation, relative valuations of Indian equities and bonds, market stability and integrity, domestic investment climate, foreign investment policy framework etc. into the picture. Any policy mistake, strife in foreign relations, civic unrest, overvaluation, fraud, scam etc. could adversely impact the external stability.

The news headlines like - “China restricting export of critical components and chemicals to India, withdrawing expert manpower from India” that can adversely affect exports or increase the cost of imports for Indian manufacturers; the US considering to impose tax on the outward remittances”, ‘the US considering 500% duties on countries importing oil from Russia”, etc., - makes one cautious about the external stability of the country.

The experts need to analyze the latest RBI data on India’s external liabilities. In particular, it needs to be assessed whether India can withstand a trade war with the US; a covert geopolitical confrontation with China; frequent cases of market manipulation; policies and procedures that make India a less attractive destination for foreign investments; worsening law & order situation on parochial issue like language, religion, regionalism, etc.

…more on this tomorrow 

After several years of corporate & bank balance sheet repair and fiscal correction, the contours of India's next economic growth cycle are beginning to emerge. With the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) maintaining a growth-supportive stance; union government showing strong commitment to fiscal consolidation, easing financing pressures for the private sector; and global markets showing signs of stabilization as geopolitical confrontations ease and trade disputes settled; the stage is set for a potential economic upswing.

The spotlight is now on three competing themes — corporate consolidation, private capex, and household consumption — each pulling investor attention in different directions.

Corporate begin to re-leverage

After many years of deleveraging, corporate debt in India appears to have bottomed out and is now beginning to rise. This shift in trajectory marks a significant departure from the post-2016 era, where Indian companies focused on strengthening balance sheets following a wave of over-leveraged investments. According to recent analyses, corporate borrowing is rising as businesses seek to capitalize on emerging opportunities.

This shift is supported by a monetary environment that remains broadly pro-growth. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has maintained a balancing act between containing inflation and supporting economic momentum. Rates have been cut aggressively and RBI is pushing for a quick transmission.

Fiscal consolidation by the union government is also helping to ease crowding-out pressures in the credit markets. With the Centre projecting a glide path toward more sustainable fiscal deficits, room is being created for the private sector to tap into financial resources more freely.

RBI’s Growth-Supportive Stance and Fiscal Consolidation

The Reserve Bank of India has definitely turned growth supportive in the past one year, after maintaining a delicate balance between inflation growth. The rates have been cut aggressively and liquidity conditions have been made favorable. Targeted interventions to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects, have bolstered private sector confidence.

Simultaneously, the Indian government’s commitment to fiscal consolidation has eased pressure on private financing. By reducing the fiscal deficit—projected to decline to 4.4% of GDP in FY26 from 5.6% in FY24—the government is crowding in private investment. Lower government borrowing means more capital is available for private enterprises, reducing competition for funds and potentially lowering borrowing costs. This synergy between monetary and fiscal policy is creating a fertile ground for private capex to flourish.

Global context changing quickly

Globally, financial markets have been navigating turbulent waters for the past some time. Monetary policies remained tight in major economies like the United States and the European Union. Geopolitical concerns were elevated as multiple war fronts were opened. The political regime changes in the US early this year, also triggered an intense trade war.

However, recent developments suggest a quick shift. There are conspicuous signs of geopolitical stability, particularly with noteworthy steps toward peace in conflict zones. The US administration is showing significant flexibility in negotiating trade deals, raising hopes for an early and durable end to tariff related conflicts. Inflationary pressures are also easing, especially with stable energy prices. These all factors combined raise hopes for a global monetary easing cycle. The US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have hinted at potential rate cuts in 2025, which could lower global borrowing costs and improve capital flows to emerging markets like India.

For India, this presents an opportunity to attract foreign portfolio investments (FPIs) to boost market sentiments, as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) for long-term projects, especially in manufacturing and green energy. The government’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes and “Make in India” initiatives are well-positioned to capitalize on this opportunity, but execution will be key.

Investors’ dilemma

Amidst corporate optimism, supportive policy environment, positively turning global context, investors and traders are facing a dilemma – whether to stay bullish on the capex theme or turn focus towards the consumption theme that has been lagging behind for the past couple of years.

In my view, investors need to examine two things—

1.    What is driving this resurgence in corporate debt?” Is it being used to fund acquisitions of operating or stressed assets, or is it fueling fresh capacity creation?”

2.    Whether easing inflation, lower interest rates, good monsoon, and improved employment prospects due to capex translating to on-ground activity, will accelerate private consumption growth, or households will focus on repairing their balance sheets and increase savings?

What is driving this resurgence in corporate debt – Consolidation or capacity addition?

The distinction is crucial. While the former drives job creation, productivity, and long-term growth, the latter may only temporarily improve capital utilization rates and return metrics. Acquiring distressed assets or merging with competitors may lead to short-term efficiency gains but could delay the broader economic benefits of new capacity creation. Whereas, investments in fresh capacities could signal a long-term commitment to growth, aligning with India’s aspirations to become a global manufacturing hub.

While mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity has been robust in the past few years, particularly in sectors like infrastructure and manufacturing, greenfield investments have seen limited areas like renewable energy (driven mostly by government incentives) and steel.

Equity markets are evidently betting on a capital investment Supercycle. Stocks of capital goods makers, construction contractors, and building material firms have seen sharp re-rating over the past year. Order books are swelling, and forward guidance from several listed players suggests growing optimism.

Consumption paradox

While the equity markets are bullish on capex-driven sectors, investor enthusiasm for household consumption remains subdued. This is puzzling, given the macroeconomic tailwinds that should theoretically support private consumption. Easing inflation, which dropped to 4.7% in mid-2025, coupled with the prospect of lower interest rates and improving employment prospects due to rising capex, should create a virtuous cycle of demand. Yet, private consumption, which accounts for nearly 60% of India’s GDP, has been lackluster over the past two years.

Several factors may explain this paradox. First, uneven income distribution means that the benefits of economic growth are not reaching all segments of the population equally. Rural consumption, in particular, has been hampered by volatile agricultural incomes and inadequate infrastructure. Second, high inflation in essential goods like food and fuel, despite overall moderation, continues to erode purchasing power for lower- and middle-income households. Third, policy support in the form of subsidies and cash transfers is being gradually unwound as fiscal discipline returns. Finally, the stress in the household balance sheet, especially in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic may have also hampered consumption growth.

The equity market’s lack of enthusiasm for consumption-driven sectors like FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods) and retail reflects these concerns. Investors appear to be betting on a capex-led recovery rather than a consumption-driven one, prioritizing sectors poised to benefit from infrastructure spending and industrial growth. However, sustained economic growth will require a revival in household consumption, as capex alone cannot drive inclusive prosperity.

What to do?

The question is what investors should do under the present circumstances? Should they continue to back the obvious beneficiaries of capex — engineering firms, infra developers, lenders to industry? Or should they begin building positions in consumption plays, in anticipation of a cyclical rebound?

In my view, both themes may ultimately play out — but on different timelines. Capex is here and now, led by policy push and balance sheet strength. Consumption is the laggard, but if the macro indicators hold, its turn could come with a lag of a few quarters.

 While the 7.4% GDP growth number for 4QFY25, and claims of continuing strong growth momentum in April 2025 are encouraging, the RBI assessment of FY26 growth and aggressive policy stance raise some doubts. A careful analysis of the GDP data released by the NSO also leaves some doubts about the consistency and sustainability of the 4QFY25 growth numbers.

Many economists have noted discrepancies and incongruencies in the data, as well as comparisons with other economic indicators and external analyses.

For example, I found the following noteworthy.

Discrepancy Between GDP and GVA Growth Rates

In Q4 FY25, GDP growth is 7.4%, while GVA growth is 6.8%. The divergence between GDP and GVA growth rates is notable, as GDP includes net taxes (taxes minus subsidies), which can distort the picture of underlying economic activity captured by GVA.

The gap suggests that tax revenues or subsidy adjustments may have inflated GDP growth relative to GVA. For instance, higher GST collections or reduced subsidies might have boosted GDP figures without reflecting proportional growth in actual economic output. This discrepancy raises questions about the sustainability of growth driven by fiscal adjustments rather than core sectoral performance.

As per Systematix research, “Recent robust GST collections have been interpreted as evidence of strong economic growth, supporting the 4QFY25 real GDP growth of 7.4%. However, this narrative contrasts with on-ground economic indicators suggesting a demand slowdown. Our analysis reveals that rising GST collections stem not from stronger economic growth but from increased indirect tax incidence in a slowing economy. This trend aligns with the government’s pro-cyclical fiscal tightening framework over recent years. We estimate an excess tax collection of INR 2.9 trillion over the past two years (2QFY24–1QFY26E), which has elevated the net indirect tax burden on Indian households to a historical peak. This has suppressed household spending power, exacerbating the lack of real income growth.”

Q2 FY25 Growth Slowdown vs. Q4 Recovery

2QFY25 reported a seven-quarter low GDP growth of 5.4%. 1QFY25 growth slowdown could be explained by the spending restrictions due to the imposition of the model code of conduct during the general elections (March-June 2025). Logically, 2QFY25 should have witnessed excessive government spending due to spillover effects from the previous quarter.

The rapid recovery from 5.4% in Q2 to 7.4% in Q4 appears inconsistent with the broader FY25 growth of 6.5%, suggesting uneven economic momentum. The low Q2 growth was attributed to reduced government spending and weak private investment, but the factors driving the Q4 rebound (e.g., manufacturing and construction) are not fully explained in the press release.

Sectoral Growth Inconsistencies

Agriculture (3.8% in FY25)

The agriculture sector’s growth improved significantly from 1.4% in FY24 to 3.8% in FY25, attributed to a good monsoon. However, this contrasts with reports of uneven monsoon distribution and challenges like low reservoir levels in some regions, which could have limited agricultural output in certain areas.

The uniform 3.8% growth figure may mask regional variations or overstate the sector’s recovery, especially since agricultural income growth (e.g., farm wages) has not kept pace, as noted in some external analyses.

Manufacturing (5.0% in FY25)

Manufacturing growth slowed sharply from 9.9% in FY24 to 5.0% in FY25, yet Q4 FY25 GDP growth (7.4%) suggests a manufacturing rebound. This is inconsistent with high-frequency indicators like the Index of Industrial Production (IIP), which showed subdued industrial activity in most parts of FY25.

The slowdown aligns with high input costs and weak export demand, but the Q4 recovery lacks detailed sectoral data to confirm whether manufacturing truly drove the uptick or if other factors (e.g., statistical adjustments) played a role.

Construction (9.4% in FY25)

Construction grew at 9.4%, down slightly from 10.4% in FY24, yet government capital expenditure reportedly slowed in FY25. This raises questions about the source of growth, as public infrastructure spending is a key driver of construction.

Private sector construction (e.g., real estate) may have contributed, but the press release does not disaggregate public vs. private contributions, creating ambiguity.

Expenditure-Side Discrepancies

Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) grew at 7.2% in FY25 (up from 5.6% in FY24), indicating strong household spending. However, this contrasts with external reports of weak rural demand and urban consumption slowdowns, particularly in discretionary goods (e.g., automobiles, FMCG).

The robust PFCE growth may be driven by urban or high-income consumption, but the lack of granular data obscures whether this reflects broad-based demand or is skewed by specific segments.

Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE) growth slowed to 2.3% in FY25 from 8.1% in FY24, reflecting fiscal consolidation. However, the strong Q4 GDP growth (7.4%) and high growth in public administration (7.8%) suggest continued government spending in certain areas, creating a potential mismatch.

The low GFCE growth may understate government contributions in Q4, or the sectoral growth in public administration may reflect non-expenditure factors (e.g., statistical adjustments).

Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) growth slowed to 7.1% in FY25 from 8.8% in FY24, indicating weaker investment. This aligns with reports of sluggish private investment but contrasts with the strong construction sector growth (9.4%), which typically relies on capital investment.

The disconnect suggests that construction growth may be driven by specific sub-sectors (e.g., real estate) rather than broad investment, but the press release lacks clarity on this.

Mismatch with High-Frequency Indicators

The GDP growth of 6.5% for FY25 and 7.4% for Q4 FY25 appears optimistic compared to high-frequency indicators like-

Index of Industrial Production (IIP): Showed weaker industrial growth, particularly in manufacturing, contradicting the Q4 rebound.

Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI): Indicated slower manufacturing and services activity in parts of FY25.

Core Sector Output: The eight core industries (e.g., coal, steel, cement) showed subdued growth in some quarters, inconsistent with the strong construction and manufacturing contributions in Q4.

These indicators suggest a more sluggish economy than the NSO’s GDP figures imply, raising concerns about potential overestimation or statistical discrepancies in the GDP calculations.

Comparison with External Forecasts

The NSO’s FY25 GDP growth estimate of 6.5% is lower than the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) revised forecast of 6.6% (down from 7.2%) but higher than some private forecasts (e.g., 6.0–6.3% by agencies like ICRA or SBI). The Q4 growth of 7.4% also exceeds many analysts’ expectations (e.g., 6.8% median estimate).

The higher-than-expected Q4 growth and the annual estimate suggest either a stronger-than-anticipated recovery or potential overestimation in the NSO’s provisional data. The reliance on provisional estimates, which are subject to revision, adds uncertainty.

Other disconnects

There are some other disconnects in the GDP data. For example, the nominal growth in 4QFY25 at 10.8%, much ahead of money supply growth of 9.6% is fully explained. A growing economy would usually need higher money supply due to higher transaction demand. This mismatch can probably be explained by the use of an erroneous deflator. Besides, external trade data, sharp contraction in subsidy payments etc. also raise some doubts.

Also read

The state of the Indian economy

The Indian economy – glass half full

The Indian economy – glass half empty

RBI makes a bold bet

The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) monetary policy statement on June 6, 2025 marked a significant shift in India’s monetary policy framework, reflecting a bold approach to stimulate economic growth while navigating global uncertainties and domestic inflation dynamics.

Policy rates cut by 50bps to support growth

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reduced the policy repo rate by 50 bps to 5.50%, a larger-than-expected cut compared to market expectations of a 25bps reduction. This was the third consecutive rate cut in 2025, following reductions in February (6.5% to 6.25%) and April (6.25% to 6.00%). Consequently, the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) rate was adjusted to 5.25%, and the Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) rate and Bank Rate to 5.75%.

This sharp cut in rates is aimed at accelerating the growth. Pertinent to note that FY25 real GDP grew by 6.5% yoy, and is expected to grow at a similar or lower rate in FY26. Considering the fragile global conditions, it is imperative to support the domestic economy maintaining a healthy growth momentum.

The rate cuts are expected to stimulate credit demand, private consumption and capex demand. At least four public sector banks (BoB, PNB, BOI, UCO) have reportedly cut their repo linked lending rates by a matching 50bps.

Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) requirement reduced by 100bps

The RBI decided to lower the CRR for scheduled commercial banks by 100 bps to 3.0% of Net Demand and Time Liabilities (NDTL). This cut will be implemented in four tranches of 25bps each, starting September 6, 2025, through November 29, 2025. This aims to enhance liquidity in the banking system.

This 100bps cut in the CRR would potentially release an additional Rs2.5 trillion liquidity in the banking system in the busy season. Notably, the RBI has taken several steps in the past few months to augment the banking system liquidity. Since January 2025, the RBI has infused Rs9.5 trillion in additional liquidity in the system; resulting in a system liquidity surplus of over Rs 1.5 trillion.

 

Policy stance changed to ‘neutral’ from ‘accommodative’

The MPC shifted its stance from “accommodative” to “neutral,” signaling a cautious approach to further rate cuts and a potential pause in the rate-cutting cycle.

FY 26 growth forecast maintained at 6.5%, despite substantial monetary easing

The RBI maintained its real GDP growth forecast for FY26 at 6.5% yoy, the same as FY25. This highlights the challenges faced by the Indian economy presently, both from the global disturbances and domestic conditions.

The RBI sees CPI Inflation at 3.7% for FY26, down from previous forecast of 4% and below its tolerance band of 4 to 6%. This clearly reflects RBI’s optimism about price stability.

Despite substantial monetary easing, a favorable monsoon, stable fiscal balance, and strong government capital expenditure, the domestic growth is not expected to accelerate from the current pace.

The question thus arises, whether this boldness of the RBI is emanating from the confidence in the resilience of the economy and its commitment to stimulate economic growth; or it is a move to preempt a slide in the economic growth due to the anticipated global trade and geopolitics related developments.

I do not have any ready answer for this inquisition. However, I shall be closely monitoring some of the pointers from Governor Malhotra’s statement. For example:

1.    In his opening remark, the Governor highlighted the global challenges – “complex interconnections within the financial system, elevated debt levels and growing influence of frontier technologies are raising financial stability concerns. Amidst heightened volatility in capital flows and exchange rates, coupled with constrained policy space, central banks of emerging market economies have a tougher task to stabilize their economies against global spillovers”.

Though, the governor confidently stated, “In this global milieu, the Indian economy presents a picture of strength, stability, and opportunity”; the global spillovers need to be watched carefully.

2.    The governor exuded confidence that the actual inflation may undershoot the RBI target, and this is one of the core reasons for the bold policy move. He stated, “While food inflation outlook remains soft, core inflation is expected to remain benign with easing of international commodity prices in line with the anticipated global growth slowdown (emphasis supplied). The inflation outlook for the year is being revised downwards from the earlier forecast of 4.0 per cent to 3.7 per cent.

A quicker resolution of trade disputes and geopolitical conflicts might change this outlook, as the global growth might accelerate and commodity prices may rise. Also, an excessive monsoon may cause vegetable prices to rise faster than anticipated.

3.    The governor emphasized that “under the current circumstances, monetary policy is left with very limited space to support growth. Hence, the MPC also decided to change the stance from accommodative to neutral. From here onwards, the MPC will be carefully assessing the incoming data and the evolving outlook to chart out the future course of monetary policy in order to strike the right growth-inflation balance.”

Though many analysts are expecting more rate cuts later this year, the governor appears to be suggesting otherwise.

4.    The governor pointed out that “we are yet to see a perceptible transmission in the credit market segment, though we must keep in mind that it happens with some lag”.

We have witnessed that the banks have been reluctant to transmit the previous rate cuts to the borrowers. In the present case also, while the repo linked rates are getting adjusted, the action in case of MCLR based loans is limited. HDFC Bank for example has cut only by 10bps post the policy statement.

A failure to ensure full transmission may defeat the objective of RBI’s aggressive easing.

5.    The governor warned that “The stress witnessed earlier in retail segments like unsecured personal loans and credit card receivables portfolio has abated, while the stress in micro-finance segment is persisting”.

The stress in MFI is typical of elevated stress in the unorganized segment of the economy, especially rural and semi urban areas. This stress also has some relevance for private consumption.

6.    The governor also sought to end the growth vs inflation debate, stating that “there is no tussle between price stability and growth in the medium and long term. Price stability preserves purchasing power, imparts certainty to households and businesses in their savings and investment decisions and ensures congenial interest rate and financial conditions, all of which foster consumption, investment and overall activity. Moreover, it is crucial for equitable growth and shared prosperity because its absence is disproportionately burdensome on the poor”.

This is a new policy paradigm for the RBI, more aligned to the political narrative than the central banking. We will have to monitor how consistently the RBI follows this new tenet of monetary policy.

Conclusion

The 50bps rate cut demonstrates the RBI’s commitment to growth amid global headwinds. The CRR reduction is a significant liquidity booster for banks. This will augment credit availability for MSMEs and retail borrowers. The downward revision of the FY26 inflation forecast to 3.7% reflects confidence in price stability. Emphasis on recalibrating business models in high-risk segments (e.g., microfinance) and strengthening credit underwriting practices indicates proactive risk management.

The shift to a neutral stance suggests the RBI believes monetary policy has limited room to support growth further, as noted in the policy statement. This could constrain future responses if economic conditions deteriorate.

Further, the RBI has limited control over supply-side inflation, driven by commodity prices and fiscal policy. If supply constraints re-emerge, the RBI’s ability to maintain inflation within the 4% target could be tested, potentially forcing a policy reversal.

Besides, rapid rate cuts and liquidity injections could lead to overheating in certain sectors, such as real estate or consumer credit, if not monitored closely.

Deposit rates that have already been declining may decline further, impacting the savers, especially the pensioners, adversely. However, the pace of transmission of rate cuts lender is still not congruent with the policy objectives.

Also read

The state of the Indian economy

The Indian economy – glass half full

The Indian economy – glass half empty

The macro environment in India looks stable and resilient, despite the scare of war and trade uncertainties. The south-west monsoon has started on a buoyant note, and IMD reconfirmed its forecast of above normal (106% of LPA) for the current season. Enhanced dividend payout by the RBI has lessened fiscal slippage concerns. Concerted efforts by the RBI to improve system liquidity have also yielded positive results. Fiscal strength, benign inflation outlook, and improved liquidity have resulted in the benchmark 10yr bond yields falling to the lowest level since 2021; reversal in FPI flows since March 2025; stability in currency and improved growth outlook.

Despite notable stability there are few areas of concern that investors should be mindful of. In particular, I shall be watching the development of external situations closely.

External situation - not worrying presently, but could deteriorate

India's external sector has shown resilience in recent years, but there are signs of strain. The merchandise trade deficit hit a near-record high of $26.42 billion in April 2025, driven by a 19.12% surge in imports outpacing a 9.03% export growth. This reflects a structural issue in India's trade balance, with heavy reliance on imported crude oil, gold, and electronics. While presently foreign exchange reserves are ~US$686 billion in January 2025, covering over 10 months of imports, the creeping depreciation of the rupee and global uncertainties (e.g., aggressive trade negotiation and geopolitics) add pressure.

The situation isn't critical yet, thanks to robust reserves and services exports, but the trend warrants caution as external vulnerabilities could escalate if global conditions worsen

Trade balance remains delicate

India's merchandise trade deficit for FY25 (April 2024–March 2025) has widened significantly, reaching $202.42 billion for the first eight months (April–November 2024), compared to $194.6 billion in the same period of FY24. This deterioration is driven by a faster rise in imports (8.3% growth to $486.73 billion) than exports (2.2% growth to $284.31 billion). November 2024 alone saw a record-high monthly deficit of $37.8 billion, fueled by a 27% surge in imports to $69.95 billion, largely due to a 4.3-fold jump in gold imports, alongside increases in electronics (17.4%), petroleum products (7.9%), and vegetable oil (87.8%). Exports, however, contracted by 4.8% to $32.1 billion in November, a 25-month low, partly due to declining petroleum prices.

The overall trade deficit (goods and services combined) is estimated at $94 billion for FY25, per posts on X, reflecting a structural imbalance. The trade deficit with China has surged to $99.2 billion, driven by an 11.5% rise in imports ($113.5 billion) and a 14.5% drop in exports ($14.25 billion). Conversely, India’s trade surplus with the US grew to $41.18 billion, with exports up 11.6% to $86.51 billion. The services trade surplus, estimated at $131.3 billion for April–December 2024, provides some relief, driven by strong IT and financial services exports. However, the current account deficit (CAD) is projected to widen to 1.4–2% of GDP in FY25, with Q3 FY25 potentially hitting 2.8% due to the November trade shock.

Trade deals with the UK, and potential trade deal with the US could impact trade balance negatively in the short term.

Despite intense efforts, India’s reliance on imported crude oil (88% of energy needs), gold, and electronics, alongside structural manufacturing gap, has not diminished materially. There have been some efforts to boost domestic manufacturing through monetary and fiscal incentives, but so far most of the investment has occurred in low value add businesses.

BoP Challenges

H1 FY25 (April–September 2024) BoP surplus was $23.8 billion, but 3QFY25 negative BoP of US$37.7bn on persistent FPI outflows and poor net FDI flows, raise some concerns over BoP for FY25; even though the projected current account surplus and potential stabilization in capital flows have shown promise in 4QFY25.

The BoP is expected to remain manageable, with a full-year CAD of 0.8–1.4% of GDP ($30–55 billion). A Q4 current account surplus could offset earlier deficits, but sustained FPI outflows and trade imbalances pose risks.

Global uncertainties (widening trade deficit, FDI slowdown, remittances slowdown due to the proposed remittance tax in the US, and domestic structural gaps pose strong headwinds for India’s BoP.

FDI slowing

Gross FDI Inflows in India were $81.04 billion in FY25, a 14% increase from $71.1 billion in FY24. FDI equity inflows rose by 45% to $29.8 billion (Rs. 2,58,873 crore) in H1 FY25 (April–September 2024), reversing three years of contraction.

However, net FDI inflows dropped to a record low of $0.353 billion in FY25, down 96.5% from $10 billion in FY24, due to large-scale repatriations and increased outward investments by Indian firms. Repatriations surged to $44.5 billion in FY24 and continued to be significant in FY25, driven by profitable exits through initial public offerings (IPOs) like Hyundai Motor and Swiggy, and divestments (e.g., Singtel’s Airtel stake, BAT’s ITC divestment). A key Swiggy investor reportedly earned over $2 billion post-IPO.

FDI slowdown could have some structural element as relative to GDP, net GDP has been declining for the past five years, and has fallen to the lowest level in more than two decades.

 

Net FPI equity flows negative since 2021

Net FPI equity flows (Primary market and secondary market) into India have been negative for the past four and half years (January 2021-YTD2025) now. A strong global liquidity event could perhaps reverse the trend, but so far there is little visibility of net FPI flows improving materially in the near term; notwithstanding the positive flows in the past three months.

Oil price and weaker USD offer some relief

Declining oil prices in early 2025 have eased pressure on India's import bill, given its heavy reliance on imported crude (85% of energy consumption). A weaker USD also reduces the cost of dollar-denominated imports and debt servicing. However, relying on these external factors is risky, as oil prices are volatile (e.g., influenced by OPEC decisions or geopolitical tensions), and the USD's trajectory depends on U.S. monetary policy. India needs to accelerate domestic energy production (e.g., renewables, green hydrogen) to reduce this vulnerability.

…but relying on externalities may not be a great idea

Dependence on favorable oil prices or a weaker USD is unsustainable, as these are beyond India's control. A stronger focus on structural reforms—such aggressive boost to manufacturing, enhancing export competitiveness, and reducing import dependency—would provide a more stable foundation. Additionally, diversifying trade partners and pursuing free trade agreements (e.g., with the EU, Japan) could mitigate risks from global volatility.

In conclusion, India's external situation is not yet alarming but shows clear signs of deterioration. The delicate trade balance, negative BoP, and volatile capital flows highlight structural weaknesses, particularly import dependency and sensitivity to global shocks. While forex reserves and services exports provide resilience, reliance on external factors like oil prices or USD weakness is risky. Fiscal slippages and food inflation add domestic pressures.

The conventional market wisdom suggests that the bonds usually lead the change in market cycles. Traditionally traders have closely followed the yield curve shape, benchmark (10 year) yields and high yield credit spreads to speculate the near term moves in equity, currency and commodity markets. Two simple reasons for this traditional practice are –

(i)    Bond markets are usually more correlated with the economy.

(ii)   Size of bond markets is materially larger than the equity, currency and commodity markets. It has the largest number of leveraged positions at any given point in time; and most of the large and influential market participants are more active in bond markets as compared to the other markets.

I am however inclined to disregard this piece of conventional wisdom. In my view, it would make sense only if the markets are operating in a free and fair manner. In cases where the central bankers and governments (through Sovereign Wealth Funds and other institutions controlled by it) actively and frequently intervene in the market, effectiveness of bond markets in leading the markets is impaired.

The world has definitely changed after the global financial crisis (GFC 2008-09). Central bankers, government, and public institutions are now playing significantly more active roles in the financial and commodity (especially gold and energy) markets. Bond prices are often influenced to suit the objectives of fiscal policy. Stock prices are influenced to suit political expediency.

Even pre-GFC, equity and bond traders did look at proxies like USD/CHF or copper—known as "Dr. Copper" for its economic sensitivity—for directional cues. In the past one decade we have seen Japan’s central bank buying equities; India’s government nudging markets via state-owned entities like LIC; the US Fed’s quantitative easing indirectly supporting massive amounts of stock buybacks; and Sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries piling into equities. This clearly indicates that in markets "no fixed formula works forever." Markets are adaptive. What held true for the past 35 years might not hold for the next 35.

US Bond yields no longer a lead indicator

In my view, the yield curve is fully relevant only if the market is free and genuine demand supply equilibrium of bond prices is discovered by the market forces. In situations where central bankers direct, manipulate or regulate yields, the yield curve is materially less important.

There is plenty of recent evidence, pointing that the US bond yields are no longer a strong indicator of the economy and/or markets. For example, consider the case of the US yield curve inversion in 2022-23.

Typically, an inverted yield curve—where short-term Treasury yields exceed long-term ones—has been a reliable harbinger of recession, preceding every U.S. downturn since the 1950s with a lag of roughly 6 to 18 months. The inversion that began in July 2022, peaking in mid-2023 with the 10-year/2-year spread hitting around -100 basis points, was the longest on record, lasting over two years. By historical standards, a recession should’ve hit by mid-to-late 2024. However, it has not happened; and the GDP growth held steady at 2.8% annualized in Q4 2024, and unemployment remains low at 4.1% as of March 2025.

Moreover, after un-inverting in September 2024—when the 2-year yield (around 3.6%) briefly dipped below the 10-year (around 3.8%)—yields have climbed across the board in the last two weeks. This morning, the 10-year yield is hovering near 4.5%, up from 4.0% in late March, while the 2-year has risen from 4.1% to about 4.5%. Incidentally, this rise coincides with a spike in recession odds, with the New York Fed’s yield curve model pegging the probability of a recession by mid-2026 at around 40%, up sharply from 25% a month ago. Normally, you’d expect yields to fall as recession fears mount, reflecting a flight to safety and anticipation of Fed rate cuts.

Prima facie, it appears that the bond market is more concerned about the rising inflationary expectations, particularly in light of the latest tariff policy of the US government. CPI is currently running above 3%—and there is skepticism about the Fed’s willingness to cut rates meaningfully from their current 4.75%-5.0% range. Higher yields also reflect a demand for more compensation amid uncertainty which could stoke inflation further. Arguably, the economy’s resilience—strong consumer spending, a robust labor market—may have also impaired the yield curve’s predictive edge this time. Structural shifts, like massive Fed balance sheet expansion since 2008 or global demand for long-term Treasuries, have certainly distorted its signal.

The recent yield rise despite recession odds implies that bond traders are betting on tighter policy or inflation risks, despite economic data flashing slowdown warnings (e.g., manufacturing PMI below 50 for months).

Conclusion: The yield curve’s relevance erodes when it’s less about market discovery and more about central bank glide path. Though it’s still worth watching, it’s no longer the king it once was in a freer market.

Tomorrow I will share my thoughts of what could be a better indicator, or aa mix of indicators to assess the likely market direction.

It was summer of 2013. The mood on the street was gloomy. The stock markets had not given any return for almost three years. USDINR had crashed 28% (from 53 to 68) in a matter of four months. GDP was on course to drop to 5.5% after growing at a rate of over 8% CAGR for almost a decade. Current account deficit had worsened to more than 6% of nominal GDP (the worst in decades). The Fx reserves of the country were down to US$277bn, sufficient to meet just 5 months of net imports. The confidence in the incumbent government had completely depleted. The people were on the street protesting against ‘corruption’ and ‘policy paralysis’.

The global economy had still not recovered from the shock of the global financial crisis (GFC). The thought of unwinding of monetary and fiscal stimulus provided in the wake of being unwound was unnerving most emerging markets ((Taper Tantrums), including India.

India, which was touted as TINA (There is no alternative) by the global investors just five years back and had become a key member of BRIC and G-20; was already downgraded to “fragile five” by some global analysts. This was the time when the government of the day took some brave decisions. One of these decisions was to appoint Mr. Raghuram Rajan, former Chief Economist and Director of Research at the IMF and then Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, as the 23^rd governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Mr. Rajan with the full support of then Finance Minister, P. Chidambaram, took several effective damage control measures, and was able to pull the economy and markets out of crisis within a short period of one year. USDINR gained over 11%, stocks markets recorded their all-time high levels, CAD improved to less than 1% of nominal GDP, real GDP growth recovered to ~7% (FY15).

The situation today is nowhere close to the summer of 2013. Nonetheless, the feeling is that we could potentially head to a similar situation in the summer of 2025.

Worsening external situation - rising global trade uncertainties due to the US unpredictable tariff policies, depleting Fx reserves, weakening USDINR, declining FDI and persistent FPI selling, pressure on the government to cut tariff protection for the domestic industry, and rising probability of a global slowdown.

Slowing domestic growth - Prospects of a poor Rabi crop aiding pressuring food inflation and RBI policy stance, crawling manufacturing growth, limited scope for any meaningful monetary or fiscal stimulus, etc are some of the factors that suggest the probability of any meaningful growth acceleration in the near term is unlikely.

Uninspiring policy response – The policy response to the economic slowdown and worsening of external situation is completely uninspiring so far. The measures taken by the government and RBI appear insufficient and suffer from adhocism.

For example, RBI has announced several liquidity enhancement measures in the past three months. These measures have been mostly neutralized by USD selling by RBI to protect USDINR and rise in the government balance with RBI (inability of the government to disburse money quickly to the states or spend otherwise. Risk weight cut for lending to NBFCs and MFI etc. is too little and too late. The damage to credit demand and asset quality in the unsecured segment is already done, and is not easily reversible.

The fiscal stimulus (tax cut on for individual taxpayers) could support the economy if at all, from 2H2025 only. There is a risk that the taxpayers in lower income segments (Rs 7 to 15 lacs) might use the tax savings to deleverage their balance sheets by repaying some of their high-cost personal loans etc. In that case this stimulus could have a negative multiplier on growth.

The short point is that (a) we are yet not in a crisis situation; (b) if not handled effectively and with a sense of urgency, the current situation may not take long to turn into a crisis.

The government, especially the finance minister and RBI, would need to urgently take several steps to take control of the situation and inspire confidence in the businesses and investors. Leaving it to the external developments, e.g., USD weakening due to falling bond yields in the US; energy prices easing due to Russia-Ukraine truce; trade normalcy restoration due to Sino-US trade agreement and normalization of Red Sea traffic; a plentiful monsoon easing domestic inflation; etc. may not be a great strategy - even if it works this time.

As they say – “it is great to have faith in God, but always lock your car”.