Do it yourself

Since the beginning of the year 2025, the exchange rate of India Rupee (INR) has fallen against the currencies of most of our major partners. Though, USDINR (INR vs USD) is the most keenly watched exchange rate (since a majority of our forex reserves, external debt and external trades are USD denominated), INR has depreciated most against EURO (EUR). The extent of depreciation against Japanese Yen (JPY), Chinese Yuan and British Pound (GBP) is mostly similar.

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Notwithstanding the views of the finance minister that “INR is not weakening, but the other currencies are appreciating”, the INR depreciation is a matter of concern to a large majority of Indian investors. Since we are traditionally a current account negative economy, on the net basis, INR depreciation adversely affects the economic fundamentals. Besides, eroding the confidence in the economy, —

·         INR depreciation makes many things expensive for the Indian households – appliances, toys, lights, clothes, footwear, medicine, communication, travel, studies abroad, gold, silver, etc.

·         A sharp depreciation discourages foreign investors from investing in INR assets.

·         The cost of debt servicing rises for the corporates which have taken debt in foreign currencies, impacting the profitability adversely.

On the positive side, it helps the exporters (textiles, IT services, pharmaceuticals, automobile, etc.). In fact, as per various estimates, INR depreciation has overall positive impact on the Nifty50 earnings, as several large companies derive a substantial part of their revenue from export of goods and services. On a lighter note, INR strength might help household budgets of investors, but might not be good for the health of their equity portfolios.

DXY vs USDINR

One question that I am frequently asked, why the exchange rate of INR vs USD (USDINR) is depreciating, while the USD (DXY – a trade weighted index for USD) itself is depreciating?

In my view, it is not a fair comparison. USDINR is a bilateral exchange rate between the USD and INR. Whereas, the US dollar index (DXY) represents a trade weighted exchange rate of the USD against six major currencies, viz., EUR, JPY, GBP, CHF, CAD, and SEK.

Moreover, If USD falls -5% vs EUR/JPY, but INR falls -7% vs USD, then effectively INR is even weaker than USD → hence USDINR still rises.

It may also be pertinent to note that while the trade with the US forms almost one fourth of India's total external trade, India accounts for just 3% of the Us external trade. Hence, comparing USDINR with DXY might not be a good idea.

Why INR is relatively weaker

The rupee isn’t just about the dollar’s global strength — it reflects India’s external balance, capital flows, oil dependency, and RBI policy. So even if the USD is weakening broadly, INR can still depreciate if India-specific pressures are stronger.

Oil prices & trade deficit: India imports ~85% of its crude oil. Higher oil prices mean more dollar demand → rupee pressure.

Capital outflows: If foreign investors pull money from Indian equities or bonds, they convert INR to USD. Even modest outflows can weaken the rupee.

Interest rate differentials: If the Fed is cutting slower than RBI or US yields remain higher, the USD stays attractive for investors vs INR.

Safe-haven flows: During global uncertainty, funds flow into USD and US Treasuries, even if the dollar index is down — EM currencies including INR often suffer.

RBI intervention strategy: Sometimes the RBI allows gradual depreciation to maintain export competitiveness and conserve reserves.

 

 India’s external debt hit US$736.3bn by March 2025, a 10% jump from last year, with a significant portion (over 41%) of the debt maturing soon. As the US threatens 500% tariffs on countries buying Russian oil, including India, investors need to evaluate: Can India afford a confrontation with the US, China and other major trade partners, and could it withstand a covert economic embargo? Here’s my take, may be naïve and ill informed, but nonetheless relevant.

India’s External Debt

According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) latest release, India’s external debt stood at US$736.3bn at the end of March 2025, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 19.1%. Key highlights of the data are:

Long-Term Debt: US$601.9bn, up US$60.6bn from last year, with commercial borrowings and non-resident deposits driving growth. About 77% (US$568bn) of this debt is owed by non-government entities. The non-government debt is almost equally divided between financial institutions (US$271.3bn) and non-financial corporations (US$261.7bn).

Short-Term Debt: US$134.5bn, representing 18.3% of total debt and 20.1% of foreign exchange reserves.

Components: About one half of external liabilities (US$251bn) is loans and debt securities, 22% currency and deposits and 18% trade credit. The rest 10% includes IMF SDRs and intercompany lending by MNCs.

Maturity: 41.2% of the external debt (about US$305bn), is due to mature within the next 12 months.

Debt Sustainability: Foreign exchange reserves cover 92.8% of total debt, down from 97.4% a year ago, signaling a slight decline in buffer capacity.

Refinancing challenge

With over 40% of long-term debt maturing soon, India faces a refinancing challenge, particularly if global financial conditions tighten or trade disruptions escalate. India’s reliance on Russian oil, which accounts for 35-40% of its crude imports (2.08 million barrels per day in June 2025), has put it in the crosshairs of a proposed US Senate bill. The “Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025,” backed by Senator Lindsey Graham and reportedly supported by President Trump, proposes a 500% tariff on countries importing Russian energy to pressure Moscow over Ukraine. India, alongside China, buys 70% of Russia’s oil exports, making it a prime target.

Economic Impact: A 500% tariff on Indian exports to the US, India’s largest export market, could affect US$66bn (87% of India’s US exports), as per Citi Research estimates. This could disrupt key sectors like pharmaceuticals, IT, and textiles, potentially triggering inflation and job losses.

Oil Dependency: India imports 88% of its crude oil, with Russia offering competitive discounts. Switching to costlier suppliers like the US or Middle East could raise import costs significantly, straining India’s trade balance.

Can India Afford a Confrontation?

India’s economic fundamentals offer some resilience but also expose vulnerabilities.

Forex Reserves: At US$703bn (as of recent data), India’s reserves cover 92.8% of external debt, providing a cushion to manage maturing obligations. However, refinancing US$270.9bn in long-term debt within a year could pressure reserves, especially if US tariffs disrupt export revenues.

Trade Dynamics: The US accounts for a US$45.6bn trade deficit with India. A trade war could prompt reciprocal tariffs, but India’s 12% trade-weighted average tariff (vs. the US’s 2.2%) limits its leverage. Negotiations for a trade deal to cut tariffs on US$23bn of US imports are underway, signaling India’s preference for diplomacy over confrontation; notwithstanding some recent comments of senior ministers that suggest otherwise.

Oil Alternatives: India has diversified its oil imports, with the US supplying 6.3% (439,000 bpd in June 2025) and West Asia 35-40%. While switching from Russian oil is feasible, it would increase costs, potentially impacting fuel prices and inflation.

Can India Sustain Virtual Economic Sanctions?

Virtual economic sanctions, such as the proposed 500% tariffs, or Chinese embargo on export of critical components, chemicals, human resources etc., would act as a severe trade barrier.India’s ability to sustain them depends on several factors.

Energy Security: India’s strategic reserves (9-10 days of imports) and diversified suppliers (US, Nigeria, Middle East) provide short-term flexibility. However, replacing Russia’s 40% share at higher costs could strain refiners and consumers.

Economic Resilience: The RBI’s Financial Stability Report (July 2025) highlights strong banking sector metrics, with declining non-performing assets and robust capital buffers. This suggests India’s financial system could absorb some shocks, but prolonged trade disruptions could erode confidence.

Need for caution

India’s debt remains manageable for now, but over 41% debt maturity in 12 months calls for vigilance. Investors in Indian bonds or banking stocks should monitor refinancing risks.

A US tariff war could hit export-driven sectors like IT and pharmaceuticals hardest. India’s diplomatic efforts to secure a trade deal or tariff waiver will be critical. A successful negotiation could stabilize markets, while failure could spark volatility.

Conclusion

India’s US$736.3bn external debt and looming maturities pose challenges, but its reserves and diversified oil sources provide a buffer. A full-blown confrontation with the US seems unlikely, given India’s diplomatic push and economic stakes. However, sustaining virtual sanctions would strain India’s trade balance and energy costs, making de-escalation the smarter play.

The 41% of external debt (US$305bn) maturing within 12 months is significant, requiring substantial refinancing or reserve drawdowns. India’s US$703bn forex reserves provide coverage, but a US tariff war could reduce export revenues, complicating debt servicing.

Sustained 500% tariffs would disrupt exports, weaken the rupee, and increase debt servicing costs. The RBI’s strong banking sector provides some stability, but prolonged sanctions could erode investor confidence and slow growth.

India’s neutral geopolitical stance and trade deal negotiations (aiming to cut tariffs on US$23bn of US imports) indicate a strategy to avoid sanctions. A waiver or partial exemption is possible, given India’s strategic importance to the US.

Read with US$703bn may be just enough

Notwithstanding a marked slowdown in the past few quarters, the Indian economy has managed to grow at a decent pace in the current global context. Though India may have lost the crown of the fastest growing global economy to Vietnam, it still remains the fastest growing amongst the top 10 global economies.

The Reserve Bank of India is holding US$658bn in forex reserves, which is considered adequate in normal circumstances or even in a usual cyclical slowdown. Despite accelerated selling in equity markets by the foreign portfolio investors (FPIs), the current account deficit of ~1.5% of GDP, is conveniently manageable. INR has been one of the most stable emerging market currencies. On the real effective exchange rate (REER) basis INR is presently ruling at a five-year high level.

In their recent policy review, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India has cut growth estimates for FY25 by 60bps to 6.6% and 1QFY26 by 40bps to 6.9%. The MPC has also hiked their inflation forecast for 2HFY25 and 1QFY26. The RBI estimates are still few basis points higher than the average estimates of professional forecasters, as per the RBI’s recent survey. It is therefore likely that growth slowdown extends well into 1HFY26.

RBI has once again made it clear that it is not comfortable about the inflation trajectory and would prefer to outweigh price stability against growth in its policy dynamics. In the recent meeting, the two external members of the MPC voted in favor of a 25bps repo rate cut, but the RBI’s official nominees voted to maintain a status quo, despite loud growth concerns and political rhetoric for monetary easing.

The market consensus seems overwhelmingly in favor of a February 2025 repo rate cut. This assumes growth staying in the slow lane; lower food and energy inflation; and fiscal improvement as promised in the union budget for FY25. We need to watch for development of La Nina, adversely impacting the Rabi crop; slowdown in tax collection and rise in cash subsidies due to election promises adversely impacting the fiscal disincline. Compensating higher subsidies with a cut in capital expenditure (as has been the case in 1HFY25) would further slowdown the potential growth, making any monetary easing more inflationary.

At the surface level there is nothing that would ring alarm bells for domestic investors. However, some of the recent actions of the RBI are reminiscent of the 2013 crisis period. The monetary policy is increasingly sounding like a plan to secure the stability of USDINR.

I wonder if RBI is really worried or it is just cautious and taking preemptive steps to mitigate any chance of a balance of payment crisis and/or currency volatility.

I have taken note of the following data points; and at the risk of being labeled unnecessarily paranoid, I would keep a close watch on these for the next few months to assess any vulnerability in India’s external sector.

·         There has been a marked slowdown in foreign flows -both portfolio flow and FDI flows in the past one year. The political changes in the US and Europe may further impact the flows in 2025. RBI may not want to further discourage flows by offering lower bond yields. For record, the India10y-US10y yield spread has already fallen from a high of 350bps in January 2024 to ~250bps.

·         RBI has created a record short position in USD (over US$49bn in forward market) in the past couple of months to protect USDINR; besides running down Fx reserves by ~US$47bn in just one month (from US$705bn in October 2024 to US$658bn in November 2024)). It has taken almost US$96bn to keep USDINR stable in the 83-50-84.50 range.

It is critical to watch this because:

The global trade war could escalate, before it settles after the inauguration of President Trump. This could slowdown global trade; lead to China dumping on non-US trade partners; slowdown in remittances and services exports to some extent.

As the denominator (nominal GDP) goes down and exports also slow down, the current account deficit may show a tendency to rise, pressuring INR. The RBI cannot afford to spend another US$100bn on defending USDINR.

RBI has hiked the ceiling on interest rates offered by scheduled commercial banks on foreign currency deposits of NRIs. This is an early sign of the RBI worrying about Fx reserves. Any measure to limit foreign spending, investments (outward FDI) and LRS remittances will confirm these fears.

Presently, FPIs own about US$650bn worth of Indian equities, which is equal to official fx reserves of India. A US$12bn (appx 1.75% of total holding) sale in the past couple of months has caused some damage to the market sentiments. A 5% selling (US$35bn) could seriously damage equity markets, currency markets and RBI’s gameplan. Remember, on an average, we are running a ~US$20bn/month trade deficit; and a net external debt of over US$682bn. In a crisis situation, US$658bn reserves might not prove to be adequate.

·         President-Elect Trump and some of his designated team members have explicitly termed India a “currency manipulator” and demanded RBI to strengthen USDINR. If RBI is forced to meet these demands, it may need to unwind its short USD position, conduct aggressive OMO to buy USD from the market, and engineer higher yields (bond and/or deposits) to attract more USD flows into India. This could make maintaining current account balance a challenging task. Especially in an environment, where China could be dumping everything in the global markets, and competitors like Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey are becoming very aggressive.

If you find it confusing, impertinent, misplaced, let me sum this up in short for you. I would prefer to totally avoid macro trades in 2025, and stay committed to individual business stories that I like.

The 3-day bi-monthly meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) begins today. This would be the last meeting before presentation of the Union Budget for the year FY26. The members of the MPC would draw inputs from the latest national accounts (2QFY25 GDP data); October 2024 inflation data; October 2024 Professional managers’ survey results; September 2024 IIP estimates; November 2024 PMI and core sector growth data; April-October fiscal balance data; global developments (political and geopolitical); global inflation, rates, currency and market trends; expert opinions and views of the members of MPC; and assessment of the current and future situation provided by the staff of RBI.

The statement of the MPC on macroeconomic outlook and likely direction of the monetary policy will be a key input in preparation of the Union Budget for FY26. However, the market participants’ interest in the MPC meeting appears limited to whether, or not, at 10AM on 6^th December 2024, the RBI governor announces a repo rate cut and/or a cut in the cash reserve ratio (CRR). Some TV show panelists might also bother to note the downward revision, if any, in the growth estimates for FY25.

If the MPC decides to maintain a status quo on its policy stance – considering growth slowdown a temporary blip expecting a recovery from 3QFY25; and continue to accord higher weightage to still elevated inflation and highly uncertain and volatile global conditions, the market participants may be hugely disappointed.

Not to cut: In the October policy statement, the governor had adequately hinted about its preference for price stability over growth (see here). Perhaps RBI is much more conscious about the looming external threats, especially the balance of payment situation if there are sudden FPI outflows; or the FDI flows get restricted; or remittances are affected.

Or to cut: In the recent weeks, RBI has allowed USDINR to sustainably breach 84 mark. It appears that it may want USDINR to weaken further before Trump takes over the US presidency on 20^th January, and urges its trade-surplus trade partners to strengthen their currencies. We have seen a similar weakness in USDCNY also, for example. A token 25bps or an aggressive 50bps rate cut could drive USDINR to 86 in near term, providing RBI a leverage to engineer a ~5% USDINR appreciation to ~83 level in the next three months.

In either case, the transmission of the lower rates may not be in the corresponding measure, as RBI might continue to control credit growth and liquidity to reign inflation, asset quality and excessive unsecured lending. I therefore would not expect a CRR cut. I am however mindful that the market is pregnant with the hope of a CRR and/or repo rate cut and no action in this regard may lead to a sharp sell-off in financial stocks, especially NBFCs.

The market participants may also take note of the following three potential near term risks:

·         Besides the real GDP growth, the nominal GDP growth has also fallen to 9% in the 2QFY25. A lower nominal GDP growth directly impacts the tax collections and corporate profitability. November manufacturing PMI is at 11 months low. Core sector growth has also been low in 3QFY25. Expecting an immediate revival of growth in 3QFY25 may not be prudent; and the RBI may not mind a transitory higher inflation to boost nominal GDP growth.

·         The president-elect Trump has explicitly threatened the BRICS nations to refrain from any misadventure that would impact supremacy of USD. It may purely be rhetorical to gain some upper-hand in trade/sanctions negotiation with Xi and Putin. Nonetheless, it could cause higher volatility in the global markets. It becomes critical given that BRICS members supply two thirds of global fossil fuels.

·         The outgoing president Biden has provided a complete pardon to his son, who was facing multiple criminal charges in the US. Biden had earlier categorically denied this favor to his son. Experts are interpreting this as an indication of rising fear of a widespread witch hunt by the Trump administration. The witch-hunt, if it does take place, may not remain restricted to the domestic political opponents of Trump. 

I shared some of my random thoughts with the readers last week (see here). Many readers have commented on my post. Some readers have raised some pertinent questions and also provided very useful feedback. Based on the readers’ comments, questions and feedback, I would like to share some more random thoughts. It is however important to note that I am a tiny insect living in a cocoon of my own. I cannot comment intelligently on the international markets, policy matters and geopolitics. Nonetheless, I reserve my rights to form strong views on global and domestic developments concerning markets, policies and geopolitics, for my personal strategy purposes.

The US debt end game

The current state of the Fed balance sheet and the US public debt is certainly not sustainable by any parameter. It is a matter of debate how the US government and the Federal Reserve would make fiscal and monetary corrections and eventually return to an acceptable level of public debt without pushing the economy into a deep recession (hard landing). One of the most talked about resolutions to this conundrum is to keep bond prices lower and buy back aggressively over the next few years. That may be one of the easiest ways to return to fiscal sanity. Creating an artificial shortage of USD and forcing UST holders to sell cheap could be one of the means to achieve this target. To create USD shortage, a reverse carry trade might be induced, by narrowing the yield spreads, besides reducing CAD through tariffs and other trade restrictions.

For context, the US is running a quarterly current account deficit in excess of US$260bn; a fiscal deficit of over US$1.7trn (2023) and USD supply (M2) of over US$21trn. The US GDP was US$27.4trn in 2023, accounting for roughly 26% of the global GDP.

The great gambler

The RBI governor's job in India might be the most unenviable one. He has to struggle 24X7 to maintain a balance between fiscal requirements, political consideration (inflation and small saving interest), growth needs (real rates) and balance of payment (USDINR exchange rates). Repo rate and open market operations are the only two major tools available to him.

The RBI has been maintaining a status quo on the repo rates for over a year now. This has sustained the US-India yield gap (to protect flows) to some extent, but the efficacy of high repo rates in ensuring price stability, which is the stated primary objective of the RBI’s monetary policy, is questionable. Besides, the RBI has been meaningfully enlarging its balance sheet in the post Urjit Patel era, while stated policy objective, until the last week, has been “withdrawal of accommodation”. This aspect is not talked about much in the public domain. One may speculate that the real objective of the RBI’s monetary policy has been to prevent USDINR appreciation (even if it means high imported inflation) and ensure sufficient inflow in small saving schemes, which are funding almost 45% of the union government’s fiscal deficit. It has been obviously playing a gamble with high stakes, US$700bn forex reserve notwithstanding.

 Indian lenders face challenges

The persistent negative credit deposit ratio of Indian banks has been a subject of discussion at all levels. The government, regulators (RBI and SEBI), bankers and analysts etc. have all expressed concern over the poor deposit growth, while the credit demand remains strong. The finance minister and RBI have even attributed the flow of funds towards capital markets as one of the reasons. In my view, high household inflation, poor real wage growth and very low real rates on deposits are the primary reasons for this trend. Besides, for most lenders the asset quality improvement trend that started five years ago may have already peaked.

I feel most Indian lenders may now face three challenges – declining margins as the cost of funds rises; flat to declining asset quality and slowing growth. Investors are cognizant about these challenges but as the response to a recent IPO of a housing finance company indicates, they may not have yet adjusted their respective investment strategies.

Focus on finding opportunities

As a wise man suggested, the small investors like me should not be wasting energy on bothering about these macro things and focus on finding the investment/trading opportunities which may be opened by policy missteps, fund flows, geopolitical tensions etc. I fully agree with this thought. For the next 4-5 months, I shall be focusing on finding opportunities and taking advantage of traders’ mistakes.

The first half of the year 2024 has been good for global markets. Despite disappointment on rate cuts, geopolitical concerns, sticky inflation, and political changes in many countries, stocks, precious metals, industrial commodities and crypto made a steady move up with very relatively low volatility.

A notable feature of the global market movement in 1H2024 was the stark underperformance of Asia ex Japan, even though the Japanese equities being the best equity markets amongst the major global markets. Brazil also underperformed despite a decent rally in commodities.

Another notable feature of global markets was the narrow market breadth of US markets. Though the benchmark indices scaled new highs, it was mostly due to parabolic rise in a handful of technology stocks.

At present equity markets appear strong on the back of a resilient demand environment, well anchored inflationary expectations and peak interest rates. Fears of earnings failing to match the stock price rise, escalation in geopolitical tensions, spike in energy prices, uncertainties about the policy direction post the US presidential elections, and erratic weather conditions are some points of concern.

India performance – 1H2024

Indian markets performed very well in the first half of the year 2024. Though Indian equities underperformed the developed markets in line with the global trend, it did very well within the emerging market universe. The key highlights of the India market performance could be listed as follows:

·         The benchmark Nifty50 gained ~10.5% during 1H2024; while the Midcap (+20.7%) and Small Cap (+21%) did much better. Consequently, overall market breadth has been strong.

·         Two third of the market gains came in the month of June 2024, post the elections. This was contrary to the pre-election consensus that BJP failing to secure a majority on its own may result in sharp decline in market.

·         The total market capitalization of NSE is higher by ~21%; more than gains in the benchmark indices – implying that stronger gains have occurred in the section of the market beyond indices.

·         The number sector outperforming the benchmark indices far outnumbers the sector underperforming. The rally was led by Realty, PSUs (mostly power, defense, and railway), Auto, infra and energy. The Capital Goods and Heavy Engineering sector have been the flavor for the period. Particularly, the businesses catering to sectors like defense, railways, and road construction did extremely well. Banks, IT Services and FMCG were notable underperformers.

·         Ship builders were the notable outperformers amongst the individual stocks. No conspicuous sectoral trend was seen for the losers.

·         Institutional flows to the secondary equity markets were positive for five out of the six months. 1H2024 witnessed a total flow of ~INR3559bn, despite FPIs outflows of Rs320bn. The correlation of institutional flows with Nifty returns remained poor (~48%).

·         The rates, currency and yields were stable in 1H2024. Policy rates were unchanged; while money market rates were marginally higher by 15bps. Deposit rates did not see much change while lending rates were higher by 10-15bps.

·         The overall Indian yield curve shifted lower and flattened completely, as the RBI maintained the status quo on policy stance.

·         The economic growth surprised on the higher side with the Indian economy recording a growth of 8.2% for FY24, beating all forecasts materially. Fiscal balance also improved with FY24RE fiscal deficit coming at 5.8% and FY25BE of fiscal deficit at 5.1%.

·         CPI inflation has inched closer to the lower bound of the RBI’s tolerance band of 4%-6% with May’24 CPI inflation number coming at 4.75%.

• Corporate performance has shown resilience in recent quarters, with sales growth recovering, margins improving and RoE rising. Banks reported consistent improvement in the asset quality and profitability.

Polling for the fourth phase of the 18^th general elections ended yesterday. Electorate from 380 Lok Sabha constituencies have exercised franchise to elect their national representatives. Over the next three weeks, eight states (full or partial), NCT of Delhi, and four union territories will vote in three phases. With 70% voting already over, a fair estimate of the national trends could be made by the experts.

Since the Election Commission of India (ECI) does not permit the publication or communication of the results in any other form of Exit Polls conducted by various agencies until the completion of voting for all seats, we do not have any expert opinion available about the likely outcome of the ongoing elections. However, a variety of guesstimates are available on social media and other platforms. Most of these guesstimates are speculative. These are either based on a small and localized sample; or gambling trends.

Many stock market experts have also presented their scenario analysis for the market performance depending upon the outcome of the general elections. Most experts have projected a sharp correction in the markets in case the incumbent BJP and its allies fail to secure the requisite majority in the Lok Sabha. As a keen political observer and a tiny investor, I am interested in these forecasts.

Unfortunately, I find that the discussions available in the public domain are not based on available empirical evidence; they lack credible analysis, and are highly speculative. These discussions deeply suffer from personal biases, political prejudices, and misplaced presumptions. One of the illustrative scenario analyses available in the public domain is reproduced below. In my view, nothing could be more baseless and more speculative than this analysis.

 

In the outgoing 17^th Lok Sabha, the incumbent BJP has 303 members, a strong majority. In the preceding 16^th Lok Sabha, the BJP had 281 members with its NDA allies having another 71 seats.

The preceding UPA government was arguably much weaker with no single party having a majority of its own. Regardless, the performance of USDINR and Nifty was better during 2004-2014 compared to the 2014-2024 period.

·         Sensex yielded a return of 15.5% CAGR during the UPA regime (2004-2014), while the Sensex return has been ~12.2% CAGR during the NDA regime (2014-2024).

·        USDINR had weakened at a pace of 2.7% CAGR during 2004-2014; while it has weakened at a pace of 3.5% CAGR during 2014-2024. 

On the social and economic reforms front also there is no empirical evidence of weaker governments doing worse than the stronger governments in the past four decades.

In my view, the market does witness heightened volatility during general elections, but there is no empirical evidence to establish a direct correlation between market performance and the form and constitution of the ruling political dispensation in India.

…to continue tomorrow

 In my view, the stock market outlook in India, in the short term of one year, is a function of the following seven factors: