Showing posts with label Surcharge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Surcharge. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

What do we really want?

What do we really want?
To accelerate the economic growth in order to generate more employment and improve the quality of life of Indian populace, the country indubitably needs huge amount of fresh capital.
Various economists, government agencies and expert committees have suggested that to attain optimum level of employment Indian economy would need to grow 8-10% CAGR for next decade or so.
The capital investment required by private sector to create critical infrastructure to support 8-10% GDP growth is pegged in the range of US$10-12trn over next 10yrs. Energy sector alone may need investment of more than US$1trn over next one decade.
It is well recognized fact that such kind of long term risk capital may not be available internally. Foreign investment is therefore a pre-requisite for the process of economic planning, development and growth. Any debate on path, trajectory and sustainability of growth should therefore begin with this assumption that adequate foreign capital would be available.
A pragmatic economic development and growth plan under the current circumstances should therefore acknowledge the following in the preamble itself:
(a)        India needs huge amount of long term risk capital to achieve the goal of fast, equitable and sustainable economic growth and development.
(b)        Meeting of this goal is materially contingent upon flow of foreign capital.
(c)        Despite unprecedented liquidity sloshing the global financial system, the risk capital that could be invested for long term in an emerging market like India is scarce and circumspect.
(d)        The long term risk foreign capital will come to India at its own terms and not at the whims and fancy of the politicians and myopic bureaucracy.
...do we want to follow the herd?
However, what is true for long term risk capital (commonly known as FDI) may not be true for the short term arbitrage money (commonly known as Foreign Portfolio Investment or FPI).
This is the money that usually is not invested by the owner of the money. Instead professional investors, who are paid to maximize the returns for owners of the money, exercise the control over such money. Mostly, their interest in the investment is limited to the remuneration they would get. The remuneration is usually based on the relative performance of the money invested over a small period of time (usually 12 to 24months).
In order to maximize their remuneration, these fund managers would chase the relative outperforming assets in a most secular fashion - with no regional, racial or systemic bias. They would go to communist China, chaotic Russia, democratic but unpredictable India, war torn Africa, vulnerable Chile & Columbia, or struggling Venezuela and Argentina.
As most of them usually move in a herd, they are able to cheer the target market by driving up the asset prices with huge collective inflows in a short span of time. They invariably inflict severe pain and cause huge volatility by their ruthless collective exit.
There is little evidence to establish their long term positive impact on the investee market or economy. However, there is enough anecdotal evidence to show the damaging impact of the excessive volatility caused by their collective actions.
The South East Asian economies suffered tremendously at their hands during 1990's. Emerging markets crashed during subprime led global crisis, when some many of them were growing at 8% to 10% annual rate.
India too had have few instances of irrational boom and bust cycle driven by collective withdrawal of FPI money. 1998 post nuclear blast exodus, 1999-2001 dotcom bubble and bust, 2006-2009 easy credit driven boom and bust, and 2011-12 Grexit paranoia led selling are some major instances.
Besides, we have also seen frequent collective actions to pressurize the government and regulators over issues such as taxation (MAT, DTAA, GAAR) and transparency (P. Note disclosures), etc.
On most occasions the government and the regulators have given in to the pressure, deciding to maintain the status quo. Consequently—
(a)        Many nagging issues got accumulated to keep the FPIs and agencies at confrontational path for many years.
(b)        The message that goes to FPIs is that Indian government and agencies accord significant importance to the stock market indices and are willing to walk extra mile for a few billion dollars of FPI flows.
Currently Indian markets are witnessing yet another instance pressure tactics. This time most of the domestic participants are also pleading with the government to yield to the FPI demands. The indications are that the government will give in yet again.
The question that may still remain unanswered is "what do we really want?"
Do we want long term risk capital that would support out economy in achieving sustainable high growth? Or do we only care for the fleeting arbitrage money that would stay in India only until a better opportunity arises in some other corner of the world.
I am certainly not denigrating the importance and need of FPI flows to Indian securities markets. But I strongly believe that unlike the long term risk capital (FDI) these flows must be on our terms and within the regulatory framework designed to ensure orderly development of securities market.

Thursday, August 1, 2019

What's bothering Indian equities - 2



Some food for thought
"A demagogue is a person with whom we disagree as to which gang should mismanage the country."
—Don Marquis (American Poet, 1878-1937)
Word for the day
Demagogue (n)
A person, especially an orator or political leader, who gains power and popularity by arousing the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the people.
 
First thought this morning
Founder of Cafe Coffee Day (CCD) succumbed to the pressure and decided to take the extreme step. This is a sad moment for many like me who had a truly good time enjoying coffee with friends in CCD.
In CCD, V. G. Siddhartha (VGS) created a brilliant institution. However, somehow I am finding the obituaries, comments and reactions from media, market participants, social media stars etc quite hypocritical.
Vijay Mallya (VM), also established a brilliant institution in Kingfisher Airlines. I had really good time travelling in Kingfisher. I am sure almost everyone did. Like VSG, he also had unpaid loans worth 8000-9000crs. Both claimed to have sufficient assets to pay their loans, but faced inadequate liquidity to regularly service their loans. Both had political connections. Income Tax and Enforcement agencies alleged evasion of tax and diversion of funds in both cases. Both chose to escape the situation instead of facing it.
The only difference is that VSG could escape to land beyond reach of anyone, whereas VM is within reach.
For VSG plight, system is being blamed, whereas VM is made out to be a villain.
I feel sorry for VSG, and I have no sympathy for VM. But I would not blame the system for the plight of both. It's the greed, vanity, managerial inefficiency, inability to manage the change, and disregard for the process of law that took both of them down. And they are not alone. Many more are finding themselves in the similar situation. I hope none takes the VSG or VM route to salvation.
Chart of the day

 
What's bothering Indian equities - 2
I noted yesterday (see here), there is not sufficient evidence to establish beyond doubt that the regulatory changes like LTCG tax, reclassification of mutual fund schemes, higher effective rate of tax for rich and certain class of FPIs, etc may be responsible for the severe correction in the broader markets in past 18months, or the fall in benchmark indices in past 8weeks.
I may add that outcome of an election fuelling a sustainable market rally is also mostly anecdotal and not conclusive by any measure. For example, look at the following chart of Nifty. The uptrend that started with RBI's strong measures to control CAD and improve liquidity, was broken in August 2015, despite a strong government perceived to be development focused at the helm. Nifty has never been able to break out of that trend line since then. Nifty has given up the entire post 2019 election rally within one month, despite the same government returning even with a stronger mandate.
It is therefore fair to assume that the market up move that started in February 2016 is in fact a shallow bear market rally that has held up well for more than 3yrs.

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In this period about one fourth of the frequently traded 1300odd stocks on NSE have lost more than 50% of their value. Another 15% of these stocks have lost anywhere between 25% and 50% of their value. About 25% of stocks have moved between (-)25% and 25%. Only less than one third of the stocks have yielded a return better than bank deposit (~7% CAGR) since February 2016.
In conventional sense, the return on the investment in publically traded equity is a function of 3 factors (a) earnings growth; (b) changes in price earnings (PE) ratio and (c) dividend.
Earnings growth is a function of multiple factors, e.g., (a) capacity (production capability); (b) demand environment (market leadership); (c) competitive landscape (pricing power, cost advantage); (d) innovation and technology advantage; (e) resource availability (raw material, labor, capital, managerial bandwidth etc.), etc.
Price Earnings Ratio (PER), one of the most popular equity valuation criteria, is the ratio between the earnings of a company and its market value. It broadly signifies that at the current rate of earnings how many years it will take for the company to add the value which an investor is paying today.
Principally, an acceptable PER for a company's stock is defined by (a) the return on equity (RoE) a company is able to generate on sustainable basis and (b) the growth rate of earnings that could be achieved on sustainable basis. A company that could generate higher RoE consistently and is likely to grow faster, should be assigned a higher PER as compared to the ones which generate lower RoE or has low or highly cyclical earnings growth.
A rise in PER, if not commensurate with the rise in earnings profile needs deeper scrutiny. Sometime the rise in PER occurs due to correction in anomalies (undervaluation) of the past. This is a welcome move. Sometime, PER changes (re-rates) due to relative forces, e.g., rise of PER in comparable foreign markets or change in return profile of alternative assets like bonds, gold, real estate etc. This is usually unsustainable and therefore a short term phenomenon. Many times, demand-supply mismatch in publically traded equities also drives re-rating of PER (excess liquidity chasing few stocks and vice versa). This is again usually a short term phenomenon.
Sustainable rise in dividend yield is generally a sign of stable profitability growth (P&L improvement) and strong financial position (B/S improvement) and stronger cash flows. In some cases however it could reflect stagnation in growth
Analyzing the present Indian market context, I find that most of the market gains in past 6years occurred due to PE expansion. The earnings growth had been anemic, and dividend yield has in fact contracted since 2013.
It highlights that 75% to 80% of the equity return in past 6 years is consequent of PE ratio expansion and only 20% to 25% is due to earnings growth. In this period Earnings have in fact grown at measly 3.7% CAGR.

 


 




As I wrote a couple of months ago also, once the market participants are through with their affair with the politics, budget, global trade war, rate cuts, need for fiscal stimulus etc, they would need to sit, put their heads together and contemplate the following:
(1)   How much is the scope for further PE expansion of Indian equities?
(2)   How much earnings will have to grow in next 3years to normalize the rapid PE expansion of past 6years?
(3)   Is there enough visibility of earnings growth for next couple of years at least?
(4)   Though the premium of midcap to the benchmark indices has moderated considerably in past one year or so, but does absolute valuations are attractive enough to provide decent returns over next 3-4years?
(5)   Is it reasonable to assume that due to higher domestic inflows into equities, we might not see any dramatic price correction, nonetheless a prolonged time correction cannot be ruled out?
Answer to these inquisitions would guide how much return one should be expecting from Indian equities in next couple of years.
Given the turmoil in corporate debt market and moderate gilt yields, on risk weighted basis the overweight equities strategy will still make more sense than a balanced asset allocation in my view. However, the return expectations may need material moderation.
Besides the fundamental issue of earnings and overvaluations, there are some market related issues that are of major immediate concern to the market participants. I would like to highlight these issues also, in my next post.