Choose your economic model

In the post-World War II era, two forces have driven economic development more than any other: real estate and exports. Together, they have transported most economies from underdeveloped to middle-income status over eight decades. Technology and productivity gains have played a critical but largely supporting role — improving export competitiveness and raising household affordability for property ownership.

Improvements in social outcomes — inclusiveness, sustainability, equity, and quality of life — have typically followed economic development with a lag, sometimes by decades. It is therefore reasonable to assess any country’s economic model against these two pillars: how well it has built exports, and how well it has developed real estate.

India’s experience on both counts is instructive — and incomplete.

Exports: A story that stalled

As India opened up its economy in 1991, exports began to rise noticeably. Growth then accelerated sharply from around 2004. Much of that momentum can be traced to the structural reforms of the NDA government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004) — aggressive privatization of core sectors, rapid build-out of industrial and trade infrastructure, and the development of engineering and technology capabilities, partly driven by the necessity of surviving international sanctions after the 1998 nuclear tests. Those compulsions produced competencies that later translated into genuine export strength in engineering, technology, and pharmaceuticals.

But after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09, the story changed. Exports stagnated. More telling, India’s exports as a share of GDP peaked around 2013–14 at roughly 25% and have been declining since. A sharp post-Covid recovery briefly arrested that trend, but the past three years suggest a resumption of the downward drift.

 

(These figures include merchandise exports, services exports, royalties, and technical fees.)

The structural issues are well known: weak manufacturing competitiveness, logistics gaps, a modest share of global value chains, and a services export base that is deep but narrow. None of these are easy to fix. But the data makes clear that post-GFC India has not been able to sustain the export-led momentum that most successful Asian economies relied upon.

Real Estate: Underdeveloped and under pressure

Granular data on real estate’s direct contribution to India’s GDP is not readily available. The broader category of “Financial Services, Real Estate and Professional Services” under the services classification shows that this group’s share of GDP rose from around 15% in the early 1990s to approximately 22–24% today — a significant structural shift.

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Much of that gain likely reflects financial services rather than real estate itself. A May 2026 KPMG report estimated real estate’s direct contribution to India’s GDP at approximately 7.3%. By comparison, most Asian economies see real estate contributing 13–15% of GDP — a gap that reflects how far India’s urbanization and housing development still have to go.

The enabling conditions for a strong real estate cycle have been present to varying degrees. Since 1991, average lending rates have fallen sharply — from nearly 19% at their 1992 peak to around 9% today — driven by sustained fiscal consolidation, better inflation management, and structural improvements in the current account. Lower rates, combined with rising employment, improving real wages, better connectivity, and expanded urban access, supported a strong real estate growth cycle through the 2000s and early 2010s.

That cycle has since lost momentum. Inflation has proved sticky, the current account remains structurally vulnerable, and real wage growth in the formal economy has slowed. Interest rates, while well below their historical highs, have stopped falling. Without a resumption of the structural improvements that drove the last cycle, the tailwinds for real estate are weaker than they were.​

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 The central question

This brings us to the harder question. If both pillars of the conventional post-war growth model — exports and real estate — are underperforming, what does India do?

One option is to double down: fix the structural constraints on exports, accelerate urbanization, and build the financial depth needed to sustain a larger real estate cycle. This is the well-tested Asian playbook.

The other option is harder to define but not trivial to dismiss. As I argued in a 2014 post on this blog (see Utopia: The Economic Solution), the Gandhian model — grounded in decentralization, labor-intensive production, self-reliance, and the primacy of the individual over capital — has attracted serious academic attention and is not without practical merit. The question is whether India has already travelled too far down the urbanization and integration path to reverse course, or whether elements of that framework can be selectively incorporated into a hybrid model.

Borrowing blindly from western models will not work in the Indian context. India’s economic model needs to reckon with a class structure, an employment challenge, and a rural civilizational inheritance that standard industrialization narratives do not address well. At the same time, a pure retreat to pre-industrial self-sufficiency is not a realistic option for a country of 1.4 billion people with legitimate aspirations.

The answer is likely somewhere in the middle — a model that aggressively rebuilds export competitiveness and develops real estate as a genuine engine of growth, while orienting its social architecture around decentralization, broad-based employment, and sustainability rather than pure GDP maximization.

The policy choice ahead

The data from the three charts above does not make a comfortable reading. Exports as a share of GDP have been falling for over a decade. Real estate is significantly undersized relative to India’s peers. Lending rates, while structurally lower than in the past, are not falling anymore. These are not cyclical problems. They are structural.

Policymakers cannot afford to wait for the globally tested model to reassert itself on its own. A deliberate choice needs to be made — either recommit to the conventional model with genuine policy urgency, or develop a credible alternative suited to India’s specific conditions. Muddling through, which has been the default, is not a strategy.

What that alternative looks like is a conversation India has not yet had at the level of seriousness it deserves.

Also read – Utopia: The economic Solution

 

The Indian economy – glass half empty

The Indian economy has indubitably shown brilliant resilience and sustained the base growth rate of ~6%. In the current year FY26 also the real GDP is expected to grow in the range of 6.3% to 6.6% (vs 6.5% in FY25).

It is expected that the tax incentive offered in the budget for FY26 may support urban consumption demand, that has been lagging for the past couple of years, while the rural demand has shown some pick-up. Good monsoon may further stimulate rural demand. Benign inflation and below potential growth trajectory shall keep the RBI on the monetary easing path. Rates may fall further and liquidity may remain supportive. Continued focus on capacity building by the government may however continue to remain the mainstay of the growth.

The global environment remains challenging with trade related uncertainties and geopolitical tensions persisting. However, a resolution of trade and geopolitical conflicts could provide strong impetus.

In my view, 6% (+/- 50bps) may now be the base growth rate (or the new Hindu rate of growth, if you like) for the Indian economy. If India can manage to meet the basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, water, electricity, sanitation, basic education, and primary health) of its 1.4 billion population, our economy might keep growing at this rate for the next decade or so, at least. However, this base rate of growth may not be sufficient to lift the Indian economy to the middle income category like China, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.

We urgently need catalysts that may provide the necessary escape velocity to catapult the India economy into a higher growth orbit. Unfortunately, the current growth paradigm lacks those catalysts.

To make my point clear, I would like to highlight the following three inadequacies of India's current growth paradigm.

Declining trend of global integration

The Indian economy has failed to maintain the pace of globalization. The share of India in global trade has remained marginal. In the past 11 years, our exports, as a percentage of GDP, have declined ~14% from 25.2% of GDP in FY14 to 21.6% of GDP in FY25. Similarly, imports have also declined from 27% of GDP in FY14 to 22.5% of GDP in FY25.

India’s exports have grown at a CAGR of 4.64% during FY15-FY25, while imports have grown at a CAGR of 4.36% during this period. The real GDP in this period has grown at a CAGR of 6.09%.

Even worse, the merchandise exports (mostly manufactured goods) have grown at a meager CAGR of 2.54% in the past 11 years. The share of merchandise export, as a percentage of GDP, has contracted 28.6% since FY14. Manufacturing GVA in FY25 was at all time low. Obviously, the government strategy of incentivizing manufacturing and boosting exports is not yielding good results, and may need a comprehensive overhaul.

 

Rate of investment remains low

The rate of investment in the Indian economy has shown some pick up in the post covid period, but it still remains much below the rate seen during 2004-2013 period. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Investments) have grown at a CAGR of 6.41% (vs Real GDP CAGR of 6.09%) during FY15-FY25. Obviously, this rate of growth in investments is not adequate to gain escape velocity.

The corporate capex growth has also slowed down to just 8% in FY25, after two years of higher growth (27% in FY23 and 20% in FY24)

Consumption not growing

The share of private consumption in the GDP has remained stagnant around ~56 over the past 15 years (except during Covid years). In the past 11 years (FY15 to FY25) it has grown at a CAGR of 6.06%, less than the real GDP growth CAGR of 6.09%. Interestingly, in this period taxes on goods and services have increased at a CAGR of 6.41%.

Government consumption has also slowed down in this period from 10% of GDP in FY14 to 9.1% of GDP in FY25. Overall, government consumption has grown at a slower CAGR of 5.18% during FY15-FY25.

Notably, NSO second advance estimates of FY25 GDP has projected private consumption growth at 10% in 4QFY25 vs the actual 6%. For the full year private consumption growth of 7.2% was also marginally lower than the NSO forecast of 7.6%.

So, if none of the engines of growth – exports, consumption and investments – is showing signs of acceleration, achieving a higher target may not be possible; even though we may just draw comfort from the fact that base growth rate is now higher s compared to 1950-1990 period.

Next week – Growth statistics – the disconnect

Also read

The state of the Indian economy

The Indian economy – glass half full

Living on hope

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recently released the results of its latest forward-looking surveys (November 2024 Round). Based on the feedback received from the respondents the survey results provide important insights with respect to consumer confidence, inflationary expectations and economic growth expectations.

Consumer confidence – Present tense, hopes high for future

The survey collects current perceptions (vis-à-vis a year ago) and one year ahead expectations of households on general economic situation, employment scenario, overall price situation, own income and spending across 19 major cities.

As per the survey results, Consumer confidence for the current period declined marginally owing to weaker sentiments across the survey parameters except household spending. The current situation index (CSI) moderated to 94 in November 2024 from 94.7 two months ago. (A value below 100 indicates a state of pessimism)

However, for the year ahead, consumer confidence remained elevated, improving 50bps from the previous round of Surveys. Households displayed somewhat higher optimism on one year ahead outlook for major economic parameters, except prices. The future expectations index (FEI) stood at 121.9 in November 2024 (121.4 in the previous survey round).

The respondents’ sentiments towards current earning moderated marginally, they displayed high optimism on future income which was consistent with their surmise on employment conditions. Households anticipated higher spending over one year horizon on the back of higher essential as well as non-essential spending.

Household inflationary expectations rise

Households’ perception of current inflation rose by 30bps to 8.4%t, as compared to the previous survey round. Inflation expectation for three months horizon moderated marginally by 10 bps to 9.1 per cent, whereas it inched up by 10 bps to 10.1 per cent for one year ahead period.

Compared to the September 2024 round of the survey, a somewhat larger share of respondents expects the year ahead price and inflation to increase, mainly due to higher pressures from food items and housing related expenses. One year ahead, the price expectation of households is closely aligned with food prices and housing related expenses.

Male respondents expected relatively higher inflation in one to three months, as well as one year ahead, as compared to the female respondents.

Forecast on macroeconomic indicators – growth scaled down marginally

GDP: Real gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to grow by 6.8% in 2024-25 and 6.6% in 2025-26. Forecasters have assigned the highest probability to real GDP growth in the range 6.5-6.9% for both the years 2024-25 and 2025-26.

Annual growth in real private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) and real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) for 2024-25 are expected at 6.2% and 7.9% (revised down), respectively. Real gross value added (GVA) growth projection has been revised down marginally to 6.7% for 2024-25 and kept unchanged at 6.4 per cent for 2025-26.

 Inflation: Annual headline inflation, based on consumer price index (CPI), is expected to be higher at 4.8% for FY25 and 4.3% for FY26.

External sector: Merchandise exports and imports are projected to grow at a slower rate of 2.4% and 4.6% respectively in FY25 and recover to 5.5% and 6% respectively in FY26, in US dollar terms. Current account deficit (CAD) is expected at 1.0% (of nominal GDP) during both FY25 and FY26.

Economy – Uneven recovery to pre-pandemic levels, accelerators missing

The latest macro data indicates that the Indian economy may be standing at an inflection point. Having survived a major accident in the form of Covid19 pandemic, the economy looks stable, having progressed well to reach closer to the pre Covid level of activity. Of course, for next few quarters the economy may still need to use the support of government spending, before the virtuous cycle of higher investment and consumption kick starts.

Post pandemic, the challenges before the government are multifold; and so are the opportunities. A successful resolution of these challenges could trigger a virtuous cycle of growth and catapult the economy to the higher orbit. A failure may not be an option, as it could cause a disaster of unfathomable proportion.

Besides, merely achieving a full ‘V’ recovery to the pre pandemic level of economic activity will be inadequate, since pre pandemic the economy was slowing for many years and was completely unable to generate adequate jobs for the burgeoning youth population. The government will need to apply multiple accelerators for the sustainable growth to reach to the target of 8% plus.

The pandemic has widened the divide in the society, as the recovery so far has been rather ‘K’ shaped. Income and wealth inequalities have widened. Disparities in access to digital infrastructure have amplified the divide in social sectors like healthcare and education. The gap between organized and unorganized sectors has enlarged materially. To maintain harmony and peace in the society, these gulfs would need to be managed.

As per a study done by the Azim Premji University scholars, “one year of Covid-19 pandemic has pushed 230 million people into poverty with a 15 per cent increase in poverty rate in rural India and a 20 per cent surge in urban India."

CMIE data showed that “the unemployment rate has gone up as high as 12 per cent in May 2021, 10 million jobs have been lost just on account of the second wave and 97 per cent of the households in the country have experienced declines in incomes”.

The labour force participation rate was at 40.22% in the period between May-August 2021, according to latest data by the CMIE. It has remained at about 40% since the start of the pandemic, compared to about 43% before it. This is the lowest the labour force participation rate has been since 2016, when data was first compiled.

Exports, one of the key growth drivers, have persistently failed to deliver in past one decade. There is no sign of any major improvement in exports, especially when the global growth has already plateaued after post pandemic push. Considering that India’s capex is closely related to exports and global trade, the probability of any material pick up in private capex appears slim.

Poor export growth and high petroleum and gold imports have resulted in sharp increase in trade deficit for India. Consequently, INR has come under pressure. USDINR is its weakest level now and looking even more vulnerable given its outperformance vs EM peers in past one year.

Persistent food and energy inflation is key concern, though other industrial input prices have shown signs of stabilizing. Given the poor wage growth for semi-skilled and unskilled workers, a large part of the population is reeling under the impact of stagflation, hurting the consumer sentiments. Consumption slowdown is one of the key economic concerns currently.

The best thing for Indian economy is that the government has sufficient fiscal leverage available to accelerate the investments. At Rs5.5bn the FY22e gross fiscal deficit is lower than the pre pandemic years. The April-October 2021 fiscal deficit is just ~36% of budget estimates. The government has thus gathered enough ammunition by adhering to higher duties on fuel and lower revenue spending to manage its fiscal balance. Buoyant revenue and aggressive disinvestment may help in improving it further.

Iron and Gold

India's trade gap widened to $13.93 billion in March of 2021 from $9.98 billion a year earlier. The trade gap was however lower than the preliminary estimates of a higher $14.11bn. The key highlights of trade data were as follows:

·         In March 2021 exports soared 60.3% to a record high of $34.5bn (up from $27.5bn in Feb’21), marginally higher than the preliminary estimate of $34bn.

·         The exports surged ~60% yoy in March, driven mainly by $6bn rise in non-petroleum products’ export.

·         Imports in March 2021 were $48.4bn ($40.5bn in Feb’21), led by non-petroleum imports of $38.5bn ($31.5bn in Feb’21). Imports surged 54% yoy

·         Overall exports contracted by ~7.2% yoy in FY21, a reasonable figure given the difficult period for trade due to global lockdowns.

·         Imports were down 17% yoy in FY21, mainly on account of 37% lower petroleum import due to lockdown and mobility restrictions.

·         Trade deficit widened in March 2021 to $13.9bn ($12.6bn in February and $9.98bn in March 2020)

·         Pharma exports maintained high growth in March, growing 49% yoy to $2.3bn, an all-time high.

·         For FY21, India recorded current account surplus equal to 1% of GDP, due to lower imports and higher FPI flows. Overall BoP surplus in FY21 was $84bn.

I usually do not like to read too much into monthly macro data, unless there is a sustainable trend that could be reasonable extrapolated to future periods. However, I find that any decision based on headline trade data might be erroneous. It is important to factor in the details. For example, consider the following:

(a)   While almost all items recorded positive growth, majority of the growth in imports and exports was driven by abnormal growth in a handful of items.

Out of ~$17bn yoy increase in exports, gold imports alone accounted for 50% delta or $8.3bn. Reportedly, gold imports touched 98.6 tons in Mar 2021 from 13 tons a year ago.

(b)   Export’s growth was led by the growth Engineering products’ export, which accounted for almost one third of the export growth. It is estimated that large stimulus spending in trade partner countries led to higher engineering product growth. However largest export growth was recorded in Iron Ore, led by sharp rise in prices.

(c)    With fresh mobility restrictions the trade momentum may slow down again. FPI flows may also taper this year reducing the CAD and BoP surplus. The consensus appears a CAD deficit of ~1% for FY22. INR may therefore

On the positive side, the advance economies are outpacing the emerging economies in growth recovery. This trend augurs well for Indian exports, especially engineering goods. A weaker INR (my view 74-74.50/USD average for FY22) might be an added advantage.